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For all those who dream and dare to go higher, faster, further, and reach for more.

I like to be involved in things that change the world. The Internet did, and space will
probably be more responsible for changing the world than anything else. If humanity
can expand beyond the Earth, obviously that’s where the future is.
– Elon Musk
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ABSTRACT
A growing concern for human society is the question of technology, how they
are to be used and how can they best be governed. The very question of whether
technology is governable remains for the most part unexplored. This work will seek
to examine these important questions. By utilizing a historical institutional
perspective, two case studies of the governance of technologies that have emerged
in the last century will be explored. Space Exploration technologies and the
advanced networking of computers known as the Internet will serve as the case to
illuminate the question of governing technology. Deep qualitative functional analysis
of both the primary and peripheral institutions will provide insight into how
technology is governed in theory and in practice, as well as how institutions are
created and change over time. By moving beyond questions of governance for
states and societies, this work will attempt to contribute to the literature of political
science as the study of governance broadly speaking. This work will contribute to
and speak to newer works on the governance of non-explicitly political realms, as
opposed to more traditional approaches to the study of governance, perhaps
allowing new insight and avenues of research into both the question of technology
and governance more broadly. Distinct policy prescriptions will be created to both
better govern these particular technologies as well as lay the foundation for effective
institutional governance of technologies in the future.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF ACTION
“The full cosmos consists of the physical stuff and consciousness. Take away
consciousness and it’s only dust; add consciousness and you get things, ideas, and
time.” – Neal Stephanson, Anathem
Prologue: Shackling Atomic Fire
At approximately 21 seconds after 5:29am MWT on July 16 th, 1945, following
light rains in the previous few hours of the early morning, the pre-dawn sky over
Alamogordo, NM erupted in the brightness of thousands of suns. This exact moment in
time signaled both the culmination of years of government directed innovation and the
beginning of a new epoch of human existence. The Trinity test demonstrated that
mankind had achieved the technological prowess to tear atoms apart and release
nuclear fire on the world. Ever cynical, the scientists responsible for this event were said
to have taken bets in the hours preceding this moment on the outcomes of this test,
ranging from a complete failure to the ignition of the Earth’s atmosphere and the
subsequent death of all surface life. The outcome of the test, a 20 kiloton explosion and
the accompanying nuclear fireball exceeded the predicted yield of 8 kilotons, allowing
Isidor Isaac Rabi to collect the pool with a bet of 18 kilotons. Yet these scientists and
their efforts, collectively known as the Manhattan Project, succeeded in producing a
novel technology before their enemies and accordingly set the pace for the next era of
political interactions between world powers. Within the next month the output of this
program of induced innovation would be unleashed upon the world twice more, this time
producing catastrophic destruction and loss of life on civilian populations.
While much of the frenetic pace of research under the Manhattan Project was
driven by fears that Nazi German researchers would develop this technology first, the
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culmination of the project occurred after the war in Europe had ceased. The dissolution
of the Nazi regime and the subsequent realignment of scientists and research projects
between Axis powers, known to Americans as Operation Paperclip pushed
technological research to new limits in the coming decades, with research into
aeronautics taking a massive steps forward. In the Soviet Union, research rapidly
expanded on nuclear sciences based both on the introduction of new scientists as well
as espionage, resulting in the August 29, 1949 detonation of the first non-American
nuclear weapon. From this point on, international relations would be heavily influenced
by a multiplicity of technological factors, and technology would also come to be
impacted to a much higher degree by politics.
As the bipolar world of the Cold War developed, a new international institution
was created to avert the need of large-scale wars from ever erupting again. The United
Nations, established in 1946, would serve as a forum for the nations of the world to
settle their conflicts in a peaceful, diplomatic fashion, essentially outlawing war. While
these high-minded goals have fallen short many times since then, the UN has allowed
for the creation of other international institutions that expand the realm of governance
beyond simply states and people. These new institutions would attempt to bring states
and peoples together to foster development across the world, with the hopes of creating
a more peaceful and prosperous world. Yet international politics still reigned. In the
early days of the Cold War, the same early days for the UN, saw relations between the
Western powers (dominated by the United States) and the Eastern powers (dominated
by the Soviet Union) sour. The creation of the atomic bomb and the fear of nuclear fire
destroying the world led to both political conflict between the superpowers, and
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eventually, to the creation of new political arrangements to govern the use of these
immensely powerful weapons.
By 1963, several new nuclear capable states had emerged, leading to a
proliferation of live fire atmospheric nuclear tests. Fearing the fallout (both political and
nuclear) the first steps were taken to create and institution governing the testing of
nuclear weapons. Proposed by the Soviet Union and agreed to by the United States
and the United Kingdom, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 represented the creation
of a new institutional framework to govern a technology. Atmospheric, oceanic, and
space-based tests of nuclear weapons would be forbidden, and distinct limits on
underground testing of nuclear weapons would be given distinct limitations.
Interestingly, the next treaty concerning nuclear weapons is found as a part of the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, banning nuclear weapons from being permanently emplaced in
outer space. Following on that treaty, expansion of the nuclear governance regime
would occur next with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. This treaty would
hold that no nuclear state would give the technology of atomic weaponry to another
state, and those states without nuclear weapons would only attempt to gain them for
peaceful purposes. With all but five states being signatories (with potentially four of
these states have nuclear weapons), the NPT has been relatively successful in limiting
the number of states with nuclear capabilities.
During the height of the Cold War the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972
drastically reduced the anti-ballistic missile capabilities of the superpowers, extending
the governance of nuclear weapons to anti-nuclear countermeasures. While upheld
during the Cold War, the United States terminated the treaty in 2002. Further treaties
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would be created to limit the yield of nuclear tests, as well as begin talks on limiting
nuclear arms. These Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would not yield great results due to
the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty would
eliminate nuclear weapons with a range of 500-5500 kms. The end of the Cold War
would see a new era of global nuclear weapons governance emerge, with the United
States and Russia agreeing to limit their offensive nuclear capabilities, as well as detargeting each other with their remaining offensive weapons. With the New START
treaty, both the United States and Russia agree to an inspection and verification regime
for the reduction of stockpiles of active nuclear weapons, as well as intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The strategic nuclear capability of each signatory would be greatly
reduced, although no changes would be made to tactical nuclear capabilities.
In the decades since the Trinity test an elaborate international legal regime has
been crafted to govern the technology of nuclear weapons. During this period the
international system has undergone many changes, resulting in an international system
that has distinctly different characteristics than those of the international system during
the Second World War. What was once a multipolar world has progressed through
bipolar and unipolar phases, and is perhaps once again on the verge of becoming
multipolar. Through these changes the institutions governing the nuclear weapons have
grown and changed as well, but nuclear weapons have not been used for military
purposes outside of testing in all this time. It would appear that the international
institutional regime governing nuclear weapons has been successful and resilient,
capable of dealing with changes in the international political system.
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This brief illustration of the technology of nuclear weapons illustrates several
interesting ideas about technology and governance. First, technology does not evolve in
a vacuum. The Manhattan Project required deliberate action to spur study and
innovation in a new area of science and technology. The context of international conflict
with other advanced nations pursing similar research increases the efforts expended in
research in a field that might have otherwise been slow to develop. Secondly,
technology requires politics and institutions to flourish and be properly utilized. Nuclear
weapons pose an existential danger to humanity, and as such distinct international rules
and norms have been adopted to prevent their use and proliferation. While there may
be some lapses, for the most part these norms and rules, as enacted by international
treaties, have prevented the use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1946. Finally, while
we typically think of international institutions in the context of governing people or
money, they are capable of providing governance structures for a much wider variety of
human activities. Nuclear weapons fall firmly within the realm of international security,
but also stand on their own as an independent technology capable of being used for
peaceful purposes, namely power generation.
As this is being written talks are underway with the Iranian regime about
governing nuclear technologies in that country. While the primary concern from outside
Iran stem from issues about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a complete
moratorium on nuclear activities is not feasible due to the potential for Iran to use
nuclear power to provide electricity to their citizens. While it is clearly a matter of
international security that is driving this discussion, the technology of nuclear
weaponry/power generation is central to this discussion. As technologies become more

5

prevalent, giving greater power to smaller groups of people, these discussions should
only become more common in international society.
The Question
Politics is rapidly changing in today’s contemporary world. Although politics is
always under a state of flux, the politics of the last several hundred years seem to be
shifting more than has been previously understood. The Westphalian world of nationstate and international power politics, while still highly relevant, has been claimed to be
breaking down (Newman, 2007). The world that is emerging perhaps does not orient
itself with the traditional problems of states disputes over resource allocation. While all
politics essentially boils down to resource allocation, the players in this dispute are in
flux, along with the medium of conflict. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the socalled “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992), states have lost their place as the sole major
actors in the world system. Non-state actors, from corporations to international terrorist
groups have begun to play large roles in the shape of the international system. And
while power is still important to the system, the definition of power is also in flux. From
traditional understandings of power as military might and the industrial capacity to
support warfighting, cultural persuasion has also joined the discussion as a type of soft
power that can be wielded to great effect. (Nye, 2004)
A large part of this shift, both in the definition of power and in the efficacy of nonstate actors can be attributed to the increasingly rapid evolution in technology over the
last several decades. Communication and transportation technologies have resulted in
the compression of both subjective time and space of a global human existence
(Harvey, 1989). Modern economics and international politics have become predicated
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on a technological society reliant on innovation and the emergence of new and novel
technologies. Yet as the brief illustration of nuclear weapons shows, these technologies
often require governance, typically taking the form of international institutions.
These considerations lead to the following major research question for political
scientists: How can technology best be governed? Simply put, this question serves as
the major research question for this entire work. While this question might seem
peripheral to mainline political science, the growing role of technology in our society as
an area of activity separate from simple economic or social uses begs the examination
of technology as a political object. That is to say, technology viewed as something to be
governed and something that impacts governance. Using a comparative approach, this
work will seek to address this big question in at least some respects, as well as some of
the issues that emerge with the governance of new and emerging technologies.
Understanding that the political process is still dominated by nation-states and their
international institutions, the role played by these actors, as well as non-state actors,
serves as an excellent jumping on point for the study of the governance of technology.
While technology may fundamentally alter the international political system going
forward, we would be best served by examining technologies that have in the last
several decades come to fruition, allowing time for an institutional governance regime to
be created and tested. This historical institutional focus should allow us to use lessons
learned from the past to prepare ourselves for the problems of the future.
As an illustration of the importance of being able to govern technology, and the
international imperative to do so, over the course of the last several decades, attempts
have been made to limit mankind’s impact on the climate. As this is a question of
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technology, and is a problem of international scale, many different attempts and
approaches have been tried to govern a wide variety of technologies that potentially
negatively impact the climate. Yet in this time little true success has been found in
attempting to govern the use of technologies that possibly cause anthropogenic climate
change. The very question of which technologies to govern has yet to be settled. Yet in
the closing months of 2015 in Paris, another attempt to combat climate change through
governmental means will take place. It is clear that this is a matter of governing
technology, but the methodology of this governance is still up for heavy and heated
debate. Perhaps some lessons could be learned by examining technologies that have
already been successfully governed at the international level, even if circumstances and
contexts vary widely.
By examining the attempts that have been made to govern space exploration and
the Internet, new insights into the problem of governing technology should be gained.
Representing some of the most important and recognizable technological achievements
of the past century, each of these cases follows a somewhat related path as that of
nuclear weapons, and even intertwine their own technologies with those of nuclear
weapons. All of these technologies began life as projects with distinct national interests
of a military nature, with the government playing a leading role in pushing research and
development into the technology. They have all subsequently found life outside of their
originally planned role, be it as power generation source, a private commercial and
exploration medium, or as the engine of a massive economic and social boom. And
most importantly for the purpose of this work, they have all required an international
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institutional framework to govern their functioning and interaction with society, whilethe
institutions have dramatic differences in a comparative context.
While this work is primarily to be focused on questions of the governance of
technology, by focusing on and comparing the institutions governing space exploration
and the Internet the black-box of international institutions can also be opened up and
examined. Taking a direct look at the processes involved in crafting new institutions
should yield interesting insights. While much emphasis has been placed on the results
of having good institutions, much less of an emphasis has been placed on how to create
these institutions. This situation is especially true when dealing with international as
opposed to national level institutions. By holding the object of governance constant,
experimentation on institutional composition should be possible. The end result should
allow for the comparison of international institutions. Recognizing that these institutions
exist within a context of political, social, and institutional arrangements should also allow
for a more comprehensive approach to the study of international institutions. Perhaps
these approaches will lead to new insights on the comparative constitutional
engineering of international institutions, exposing new avenues of research for scholars
of international institutions.
It should be noted that while this is primarily a work of political science, working
within the traditions of comparative politics, international relations, and political
economics, it does push out at the margins to a degree. That is to say that a more
interdisciplinary approach has been applied. History, sociology, political science,
economic, all of these disciplines have at least some representation in this work.
Perhaps this work would best be understood in the terms of science and technology
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studies, but with an explicitly political angle. While the trend recently is for extreme
specialization within a narrow discipline, there are still important questions that require
an interdisciplinary worldview. Technology, once out of the laboratory and into the
hands of actual humans, appears to be one of these areas needing a wide approach, at
least in its current position in human activity. As such, this work will treat technology and
its governance as a political question, but with the recognition that other social science
disciplines have much to say about the subject.
Plan of Action
In order to answer the big question about the governance of technology, careful
research will have to be conducted with an eye towards the evolution of institutions.
While technology has been governed at the national and sub-national levels (e.g.
Murmann, 2003), with widely varying results, for the purposes of this study, research will
be conducted at the international level. Future work will be able to examine these
questions from an empirical and quantitative approach, but this work will examine this
question from a qualitative, case-study based approach. These case studies, space
exploration and the Internet will hopefully provide insights into the governance of
technology that can prove useful to policymakers as well as provide new avenues of
research for academics. With these particular cases, we can also examine the causes
of retarded development in space exploration and what has caused the Internet to
become so widely adopted and embedded in nearly all aspects of human activity.
This study will continue in chapter 2, examining the current literature on
institutions. Particular attention will be paid to the literature on institutional impacts on
developmental outcomes, a very close parallel to the question of governing technology.
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The research on international institutional development will be highlighted. Previous
work on the question of technology will also be explored, laying out a path for research
into the governance of technology. Although the question of technology has been
previously examined from philosophical as well as industrial/economic approaches,
political elements of technology will be highlighted. The inductive, narrative
methodology derived from a historical institutional approach will be introduced. The two
cases for this study will be justified apart from their inherent interesting properties,
focusing on the least similar case selection model. The model of subversion of
institutions will be explained and will serve to inform the thick descriptions to follow.
From this point, the main body of this work will begin. The following 6 chapters
will comprise two mirror image case studies following a similar trajectory. The first part
of each case study will be fairly functionalist in nature. A direct examination of the
dominant institution governing each technology will be conducted, with a brief historical
note to place the institution in its context. These chapters serve as the foundation for the
case studies as wholes, but do not reflect the entirety of the institutional structures for
the technologies. The second part examines this wider institutional context, placing the
primary institutions at the center of a constellation of institutions, each playing a distinct
role in governing the technology. Each institution is examined on its own as well as in
the context of the wider institutional governance structure, with particular emphasis
placed on the relationship between the peripheral and core governance institutions. The
final segment of the case study deals with questions of subversion. Each case study,
and for that matter most institutions in general, experience attempts at subversion. The
manner in which the institutions of the case study weather and respond to these
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subversion attempts has a great bearing on the evolution of these institutions, and
deserves special focus on its own. These subversions will be examined in light of the
subversion model presented in chapter 2. These three parts are seen in both case
studies, while the particular players vary to a significant degree.
More specifically, Chapter 3 begins the case study on space exploration. By
focusing on the formal institutions governing space exploration, namely the five UN
administered treaties collectively known as the Space Treaties, a better view of how
states create international institutions can be gathered. These five treaties, starting with
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and ending with the Moon Treaty of 1979 are all
predicated on the notion of scientific commons. This concept will be explored, as it
underpins the treaties and has served to direct the types of activities mankind can
pursue in relation to outer space. Most of this chapter is dedicated to understanding
OST 1967, as further treaties build heavily on the work conducted in that treaty. Chapter
3 concludes by examining the strengths and weaknesses of the institution of the space
treaties.
Chapter 4 examines the other institutions that play a role in governing mankind’s
activities in outer space. Included in this chapter are the United Nations Office of Outer
Space Affairs, the International Telecommunications Union, the World Meteorological
Society, and INTELSAT. Each of these institutions plays or has played a distinct role in
executing the day-to-day governance of outer space activities. While each institution
may have a distinct competency in governing outer space, taken together, there are still
large areas of space exploration that remain under or ungoverned. The patchwork
nature of this governance structure is highlighted, illustrating the need for a central
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coordinating agency with real authority at the multi-national level to coordinate the
governance of outer space.
Chapter 5 deals with attempts to subvert the institutions governing space
exploration. In this case the focus is on non-state actors attempting to change the
institutional structure to benefit themselves. In the case of space exploration, one of the
major goals of the institutions, as stated by the primary parties to space exploration and
noted in Chapter 3, is dissuading the introduction of new actors in the space exploration
system. Yet these actors have emerged through the processes explored in this chapter.
The primary processes through which this occurs are privatization and
commercialization of outer space activities. Each of these processes is defined and
examples are given. For privatization, the Russian Space Agency and INTELSAT are
used as examples of the process. For commercialization, the entire process of
commercial space exploration, spurred on by the Ansari X-Prize, is examined and
special attention is paid to Space-X as a primary example of the commercial space
industry. The impact of these two processes on the institutions governing space
exploration is examined, with potential for change to the system discussed.
Chapter 6 begins the case study of the institutional governance of the Internet.
This case, as well as this chapter, has significant differences compared to the other
functionalist institutional chapter (chapter 3). Whereas space exploration has a series of
treaties that can be examined in a very functionalist manner, the institutions of the
Internet appear to be more organically developed, as opposed to negotiated at the
international level. Therefore the process of the development of ICANN is the primary
subject of this chapter. Once the process of creating ICANN, the multistakeholder
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governance model of the Internet through these institutions is examined. Relying heavily
on corporate governance documents, for ICANN is both an international institution and
a private, not-for-profit corporation, this chapter seeks to understand how a private
corporation can be responsible for the governance of a public good like the Internet.
Chapter 7, heavily reflecting chapter 4, examines the other institutions that play a
role in governing the Internet. While the dominant question of governing the Internet is
setting standards and controlling the Root Domain Name Servers, many other issues of
governance surround the Internet. This chapter examines these other institutions and
the role they play in solving questions of Internet governance. Their relationship to
ICANN is also scrutinized. In particular questions of Intellectual Property management
are probed, relying on the World Intellectual Property Organization as a primary
institution. The ITU is also inspected for the important role played in setting standards
for the technical operation of the Internet. Finally, the role played by the United States’
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, a division of the
Department of Commerce, is examined, as technical authority over Internet Assigned
Names and Number rests with this group. The interaction and relationship between
these institutions and ICANN is researched, showing that the Internet is much more
thoroughly governed and administered than space exploration
Chapter 8 deals with the subversion attempts on the institutions of the Internet.
As the Internet is essentially governed and operated by private entities, in the trust of
the public, these attempts at subversion are shown to come from more traditional
sources, namely states and international organizations. While the subversions at the
international level are shown to be relatively benign, and perhaps will result in a more
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open and better administered Internet, the national level assaults on the Internet’s
governing institutions and the Internet itself are more insidious and potentially damaging
to the Internet. For international subversions, The World Summit on the Information
Society and the Internet Governance forum serve as examples. The BRICS cable is
also presented as a possible attempt at subversion. At the national level, Iran’s “Halal
Internet”, China’s “Great Firewall” and the United States and UKUSA’s surveillance
networks as exposed by Edward Snowden serve as our examples. The process of
Internet Balkanization is also inquired into and shown to be a potential problem for the
Internet as it currently exists.
Finally, Chapter 9 attempts to tie all of these disparate threads together, directly
comparing these two case studies. From this comparison, many intersections and
divergences are highlighted. Interesting lessons learned are derived, potentially
answering the questions raised in Chapter 2. All of this eventually leads to distinct policy
prescriptions. Some of these give advice for space exploration or the Internet
specifically. Others of the prescriptions deal more broadly with questions of governing
technology. Lastly, some of these prescriptions deal with the creation of international
institutions as a whole. Lessons for academics and potential future avenues for
research are proposed as well.
It is my hope that this overview has stirred interest in the question of the best
way to govern technology, as well as the particular cases that will be presented ahead.
Although this work does not neatly sit within the mainline of political science, interesting
findings from the study of technology, as well as these particular cases should fill in
some of the gaps that currently exist in the study of institutions. Politics should be
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concerned with more than voting, wars and foreign aid, and this work could perhaps
expand the study of governance beyond that admittedly reductio ad absurdum take on
political science. Technology has both extreme promise for progress and development
of the human race and extreme threat for the ability of individuals and small groups to
affect massive destruction. As technology become more important and embedded in
human society we must both treat it as something governable and learn how to govern
it, lest it be too late and the dark and destructive side of technology becomes
unleashed.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE SELECTION
“The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is
not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' –Isaac Asimov
Political Science is a discipline primarily focused on the study of systems of
government, but the overwhelming focus on these types of governments is on the those
systems of government that govern people and populations. Yet many other realms of
human activity also require governance, ranging from business enterprises to sporting
activities. While much of the study of these governance structures has been conducted
in other academic disciplines, political scientists still have an overarching interest in the
understanding the functioning of these different institutional types; lessons could still be
learned from the other types of governance to be applied to the realm of the purely
political. As pointed out by Giovanni Sartori, among others, the structures and
incentives created by institutional arrangements can lead to vastly differing outcomes
(Sartori, 1994). As this work seeks to understand the formation and operation of
international institutions, as well as those institutions that specifically govern things (in
this case, technology) as opposed to people, this chapter will examine the current and
relevant literature on institutional structures, finding gaps in the literature that this work
will subsequently attempt to fill.
The literature review will examine not only the literature on institutional impacts
on outcomes, but also the literature on international institutional formation as well as
institutional change. While these literatures are focused primarily on governmental
structures for national and international governance, an examination of the impact of
institutions on economic and business outcomes will also take place. The importance of
understanding governance structures for non-political entities will be highlighted. From
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the gaps in the literature that will emerge, the major research question of how to best
govern technology will be broken into three distinct lines of questioning. Finally, the
selection of case study will be explained and the comparative method of this work will
be justified. The foundations for the two case studies in this work will be laid out to allow
for conclusions about international institutional formation, change, and the governance
of technology to be drawn.
Literature Review
Within political science, the study of institutions is a foremost concern, and more
specifically the study of institutional formation is an endeavor of great importance.
Understanding how institutions take their shape and the impacts these institutional
structures have on outcomes is a key concern for a large swath of the works studying
governance. It should be noted for the sake of this literature review, “institutions” and
“organizations” shall be treated as basically interchangeable, although several authors
assert that distinct nuances exist between these different terms (North, 1990, Hodgson,
2001, Leftwich, 2007 etc.), merely for the sake of expediency. Also, when institutions
are referred to in this work, they may be either formal or informal (Hodgson, 2001;
North, 1990), as the interaction between both types of institutions is important to the
study of political processes of institutions (Lauth, 2000). While norms might be
considered to be a part of institutions, for this work the conception of culture as an
institution will be denied. Norms will serve as the linkage device between culture at the
international and national level, and institutions.
It has been borne out by the literature that institutions are primarily shaped by
political processes, and as noted specifically by James Robinson “…comparative
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institutions [are] ultimately about politics and political institutions, since politics is
precisely about how society decides on the things that affect it collectively” (Robinson,
2002: 511). These institutions can be created by cooperation between states
(Weingast, 2002; Shepsle, 2006; Sanders, 2006; Keohane and Nye, 2012, etc.) to
achieve collective goals and mutual benefits (Greif, 1993; Russett and O’neal, 2001,
etc.), or may be the product of states themselves seeking to accomplish either national
or international goals. In attempting to understand these institutions, there has been a
focus on the search for the best institutional type (Leftwich, 2007), but the “new
institutionalism” has expanded research in the direction of a more holistic approach of
both formal and informal institutions and their impacts on political processes (Rhodes et
al 2006; Peters, 1999; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006).
Much research dealing with institutions and institutional change has focused on
the politics in developed and stable polities of a generally democratic bent (Moore,
1966; Skocpol, 1979; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Rothstein, 1996; Thelen,
1999; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; etc.), but some more recent work has begun to focus
on development in non-democratic states (Booker, 2000; Gandhi, 2010; Levitsky and
Way, 2010, etc.). Both of these research avenues are predicated on the notion that
states must establish stable and sustainable political institutions in order to succeed
(Huntington, 1967; Apter, 1966; Rawls, 1971). Leftwich (2007) points out this very
problem, that most of the work that has been conducted on the development and impact
of institutions has been done within stable societies, and those that have focused on
revolutionary change still keep their focus on historical events within currently stable
societies (e.g. Moore, 1966; Huntington, 1967; Scokpol, 1979 etc.). In answer to this
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problem a new push in recent decades to “bring politics back in” has been driven by
non-political scientists to begin examining the importance of political processes on nonpolitical realms such as economics and market failures (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2002, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, 2012; Becker, 1986). Leftwich
(2007), working again from an outsider’s perspective examining the question of political
science and the study of institutions, notes that much of the policy world (best
exemplified by the World Bank) attempts to remove political considerations and the
political science community focuses largely on macro-institutional issues like state
formation, nation-building and democratization to the detriment of the politics of
institutional development.
Within comparative politics, the vast majority of work on institutions that has been
discussed thus far is focused on institutions as an independent variable. Institutions
cause outcomes, and are not themselves the outcome. This leaves a significant gap in
the literature, one that requires departure from the standard operating procedures of
institutional work. International relations theory supplies many interesting perspectives
on the creation of institutions, focusing on rational development and design of
international institutions. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) provide a series of
interesting conjectures laying a roadmap for research into rational institutional design.
The work on rational institutional design anchors an entire special volume of
International Organization (55,4. 2001). Many of the conjectures laid out in that work
will inform the design of the case studies within this dissertation. Of particular
importance are the elements of membership, scope, centralization, control and
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flexibility. These elements will be crucial in case selection, as a least similar model will
be adopted for this work.
Yet even this literature from international relations has its limit. The literature on
public bureaucracy, as exemplified by Terry Moe (1989, 1990), points out that
competing interest groups have different goals within an organization. Institutions are
the product of their political environment (Moe, 1989). In the way that these institutions
allocate resources, distinct interest groups will attempt to create the institutions in the
way that best serves their interests (West, 1997). Yet the question remains where these
interests originate. To answer this question a framework of understanding from the
constructivist literature will be useful. Wendt (1991,1999, 2001) finds that many of the
large structures that typically define relations between states are themselves
constructed in a social context. While his most famous work, “Anarchy is what states
make of it”, deals with the structure of anarchy, in the aforementioned volume of
International Organizations (55, 4. 2001) he critiques the purely rational approach to
institutional design.
Wendt (2001) points out this problem of political science lagging policymakers in
understanding the institutional creation process. The process of institution creation is, in
the view of Wendt, not a rational process. The problem is that most of the work on
institutions takes actors and structures as given. Applied to the body of literature that
has been examined thus far, this critique appears to be quite valid, and leads to the
conclusion that truly to understand how institutions are created, a greater focus must
be placed on the international structure and actors involved in the creation of the
institution. The question of normative context must also be considered for institutions, in
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that institutions convey the norms of their creators in the creation process, as well as
the norms the creators wish to cascade across the community.
It has become clear that even with a widespread neglect of work on institutional
development itself, institutions play a significant role in the political and economic
development of states. A wide variety of economics literature has shown through
quantitative research that institutions impact national economic development (Zysman,
1994; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Aron, 2000, Acemoglu et al 2000; Rodrik, 2004,
IMF, 2005, etc.), broadly finding that strong institutions can lead to better developmental
outcomes. More recent works of political economics have examined the specific
processes at work in more focused case studies. Mahoney (2010) examines in great
detail the impact of institutions in the colonial and postcolonial development of Spanish
America; showing not only that institutions do matter for development, counter the
geographical determinist approach of Diamond (1997), but that institutions are capable
of change resulting in different developmental outcomes. Vivek Chibber (2003) focuses
on the dual cases of India and South Korea exploring the role of institutions in late
development and industrialization. Much like the work on the so-called “developmental
state” (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Leftwich, 2000; Doner et al, 2005, etc.) the importance of
particular institutions (namely nodal agencies and export-oriented industrialization) on
successful development outcomes is highlighted.
Yet it is not only the “developing world” that is subject to institutional impact on
development, as highlighted by Thelen (2004). Western nations developed their
institutional arrangements in certain social and cultural contexts leading to different
varieties of capitalism delineated by their institutional arrangements (Hall and Soskice,
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2001; Esping-Anderson, 1990). These differences in capitalism and democratic
institutions can also have a distinct impact on the types of outcomes witnessed even in
developed states. While this leads us back to a very Putnam-esque (1993) question of
what comes first, the culture or the institutions, it remains clear that culture and
institutions are interrelated, and that institutional arrangements lead developmental
outcomes.
Much of the work discussed up to this point has been primarily functionalist in
nature, that is to say being concerned with how the institution functions and the
outcomes produced by the institutions. While a functionalist approach is useful,
especially in the case of first attempts at understanding new institutions, Haggard
(2004) suggests that we must look beyond the function of institutions to examine the
political processes and structures that have formed these institutions. Some important
historical works have been conducted to examine the political processes that support
institutions, predominantly of an economic variety (Grief, 1993, etc.). Even the currently
dominant economics institutions such as the World Bank and IMF have acknowledged
that the role of politics and power in governmental and economic performance is a
leading factor in outcomes (Levy and Manning, 2002; Dahl-Ostergaard, et al 2005;
DFID, 2005). Leftwich (2007) points out that institutions themselves exist to support
policy, and therefore political goals, even if his major focus is on economic institutions.
Abbot and Snidal (1998) examine why states pursue the creation of international
institutions, finding that international organization can aid state goals of distribution and
norm creation. Putnam (1986) demonstrates that political action must play out
simultaneously at the level of the international institution as well as domestically.
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Institutions can also extend beyond the mere service of political goals and begin
to serve their own interests as well, becoming “sticky” or “path dependent” (Pierson,
2000), but may also evolve and change over time due to internal political activities
(Chang and Evans, 2005). Institutions may be subject to outside pressures to change,
especially as the external balance of power begins to shift (Thelen, 2004). The political
pressures played out surrounding institutions typically fall into several categories
(Leftwich, 2004), politics as government, politics as class conflict, economics of politics,
and politics as a process. All of these politics are subject to the level at which they are
played out, be it games about the rules (constitutional issues) or games within the
rules(normal politics) (Lindner and Rittenberger, 2003). For the purposes of the work at
hand, the major focus will be on the games about the rules, or the decision-making
political process about institutional formation. Another major focus will be on how the
various institutions of governance compete with each other to exert power over a given
area of policy.
Power is another major factor that impacts institutional creation and operation,
and as such has been a major focus for political scientists over the last several decades
(Lukes, 1974; Poggi, 2001; Weber, 1964; Dahl, 1957, etc.). First, the traditional firstlevel power as per Lukes (1974) comes into play with the interaction of states in the
formation of institutions. The cultural climate of the day will be heavily influenced by
traditional power distribution of actors in the creation of institutions (Gilpin, 1981).
Economic, military and ideological powers come into play for these considerations. This
would especially be the case under certain eras of institutional creation where nationstates hold more authority. Another type of power, infrastructural power, will also be of
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great importance in understanding how institutions come to be, particularly in the case
of institutions that manage infrastructures (Lem, 2013).
Another interesting concept that has captivated political science but which is to
be applied in a different manner in this work is the concept of the state. Once the state
was brought back in (Evans, et al, 1985), the institutional structures governing people
and lands were once again a focus for research. The ideas of governance and state
capacity were heavily explored by those interested in political economic development
(World Bank, 1997, 2000; DIFD, 2001, etc.), with the focus being on the impact of a
strong state on political economic outcomes within the territorial boundaries of the state.
States themselves have goals and serve as more than simply the stewards of their
lands and peoples, often coming into conflict with those being governed (Bates, 2001;
Tilly 1975, 1992). While these states have goals of administration within their own
territory, they are not the top-level of the international system. Instead they are also
players at the higher international systemic level (Russett and O’neal, 2001; Watson,
1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Baldwin,1993, etc). It is this treatment of states as
actors in a system that will be of importance to the work at hand.
As political scientists, we have become heavily focused on the idea of the state,
be it as actor or sovereign, but it has become clear that non-state actors also play
significant roles in the contemporary world system (Hoffman, 1998, etc.). This new view
that states are not the only or necessary actors in the international system has opened
up new avenues to understand how institutions can be crafted. One interesting new
avenue that has been sorely underexplored in the political science community is the
idea of the multistakeholder model (Utting, 2001). This model of governance allows for
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more than states to participate in political and policy discussions without a hierarchical
distribution of power, allowing for a wider range of voices and inputs to be heard.
Studies in not being governed and anarchy have also been conducted, most
prominently by James Scott (1997, 2009, 2012, etc.). It is clear that while we focus on
the study of governance, we as political scientists should look beyond the state model,
as enduring as it has been, for it might not always be the most important form of
governance.
Understanding the basic concepts of national institutions, power and states, it
now becomes possible to move up a level of analysis and examine international
institutions, as opposed to the previously discussed national level political institutions.
Similar processes as national institutions should be at work in the international level, yet
there appears to be a relatively large gap in research on the creation and evolution of
international institutions. Apart from the work on international economics institutions, the
majority of work has focused on the role played by international institutions in security
issues. While the UN has been examined rather extensively as a third party in internal
conflicts (Oruci, 2012; Fortna, 2004), most of these studies have focused on the role
played by UN Peacekeepers in prolonging or shortening conflict, as well as on human
rights abuses committed by the blue hats themselves (Smith and Smith, 2010). Larger
questions about the role to be played by institutions in an era of change in the
international system are addressed by Newman (2007). Newman examines the
question of multilateral action in a post-Westphalian system, and finds that there is a
choice to be made by actors: to act within formal multilateral institutions or to operate in
ad hoc multilateral coalitions. While he specifically focuses these questions on issues of
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collective security, these questions seem readily extendible to other realms of
cooperation.
The focus on international institutions appears to fall under two main categories:
generalist transnational institutions and specific interest institutions. The generalist
transnational institutions are best represented the United Nations, ASEAN and the EU.
The primary and usually sole actors within these institutions are nation-states
themselves, and the activities conducted are typically of a general nature. These
institutions serve to help coordinate activity between states and foster interdependence
under a liberal theoretical framework (Russett and O’Neal, 1993 etc.). Specific interest
institutions are the more common type of institution and have specific mandates for
action and behavior. These institutions can be initiated by a single state or multiple
states, and my have actors other than states as participants. While a wide variety of
these types of institution can exist, and for various purposes, most of these institutions
focus on issues of economics or security (e.g. WTO, NATO, IMF, etc.). For the
purposes of this work, this institutional type will exclude multinational corporations and
non-governmental organizations, as states must play a fundamental role in the creation
and operation of these institutions.
Most work that has occurred on this type of institution has focused on the
security or economic institutions. Yet there is more to be governed, and institutions
affect more than people or economic activity. This work will examine the growing
governance of “things” beginning with a thing of growing importance in human life,
technology. Academics have been exploring the question of technology and humanity
for a quite some time now, but prominently began with the works of Heidegger (1954),
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Lem (1964) and Ellul (1964). These early works examined the very concept of
technology and how humanity interacts with technology as a tool and perhaps
something more. Although these works are of a significantly philosophical persuasion,
they greatly inform current thought on the role of technology in society, and underpin
much of the bioconservative and transhumanist discussions.1
It should be noted that technology exists in a gap of typical understanding of the
world. While the scientific process is typically considered embedded within culture and
society, the application of science manifests in technology. These technologies have
traditionally been treated as part of economic activity, but in recent years this treatment
does not seem accurate. Technology has emerged as a linkage between all aspects of
the traditional political economic triangle (per Weber, 1922). It has also perhaps become
disembedded from society, existing apart from the traditional understandings of man’s
interactions with technology. A deeper understanding of humanity’s relationship to
technology is necessary, and this should be an appropriate realm of inquiry for political
scientists.
From a historical perspective, the interaction between technology and society
has been explored in depth by both McNeill (1982) and Pacey (1990). They find that
technology has played an important role in shaping society, primarily by dictating they
manner in which wars are fought. The technology of war facilitates a shift in the political
economic arrangements of a society to make fighting possible (McNeill, 1982).
1

Bioconservative and transhumanism refer to particular sides in the discussion about
the role of technology in human life and society. Bioconservaties argue that the
inclusion of new technologies should be restrained. Transhumanist argue for the
integration of technology in human society, up to and including in the human body itself.
See the work of Nick Bostrom, Ronald Bailey, Peter A Lawler, and Leo Kass for a much
more in depth discussion of these topics.
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Alternatively the dialogue and trade between world cultures is facilitated by exchange in
new technologies (Pacey, 1990). Collins and Pinch (1998) explore the uncertainty that
is faced by society employing a technology, focusing on disputed outcomes of
technology, and places where failure of technology was in fact an option. This
sociological approach places technology fully in the context of culture and society, and
allows us to remember that technology, as familiar as it can become, always contains
an element of risk.
A more practical approach to the interaction between technology and society
(and specifically politics) occurs in the political economic, neoclassical economic, and
business literatures. This literature typically treats technology as part of the overall
business and economic environment. Responding to Polanyi’s assertions leading up to
his 1944 The Great Transformation, Schumpter (1942) shows the role to be played by
technology and innovation in allowing the capitalist system to survive. Binswanger et al
(1978) explore the notion of Induced Innovation, focusing specifically on attempts by
political bodies to craft institutions that would spur innovation in the agricultural sector.
They widely find that institutions do have a large degree of impact on the development
of new and novel technologies, especially in routinized research and development
based innovations.
There is also some evidence that proper institutions can help spur radical,
disruptive innovations of the Schumpeterian variety. Ruttan (2001) builds on his prior
work with Binswanger to explore the larger process of inducing innovations, finding that
institutions do facilitate the creation and adoption of new technologies. The confluence
of resources, culture, institutions and technologies builds and interacts to induce
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innovation at the national and firm level. Narula (2003) explores the impact of the global
society and globalization on innovation, finding that increased cross-national research
and development can lead to new innovations. He also finds that national institutions
can cause technology to be come “locked-in” to a particular avenue, despite overall
cultural trends, as evidenced by a resource extraction economy in high human capital
Norway.
Both of the previously discussed works, Binswanger et al (1978) and Ruttan
(2001), focus on the national level, dealing specifically with processes inside the United
States, while Narula (2003) deals with the international system as a whole. As has been
shown in previously discussed works, processes function differently under different
social, cultural and political environments. Murmann (2003) exposes this notion to
technology and innovation by examining the nascent synthetic dye industries in England
and Germany in the pre-WWI era of globalization. The contexts of each country led to
vastly different institutions, and subsequently vastly different results. The legal and
intellectual property regimes vary between the cases and, as such, different reward
structures are created. By creating a beneficial reward structure in Germany, as well as
investing heavily in human capital and research and development, Germany was able,
in a very short period, to overcome an initial deficit in synthetic dye innovation to
become the world’s leader in production. Murmann introduces many important concepts
and approaches to the study of the interaction among technology, politics, institutions,
and economic outcomes. Yet his work remains firmly rooted in a distinct historical era
and on one particular niche of economic and technological activity. It will be important to
build on his approach to see if similar process and trends hold up across industries and
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time. This work will attempt to do just that, not just by comparing across national
boundaries, but by comparing institutional structures at the international level against
each other.
As a final interesting work, one with a heavy impact on the work at hand, Krasner
(1991) deals specifically with the political question of communications coordination at
the international level. His examination of the Pareto frontier for the governance of
communication not only in part inspired this project, but deals directly with some of the
second order institutions governing both space exploration and the Internet. He finds
that power and past institutional choices play an important role in the creation of
institutions, often leading to suboptimal results. This piece by Krasner serves to bridge
the divide between traditional international relations, comparisons of international
institutions, and studies of the governance of technology.
Gaps in the Current Research and Research Questions
As should be apparent by this point, some significant gaps exist within current
research on institutions, across several fronts. While many of these lapses in research
will be pointed out, only a handful will be truly addressed in this particular work. The
major areas of concern for research that have not been adequately addressed fall into
several major categories, all of which serve the overall question of the best way to
govern technology. First are the questions about the creation and evolution of
institutions. Second, there exist major gaps in the research into international institutions,
particularly in how they function together in a horizontally integrated context. Third,
there is the question of how institutions change over time. This work will attempt to
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cover questions from all of these categories, while many gaps in research will remain for
future work.
Some important questions about the creation and evolution of institutions are ripe
for being addressed both by this work and others. While we appear to have some idea
about how institutions are created through political processes (as shown in the records
of UN treaty negotiations, among others), the exact nature of the political process that
creates institutions remains murky. National institutions are influenced by the cultural
elements of the state that is creating the institutions (Putnam, 1983, etc.), but is there a
similar influence on the creation of international institutions? As suggested by Wendt
(2001), is it possible that there could be an international culture, and if so where does it
emerge? The literature on Hegemonic Stability theory (Gilpin, 1981 etc.) suggests that a
hegemon creates norms and institutions for behavior. Is that really the case, and if so
can the hegemon change its norms while still in power? This work will seek to address
these questions of institutional development in the first chapter of each case study. The
predicted outcome is that norms for institutional creation will be generated by the
historical and geopolitical factors present at the creation of the institution.
Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a) predict that sets of institutions will
function together to govern within a larger institutional context. While the research along
this vertically nested line of questioning is carried out by Aggarwal (1985), this work will
examine a more horizontal relationship between international institutions. The second
chapter of each case study will examine the interlocking and complementary institutions
that aid in the governance of technologies.
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As to the final set of gaps in the research, as to how institutions change over
time, a particular model of subversion by non-dominant actors within the institutional
framework will be developed. Building on the work of the Stopler-Samuelson Theorem
(1941), as well as Karl Polanyi’s concept of the double movement (1944), the model of
subversion works as follows. In institutional creation, a dominant player, as decided by
the norms of institutional creation at the time of origin for international institutions, will be
given preference by the institution. The non-dominant players will attempt to subvert the
institution to give preference to themselves. If the international norms and power
structures of institutional creation hold, then subversion will fail. If the international
norms and power structures of institutional creation have shifted, then the subversion
will succeed. This model will be examined in the third part of each case study.
As stated in the previous chapter, the major focus of this work will be on the
question of how international institutions govern technology. In order to accomplish this
goal, a comparison of two different technologies will be conducted, looking for
similarities and differences in the way the institutions are created and the outcomes
from these institutional arrangements. The above questions, best summed up as “How
is technology best governed at the international level?”, will be addressed by analyzing
each of the institutions in a historical institutional framework. While technology on its
own might not be overtly political, this question of governance requires a distinctly
political approach. The decision to build an institution at the international level to
regulate technological activities is both political and practical. This work focuses
primarily on the political aspects of these decisions, but also allows for practical
concerns to play a large rule. An inductive approach to actual world events and
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structures will allow for conclusions to be reached. These conclusions, which will be
featured in Chapter 9, can provide ample and fertile space for future work on both
institutions and technology.
While a good deal of functionalist analysis will be employed, it is also important
to look at how these institutions function in the context of the international system. It is
better to see how these institutions develop over time than to simply take a snapshot of
their functioning at one point in time. This approach will allow for the interaction of
individuals, groups, and other institutions to impact and allow for the evolution of the
institutions in question. While agents (in this case primarily states, working in an
international context) do create institutions, they are also influenced by the institution’s
rules and norms of behavior in the subsequent modification of the institutions. As
pointed out by Knight (1991), “institutional development is a contest among actors to
establish rules which structure outcomes to those equilibria most favorable to them”
(p20). The historical institutional approach will allow this work to remain flexible to the
balance of power both nationally and internationally, and the context that causes
institutional evolution, as well as acknowledging the power of ideas in institutional
formation. As Charles Tilly was fond of saying, this will allow us to explore “Big
Structures, large processes, [and make] huge comparisons” (1984).
Case Selection and Justification
The search for two compelling cases of international institutions governing
technology presents some interesting options, along with some vexing obstacles. While
in an ideal world a random selection of technology governing institutions would be used
for this study, in practice there are simply not enough cases to allow for this to occur.
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Also, due to the relative paucity of cases, quantitative work will not be possible at this
time. While many cases of technologies exist, being one of the major distinguishing
features of human society, relatively few of these technologies have had such a large
reaching impact as to require international coordination. A qualitative, historical
institutional approach will allow the cases to be fully explored, perhaps leading to new
avenues of research on the governance of technology that could be conducted in a
more technically rigorous manner moving forward.
Technologies for consideration in this study generally fall into three categories:
transportation, communication and weaponry. This is due, in part, to most other
technologies not requiring a significant international coordination. In order to properly
test the impact of norms in institutional creation, as well as dealing with the problems of
international coordination, the question of power must be controlled for. Power and war
are such large problems, that they will overwhelm any discussion of weapons
technology, maximizing the role played by superpowers and hegemons. This leads to
the disqualification of weapons technologies from consideration as cases. In order to
see the role played by structures and actors, the focus must be placed on more heavily
civilian technologies. The categories of transportation and communication will become
the primary pools of technologies for consideration in this study.
As mentioned above, one of the major obstacles to this study is that
technologies with a far-reaching impact have only rather recently (within the last two
centuries or so) come into existence. While two hundred years appears to be a long
time for the human scale, at the scale of the development of society and technological
progression, this two-hundred-year period places us in the midst of the industrial
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revolution. Many tectonic shifts in society have occurred within this period, and
technology has greatly progressed in a relatively short period of time. Generally,
technologies are governable with local rules and do not require a great deal of
international standardization. The standardization and governance required can typically
be handled internally by the companies or individuals that have created the technology.
A prime example for this phenomenon is the variation in standards for electrical
power delivery. Many different voltages, wattages, and physical plugs have been
adopted around the world, with regional standards emerging either naturally or through
agreements. This problem has been mostly settled without need for a large international
institution, leaving it up to individual travelers to overcome issues that arise with the aid
of travel adapters. Perhaps another obvious example for this problem can be observed
with railroad track gauging, one of the earliest cases of a technology requiring some
degree of coordination across national lines. Many different standards for railroad
gauges exist, but there has been no move to standardize international railroad gauges,
as this is a problem that can be dealt with via a technological fix.
While many different technologies have a large enough international reach to
require some sort of international governance regime, these technologies have only
recently been developed, essentially within the last two centuries, with most major
innovations coming in the last century. The previously mentioned railroad technology
could potentially require an international governance regime, but for the most part has
been able to exist without an overarching regime. Similar is the notion of sea travel,
which has existed for as long as human history exists. It is only in recent years that an
overarching international governance regime, the UN Law of the Seas, has been
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established. Previously, sea travel relied on informal norms of behavior or much more
limited treaties to govern behavior, with little actual governance of the technologies of
ocean going itself.
Apart from transportation technologies, early communication technologies also
present some interesting possible early cases. While some international agreements
regarding postal deliveries eventually coalesced into the Universal Postal Union in 1874
(UPU, 2015), the first major international institution governing a communication
technology is the International Telecommunications Union established in 1865. While
this international institution was initially established to govern international telegram
communications, it would prove to be highly important for the governance of many
different communications technologies that followed. The ITU provides a highly
compelling case deserving of much deeper study, but does not make itself readily
available as a central case study for this work, as it covers a wide variety of
technologies.
To be a valid case for this work, the technologies must be of a rather
consolidated nature, meaning that while they may be highly related to other
technological activities, they must be able to stand on their own as a technological
achievement. The technology must also require international coordination in order to
operate effectively. As an added consideration, the technology should be primarily
civilian, to allow for some freedom in the creation of a governance institution. Nuclear
weapons are one of the most obvious technologies where some sort of international
regime would be important, but due to the almost exclusively military nature that they
have taken on, they have been ruled out as a case, along with the other major weapons
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of mass destruction. Some sort of international institutions must obviously have been
established for this study to be valid for any case, so many of the currently emergent
biological and medical technologies rule themselves out.
The choice remains between selecting cases with a high degree of similarity or
cases that do not have many similar characteristics within the typology of international
institutions governing technology. The major variable will be the type of technology that
is governed, e.g. airplanes, trains, radio, televisions. Both approaches have their merits
and drawbacks; most similar cases would allow us to see the variations put into place
when creating institutions for technologies, but it is also very likely that similar
technologies would build on each other and the institutions would follow suit. For
example, most telecommunications technologies have come to fall under the purview of
the ITU. While this case would create an interesting study into how one institution was
created and evolved over time, as the ultimate goal of this work is to compare
international institutions with each other, a single institutional case will not suffice. This
situation leads to the preference for least similar cases. Radical differences in
technologies should lead to different institutional outcomes, and if not, then much can
be learned overall about how the governance of technology occurs.
Also in play, but of secondary consideration, is that of the time period where the
technology and institutions emerge. One of the major research questions is the effect of
international political context on institutional creation. As most major technological
breakthroughs of the last century that readily present themselves occurred during the
Cold War period from 1946 until the late 1970s, this situation sets one of the major time
periods for study. The second case should come from either before or after the Cold
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War/Modernity period of the international system. While many technological innovations
occurred before the Cold War international system emerged, during what will be termed
the interwar period, these technologies were mostly of the type not requiring large
international regimes, or were of a military application. As such, the period after the
Cold War/Modernity international system, the much better defined Neoliberal
international system, seems a much better time period for case selection.
Using these criteria, the two cases that have been selected are space exploration
and the Internet. It should be noted that while the term space exploration is used in this
case, the implication of a focus on early rocketry and the ‘Space Race’ is not intended.
What would perhaps be better would be the idea of spaceflight, while that too has
implications of simply manned activities in space. And although space exploration has
connotations of scientific activity, commercial, and to some extent, military activity
should also be implied. So while the term space exploration is not ideal, for the
purposes of this work it will suffice. Space exploration represents a technology in the
realm of transportation, perhaps even representing the pinnacle achievement in that
realm that has occurred to this point in history. The technology was brought into full
development during the Cold War and the intricate institution governing space
exploration was also created during this period (Ogunbanwo, 1975). With a distinct,
formal set of international laws and institutions established, space exploration makes an
excellent case for study, and will serve as the base for comparison in the work.
The Internet presents some interesting qualities and extreme differences from
space exploration, as well as some intriguing similarities and overlaps that allow for it to
fit as the second test case for this study. While the roots of the Internet extend back to a
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military research project during the height of the Cold War, the technology has
significant civilian roots at the University of Southern California (Mueller, 2003). The
Internet as it is known and experienced today emerged firmly during the Neoliberal
period, which for the purposes of this study begins in the early 1980s (Kahin and Keller,
1997). Moving ideas as opposed to things, the Internet represents a communication
technology. The institutions of the Internet do not follow a distinctly international and
formal political institutional framework, instead relying on what has been termed the
multistakeholder model of governance (Utting, 2001). The processes involved in the
creation of these institutions should provide a great deal of insight into the decision
making process for crafting international institutions.
Each case study will occur in three parts. The first part shall be primarily
functionalist, examining the primary international institution responsible for governing
the technology. Although attention will be paid to the political elements at play during
the creation of the institutions, the majority of the research will attempt to simply
understand the regime as it was set up initially. Other works (Oganbanwo, 1975;
Mueller, 2003, Mueller, 2007, Denardis, 2009, etc.) have focused specifically on the
political and cultural forces at play in each case study, and are mentioned and highly
recommended reading to further understand the processes in each individual case. But
in the interest of comparison, the focus will remain on the functional elements of the
institutions. This section of each case study will address the question of how to best
form the initial institution to govern a technology, as well as providing insight into the
question of overall institutional formation.
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The second part of the case study will look at the institutional context of the
governance regime. The interactions between the main institution and other institutions
that support the primary institution will be of great importance, as well as the role played
by the peripheral institutions. Using the framework of rational institutional design as a
guide (Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal, 2001b), the horizontal integration of institutions for
governance of technologies will be highlighted.2 This second part will address the
manner in which interlocking international institutions work together to more completely
govern a technology.
Finally, each case study will examine the attempts at subversion faced by each
regime. Using the model based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Polyani’s
conception of the double movement, both cases will be examined for subversion from
non-dominant factors. The question at hand will be how institutions weather subversion
attempts or succumb to subversion, as well as to what degree institutional inertia keeps
the institutions the same. This final part of each case study addresses how the
institutions governing technology can deal with change over time.
The three-stage approach to these case studies will allow the best possible
observation of the cases as they formed and developed. The functionalist chapters will
answer questions about the ability of international institutions to govern technology, as
well as the contextual issues about institutional creation. The more historical institutional
chapters on institutional context will allow a wider lens to be applied in order to answer
questions about reward structures and outcomes of governance. The chapter on
subversion will also take an historical institutional approach, but with a much more
2

An interesting role is found in both case studies for the ITU, something that is
examined in the conclusion.
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refined and focused view on questions of institutional change and evolution in the face
of both external and internal pressures. These case studies should reveal much new
information across a wide variety of questions about international institutions and the
governance of technology. Hopefully, steps can be taken to answer the major question
of this work: How can technology best be governed?
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CHAPTER 3: THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967 AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR GOVERNING SPACE
“They didn’t want it good, they wanted it Wednesday”- Robert A Heinlien
This chapter serves as the first part of the case study for space exploration. In
this chapter, the historical and geopolitical contexts of the creation of the treaties
governing outer space will be explored. Although the major focus lies in the functional
institutional elements of the outer space treaties, the importance of the historical power
dynamics and the impact these have on norms will be highlighted. The early Cold War
era is highlighted as an era of contrasting ideologies: avoiding nuclear war and newly
independent countries asserting their newfound role in international society.
The institutional story of outer space begins in 1957, with two unrelated but
ultimately highly important events. The first is the beginning of negotiations on the
Antarctic Treaty, which was ratified on 1 December, 1959. The second event is the
launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union in October of 1957. While these two
events might not appear to have a great deal in common, both play large roles in the
eventual creation of the international legal regime that governs space exploration.
Without the actual launching of an artificial satellite into space, the theoretical
discussion on the governance of space would have remained in the realm of the
theoretical. And without the structures that were enacted by the Antarctic treaty, the
eventual treaty that was created to govern space exploration, the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, henceforth referred to as either the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 or OST 1967,would most likely have taken an entirely different form.
Taking into account these two crucial events, this chapter will seek to address three
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major questions. First, how did this treaty come to take the form it did? Second, what
does the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 actually govern? Finally, how does OST 1967 and
its other cousin treaties actually go about the day-to-day business of governing outer
space?
Prior to the launch of Sputnik, the question of legal regimes concerned with outer
space was strictly academic, yet with the launch by the USSR, the question quickly
moved from the realm of science fiction into reality. Within two and a half years the
question of governing space was quickly addressed and the decision was made to
explore the construction of intergovernmental organizations to deal with outer space
activities (Miles 1970). While the initial institutional response was to address outer
space issues under the framework of nuclear arms, the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hence forth referred to as COPUOS) was quickly
established and made a permanent feature of the United Nations. By December of 1959
movement was already underway to explore the creation of a permanent treaty on outer
space.
COPUOS and OST 1967
COPUOS was formed with the distinct mandate to create law in regard to outer
space, and as such had to begin immediately addressing problems that were still nonexistent. The committee was tasked with the difficult duty of writing laws for problems
that only existed in the realm of the theoretical. One of the problems faced by
COPUOUS was simply the matter of defining and delimiting outer space (Benko, 1985).
While this might seem a fairly straightforward issue in the first decade of operation,
during which time the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was formalized, the Legal
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Subcommittee of COPUOS “arrived at the conclusion that no scientific and technical
criteria could be found which would permit a precise and lasting definition of outer
space” (Benko, 1985, p121). The very question of defining the limits of outer space
remains unresolved in international law to this day, but has generally come to be
recognized as everything above 60 miles from sea level. While this issue is not the
major focus of the chapter at hand, it does serve to illustrate the various difficulties
encountered in crafting the law on outer space.
With resolution 1721B from the United Nations General Assembly on December
20, 1961, COPUOS took on the cumbersome task of extending international law into
outer space, and in turn began to accept state level submissions on the shape which
space law should take (Forkosch 1982). Over the course of the next two years a draft
on Declaration of Legal Principles was crafted and eventually presented to the General
Assembly for adoption. At this point, however, COPUOS began to take a much more
cautious view of their work. The committee became reluctant to rush the process of
crafting the law, which would govern outer space, and instead began to adopt the “legal
stepladder approach” (Forkosch 1982, p30). This new, cautious approach had the
unfortunate side effect of angering the General Assembly, prompting the committee to
continue work on the draft Declaration of Legal Principles. This rushed draft was quickly
commended for signature in 1966, eventually becoming the Outer Space Treaty of 1967
signed by over 100 nation-states. This treaty was recognized at the time as a stop-gap
measure for later treaties that would truly shape the international legal regime
concerning outer space. While there were subsequently three further treaties adopted
(to be discussed in a later section), OST 1967 still stands as the primary treaty shaping

45

the international law of outer space. The next section will directly address the treaty,
examining the various legal principles enacted to create the current regime.
Legal Principles of OST 67
One historical note should be made before beginning the true study of OST 67,
namely, that the historical period in which the legal regimes for outer space were crafted
is a very peculiar moment in history. While on the surface the Cold War seems to hold
the most sway over any discussion of this era, it is also very important to remember that
this was also the era in which most European and western powers were giving up their
hold on their colonies. The impact that the decolonization period had on the legal
frameworks of OST 67 would perhaps make for very interesting separate future work,
as norms regarding ownership of colonies and non-contiguous national territories were
in flux. For now, however, we must turn the question at hand, the Legal Principles of
OST 67. The treaty fall into roughly four categories to be examined individually:
Ownership and Access, Weapons and Military Activities, Liability and Responsibility,
Notification and Registration, and Rescue and Return of Astronauts.
Ownership and Access
Perhaps the most fundamental role of any institution is to define property rights.
As such, OST 1967 follows on the heels of another UN treaty in the type of property
rights regime enacted in outer space. Both OST 1967 and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959
start with the premise that certain lands and areas should be held as “scientific
commons for all mankind”. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty is as follows:

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
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irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be
the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage
international co-operation in such investigation.
This opening article of the treaty sets the stage for a more complete commons-based
property regime in several ways. First, the treaty places emphasis on the notion that
there should be access of all mankind to outer space, without regard to any level of
difference along scientific or economic lines. This approach creates a situation where all
of humanity should have access to space on a theoretically equal basis. While this
might hold to the high-minded political and ideological aims of COPUOS, it has little to
no bearing on the actual realities of space travel, which at the time was restricted to only
a handful of highly advanced technological and economic societies. With this particular
approach to property rights in outer space a situation has been created where further
down the line any nation-state could possibly (yet highly unlikely) petition for access to
space, even if they do not have the ability to reach outer space on their own. It is
foreseeable that some less developed nation could bring suit against either a space
faring nation or a private space company, which have their own legal issues as well, for
access without being able to pay full price for said access3. An interesting precedent for
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While the author does not necessarily agree that this is a likely outcome, potential
avenues for developing nations to petition for access to space exist. The following is the
text of Article 2 of the1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries “2. States are free to determine
all aspects of their participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of
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this situation could be the current geopolitical conflict concerning mineral use in the
Arctic and Antarctic. (Leighton, 2014) There is also the possibility that a formerly spacecapable nation such as the Unites States could use OST 1967 to gain access to space
for free from another state with space capability. Although this idea may seem ludicrous
on the very face of it, the legal justification could be extracted from the first article of
OST 1967.
Secondly, Article I places a great deal of emphasis on outer space being
available for scientific exploration. The greatest emphasis for the outer space treaty
seems to be on studying outer space. This emphasis is perhaps reasonable in light of
the level of development of space exploration techniques at the time. Very little work
had been done to advance economic interests in space, and COPUOS was an offshoot
of UNESCO, a United Nation body concerned first and foremost with culture and
science. This confluence of prior work, institutions, and era of international politics lead
directly to a particular institutional arrangement for space exploration, one that privileges
scientific exploration as opposed to economic investment. While this institutional regime
is perhaps an offshoot of the earlier Antarctic Treaty, it bears repeating that even
COPUOS believed they were rushed and that the treaty they put forth was ill advised.

outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. Contractual terms in such
cooperative ventures should be fair and reasonable and they should be in full
compliance with the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned as, for
example, with intellectual property rights.” From this, as well as the remainder of the
Declaration special attention towards developing countries and space is to be given.
Already, space faring nations have given access to space to astronauts, cosmonauts,
and taikounauts from non-space faring countries. The author predicts this trend to
continue in the future.
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Yet this treaty serves as the least bad example of policy that could be crafted in such a
short period of time and be deemed acceptable to all signatories (Ogunbanwo, 1976).
While Article I delineates access to outer space, this is not the only aspect of
ownership. Instead we must turn to Article II to gain a more complete understanding of
what property should look like in outer space. Article II is as follows: “Outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” These
thirty words make up the vast majority of property rights that can be held in outer space,
and have caused a great deal of ink to be spilled in frustration over such limitations.
This article is very clear in language and intent, leading to the conclusion that no part of
outer space can be claimed by any nation on earth. While this article does further the
goals of peaceful scientific exploration, it leaves little room for possible economic
activity. The situation is further complicated when one thinks about the possibility of
future colonization of outer space and celestial bodies, a notion that was already in the
common discourse of the time. It would appear that OST 1967 was crafted intentionally
in such a way as to limit economic growth and expansion of property into space, as well
as to limit new entrants into outer space activities, primarily through its treatment of
liability as described in a later section. While this treaty was a rushed first pass at
governance of outer space, the sentiments expressed therein seem to hold in the
subsequent treaties that deal with celestial bodies. This notion of property ownership in
space will be revisited later in this chapter, but for now we must turn to the question of
weapons in space.
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One final note must be made before the discussion about weapons in outer
space can commence. While there has been particular difficulty in actually delimiting
outer space in a legal sense, the concept of a celestial body has not been as difficult to
define. Celestial bodies include all natural objects that are not the earth. As a
consequence of this accepted legal definition, all objects in outer space that are not
man-made or the Earth itself are considered property of all mankind (Ogunbanwo, 1975.
p.95). While this concept is not a particularly difficult to grasp, it does lead to possible
problems further down the road, especially as the likelihood of finding other intelligent
civilizations seems to be increasing. However, discovery and interaction with a nonTerran intelligent civilization would create other, perhaps more pressing matters of law
and treaty for Parties to the Treaty to deal with. This example simply highlights the
difficulties and problems to be found within the current legal framework under which
space exploration and exploitation takes place.
Weapons and Military Activities
While much academic and policy work has been focused on the question of
placing arms, and more specifically nuclear arms in outer space, very little attention is
paid to this problem within OST 1967. Article IV, the relevant article when discussing
arms and military activities in Outer Space, reads as follows :

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct
of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be

50

prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
OST 1967 utilizes very clear language in relationship to the emplacement of nuclear
arms and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. No weapons of mass
destruction are to be put into space in a semi-permanent or permanent fashion. This
understanding does leave room for such weapons to make sub-orbital flights, but no
weapons can be left in space for positioning in the case of war. The treaty also does
not have anything to say about the manufacture of such weapons (Ogunbanwo,
1975p.92). There does appear to exist a series of so called loopholes within Article IV
as was specifically pointed out by Italy in subsequent attempts to amend OST 1967
carried out in 1968, namely weapons could be placed into semi-orbit or on crafts that
are sent into deep space. The so called Three Powers of space, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, clarified that they already believed the loopholes
to be closed by the treaty as written, a situation that satisfied Italy’s needs and the
request for amendment was subsequently withdrawn (Ogunbanwo, 1975. p. 102).
While placement of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in space is
prohibited, the treaty has nothing to say about conventional weapons. A simple iron or
tungsten mass, when dropped from orbit can still have a very large impact without the
negative radiological or biological consequences outside the initial blast radius (Menon,
1987. p.44). Yet given the distinct geopolitical power structure of the day, most policy
concerns were focused on the concept of WMDs, and OST 1967 served as an
extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (Menon 1987, p44). It is interesting to
note that this treaty, OST 1967, served as one of the many and earliest stepping stones
along the road of nuclear disarmament talks, even though the treaty is nominally
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concerned with outer space activities. This concern might be a left over from the earliest
days of international discussion on outer space, which were initially conducted under
the guise of arms control and limitation (Ogunbanwo, 1975).
Moving on from the strictly limited concept of WMDs in outer space, the second
paragraph of Article IV deals more broadly with the concept of militarization of outer
space. This particular paragraph deals dictates a much more limited scope than the
other parts of OST 1967. While most sections refer to outer space, the moon and other
celestial bodies, this paragraph deals only with the moon and other celestial bodies.
This focus is clearly a deliberate choice, opening up orbit and space stations (manmade celestial bodies) to occupation by military forces. This prohibition on military
installation is very clearly modeled after Article I of the Antarctic treaty (Menon 1987,
p44). Yet there exists one particular phrase that opens up military uses in outer space to
less clear interpretation. The phrase “peaceful purposes” when used in conjunction with
the use of military personnel, creates a good deal of confusion about the proper role for
the military in space exploration. While it is clear that military personnel, such as pilots,
can be used for scientific research, as is directly stated by the Article, the true meaning
of “other peaceful purposes” remains occluded.
Two separate approaches exist in the interpretation of the peaceful purposes
clause. First is the nonaggressive approach. This approach, as favored by the United
States of America, is generally held to mean that no use of military force will be allowed
against sovereign states, especially with regard to territorial integrity or political
independence. This leads to the United State possibly putting military astronauts into
space, but these astronauts may not act in a military manner against other sovereign
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nations. The second approach to the peaceful purposes clause, the non-militarization
approach, was that favored by the Soviet Union and many other states. This approach
is much less nuanced, and leads to the demilitarization of space and other celestial
bodies by those who hew to this interpretation. As such, those who hold this view do not
believe that the military should have installations at all on celestial bodies, be they for
peaceful purposes or otherwise.
In order to keep Article IV functioning, another series of articles were enacted,
namely Articles X and XII. Article X reads as follows:
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the
purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis
of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an
opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The
nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it
could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States
concerned.

And Article XII reads as follows:
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable
advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be
held and that maximum precautions may betaken to assure safety and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

The former article makes all launches public, or at the very least open to
observation by any other States Party to the Treaty (hence abbreviated as SPT). This
measure is fairly straightforward and is a non-rigorous attempt to keep all treaty parties
honest and open in their space launches by keeping all events open to outside
oversight. There does exist the caveat that the conditions under which observation of
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launch may occur will be determined by “agreement between the States concerned.”
While this clause does provide for some conditionality for observation to be put into
place, the overall thrust of the Article is to foster transparency in outer space activities.
The latter article deals with visitation to foreign space installations and vehicles
by other treaty signatories. Again, this provision is rather straightforward but is a bit
more rigorous in allowing other parties to the treaty to actually visit space installations
given some “reasonable advanced notice.” What this notice would be has never truly
been determined, as no permanent or semi-permanent installations have ever been
installed on any celestial bodies. The closest that humanity has come to any installation
that would be affected by Article XII are the various space stations that have been
launched. This provision is focused on maintaining safety for any astronauts, as space
travel is currently an inherently risky proposition. The “reasonable advanced notice” and
“appropriate conditionality” are focused on technical concerns regarding safety, not on
any security dilemmas that might occur between SPTs (Oganbanwo 1975. p.105). It is
unusual that this provision has not truly emerged as an issue of contention, as it could
clearly be used by space capable nations to visit other SPT’s space stations. Given
current space capabilities, this article could be cited by the Chinese to gain access to
the International Space Station, a space station from which they were specifically
excluded by the ISS board of governors at the planning stage.
Yet again, as with Article X, the actual enforcement of the clause seems to hinge
on consultation between the parties in play. While there is clearly a sense that parties
should, if not freely, easily allow access to their space based facilities, it does rely in the
end to negotiation between the parties involved to arrive at complete understanding as
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to how access will be given. Yet the interpretation of this conditionality comes down to
conditions of visit as opposed to veto on access (Ogunbanwo, 1975. p.104). Again,
these conditions are more focused on safety and the materiel necessary for visits as
opposed to any vetoes on security concerns. It should also be noted that this Article
does not mention nor include access to satellites. Verification of Article IV in relation to
satellites in orbit would therefore be entrusted to individual nation’s methods of
verification. What this would entail would be left up the nations themselves and falls
outside of the realm of the work at hand. But it is interesting to note that manned
facilities and permanent facilities on celestial bodies are open to visitation and
verification while satellites are left up to verification methods available to individual State
Parties to the Treaty.
Military Activities
When it comes to the legality of military activities in outer space, Hurwitz (1986)
has identified three rights that are held by all space-faring nations. These are the Right
to Exploration, the Right to Self-Defense, and the Right to Overflight. If a military activity
does not fit under one of these rights, then it should be considered an illegal activity.
Several interesting concepts must be addressed to see how this treaty applies to
military activities in space. First, the right to exploration does not seem to be directly
related to military activities in space. Hurwitz identifies 5 requirements for any activity,
military or otherwise, to be considered legal in outer space under the legal regime of
OST 1967 (Hurwitz, 1986. P.55-81). The first of these principles is that any activity in
space must be “For the Benefit and in the Interest of All Countries.” This language is
drawn directly from the text of the first Article of OST 1967. Broadly understood, this
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means that the action must further international peace, promote co-operation and
understanding, and if information is obtained the results must be released to the general
public. The question of whether or not any activity must exclusively benefit all countries,
however, remains in doubt (Goedhuis, 1970. p.27). In direct relation to military activities
in space, this principle seems to denote that the military may only be involved in
peaceful activities, generally related to science and exploration. This principle seems to
rather clarify the role of the military in space, but the inclusion of the other 6 principles,
also derived from Articles I, III, and IV, helps to create a full picture of the role of the
military in outer space.
The second requirement for military activities in space under the right to
exploration as per Hurwitz, states that space activities should be carried out “Without
Discrimination … on a Basis of Equality,” directly quoting from Article I of OST 1967.
Hurwitz does go a step further in his interpretation of this clause, noting that “Equality” is
more of a legal fiction than a political fact. He derives this interpretation from the notion
that states are only equal in deriving benefits that are open to others. This appears to be
a rather narrow, if perhaps reality grounded, reading of the law at hand. But on the
specific notion of military activities in space, these actions should hold to the notion of a
basis of equality. This approach has more to do with the notion that all SPTs should
have equal legal footing in making proposals. No state should be allowed to undertake
military activities in space simply because they wield a technological or military power
advantage. All SPT must be held to the principles of the rule of law as established by
OST 1967.
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The third requirement builds on this notion of respect for the rule of law, making a
deliberate reference to carrying out space activities “In Accordance with International
Law”. Building on Article III of OST 1967, this principle asserts that any military activities
that take place in outer space must hold to international law. While some observers
have noted that respect for international law seems to be taken for granted within OST
1967, this claim can be clearly refuted by the two specific references within the treaty to
acting “in accordance with international law,” seen in Articles I and III. All activities in
space should be held to the scrutiny of international law, including the charter of the UN
and any normal international prohibitions on military action.
The fourth requirement is that any military action in space must be carried out “In
the Interest of Maintaining International Peace and Security and Promoting International
Co-operation and Understanding.” This requirement greatly limits the freedom of the
military to operate in outer space, leaving them only with the role of keeping up
international peace and fostering co-operation. Translated to tangible activities, some
operations could be monitoring of international agreements from space (perhaps giving
legal cover for orbital spy satellites), protecting the world from bolide collisions, and
conducting scientific missions (which seems to be the primary concern for almost all
activities under the treaty).
Perhaps the most important, and the most disputed, of the requirements is that
military activities be carried out “Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes.” This requirement,
as derived from Article IV, is the requirement that has caused the most debate between
the various space powers and SPT. As previously mentioned, the Unites States and the
Soviet Union took drastically different stances on the interpretation of “peaceful
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purposes,” breaking down into the debate between non-aggression and nonmilitarization. Yet more interesting to this debate are the locations where this principle
applies. While all previous principles and requirements applied to outer space and
celestial bodies, this requirement applies only to celestial bodies. This interpretation
leaves open the possibility not only to orbital military space stations, as long as they do
not contain WMDs, but also to space stations at various other points, including but not
limited to the LaGrange points. As previously mentioned, this outcome is considered to
be a deliberate action by COPUOS in drafting the treaty. It should be noted that the
generally accepted interpretation of “peaceful purposes” aligns with the non-military
approach outside of the United States, but that even the then-Secretary of the UN, U
Thant stated that the door was not completely barred against military activity in space.
Right to Self Defense The next major right identified by Hurwitz in relation to the
militarization of outer space is the right to self-defense (Hurwitz, 1986. P. 82). This right
is derived not from OST 1967, but from the UN Charter of 1947. As OST 1967
deliberately mentions that outer space activities must take place in accordance with
international law, especially the UN Charter, Hurwitz derives that a right to self-defense
must exist in outer space. Yet this notion that states have a right to self-defense is not
universally held by all parties in either academia or the policy realm. Many authors,
including Chandrasekharan, Markov and even the Argentine delegate to COPUOS have
explicitly state that the right to self-defense does not apply to outer space, and the
principle of non-military presence in space supersedes even the UN Charter in regards
to the right to self-defense. (Chandrasekharan, 1967; Markov,1968, Ogunbanwo, 1972).
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Hurwitz, however, argues against the strictly non-military interpretation of Article
IV, instead preferring the non-aggressive interpretation as favored by the United States.
As such, he finds that a rather extended right to self-defense exists in outer space. He
finds that states not only have a right to self-defense in space, but that they also have
self-defense rights from space and through space. This interpretation is perhaps the
most expansive right to self-defense that one could derive from OST 1967. The right to
self-defense in space is a rather straightforward affair, meaning that if attacked while in
outer space, states have a right to use military force in defense from these attacks in
space. The right to self-defense from space is a bit more complicated, but from a legal
perspective remains relatively straightforward. States have the right to defend
themselves from attacks that originate or travel through space and reach their home
territories. This defense can take place both terrestrially and in space (perhaps being
extended to the destruction of space-based weapons platforms). The most complex of
these rights to self-defense comes in the right to self-defense through space. This right
involves using space as the medium through which the defensive action takes place.
Given this interpretation, any retaliatory strike or method of interception could travel
through space. As has already been discussed, it appears that SPTs do have the right
to use ballistic weapons that are sub-orbital in nature. This action would appear to be
what Hurwitz has in mind when he discusses the right to self-defense through space
(Hurwitz, 1986).
The right to self-defense in relation to space, be it in, from, or through, is derived
by Hurwitz from both international law, as laid out in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and
from US jurisprudence. While Article 51 is rather simple in its provision of the right of
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states to self-defense, the use of US jurisprudence to create a right to self-defense in
space is a bit more convoluted and controversial. His approach relies heavily on two
cases from the 19th century, both of which focus on maritime incidents. While the
analogue between maritime and outer space is one that is commonly applied, the
particular instances used by Hurwitz might be a bit suspect. The first instance was
decided by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Church v. Hubbart, in which an
absolute right to defense of sovereignty is extended beyond even the sovereign territory
of the state. Daniel Webster furthered this interpretation during the Caroline incident of
1841. These two avenues taken together, both international law and US jurisprudence,
do seem to create a distinct right to self defense, and the qualifications of location
where this defense may take place does not clearly exclude outer space. This matter is
indeed a complex one that has not been cleanly resolved, but Hurwitz does indeed
make a rather compelling argument to support a right to self-defense in outer space.
Right to Overflight The final right identified by Hurwitz that would allow military
activity in space is the right to overflight. This right in one of the most important rights
surrounding space flight in general, as by its very nature, space travel must occur over
the airspace of more than one country. No state on earth is capable of sustaining an
orbital path over its sovereign territory, and as such space flight must encroach over
sovereign airspace in a way that is much more complicated than simple air travel. While
airplanes can simply fly around sovereign claims, orbital paths are much more
determined by gravity and cannot be as simply rerouted. Even on the question of
launching an object into space only a handful of nations would be capable of putting an
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object into space over their own territory.4 The early concerns about overflight were
addressed in several ways.
In the earliest days of space flight, the United States and its facilities in Florida
had a launch path that passed over Santo Domingo and the United Kingdom. The US
negotiated a treaty for access to overflight of these countries during launch. This regime
of almost ad hoc negotiated treaties for overflight quickly gave way to a new paradigm
of third party recognition of overflight rights, especially during the launch phase of a
spaceflight. Yet is perhaps most interesting to note that this new paradigm did not
emerge from specific negotiation, but instead from “tacit consent.” Without this consent
to overflight, tacit or otherwise, it would be impossible to conduct space exploration.
Much like the law in relation to ship travel through territorial waters on the high
seas, the regime for airspace above a sovereign state is divided into several different
areas of legal jurisdiction. The closest to the ground, and the area over which the state
maintains full control, is the so-called “territorial airspace.” The volume above the
territorial airspace, but not quite to outer space is called the “contiguous zone.” While
the state still retains full control over this airspace, any space object may traverse this
airspace freely during take-off and re-entry. Finally there is the area that is free for use
by all and where no nation may stake a sovereignty claim: outer space proper. The
problem of delineation of these areas has been discussed above, but very few claims
and disputes are actually raised in practice. This situation creates a rather

4

United State, Canada, Russia, Brazil, China, India, Japan. It should be noted that
Russia currently launches from Kazakhstan. Canada does not launch from their own
territory either. It is merely the case that these states could theoretically put an object
into space within their own territorial holdings. Once in space their orbital trajectories
must still travel over other sovereign lands.
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straightforward legal regime for understanding the problems inherent in overflight of
other sovereign states with regard to space travel.
With respect to the specific right for military activities to overfly other sovereign
states, Hurwitz argues that since no body exists to rule any particular space launch as
illegitimate, then all launches must be considered legitimate. If a launch were to be
declared illegitimate, and any state were to actually veto said launch, then this veto
would have the effect of preventing development in the field of space flight, something
that directly contradicts the spirit of exploration for all mankind.
The logic employed by Hurwitz appears to be tenuous at best, perhaps relying
too much on extending the principles of self-defense to space flight. While Hurwitz might
overstretch his arguments, his interpretation does seem to stand firm. While his views
on the militarization of space may side with a pro-militarization approach, he does not
find a right to weaponize space. This view, along with the actual policy of space faring
nations thus far, has lead to a regime where military activity in space, aside from
reconnaissance and remote sensing, has generally been avoided. Much like the tacit
agreement on overflight, there appears to be a tacit agreement not to undertake military
activities in outer space. This agreement, perhaps more than the treaties, has been
most effective in keeping outer space free for scientific exploration by all mankind.
Liability and Responsibility
The next aspect of space travel that must be understood from a legal perspective
is the notion of liability and responsibility for any launches. At issue is the question of
who holds liability when an object is launched into space and who will be responsible for
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damages, should any occur. The relevant section of OST 1967 is Article VII, which
reads as follows:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally
liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies .
Also relevant as to the question of responsibility for any space launch is Article VI,
which reads as follows :
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental
entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to
the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization
and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
While these articles clearly place the burden of liability on the launching state, a
situation that will undoubtedly change as private space travel is expanded, there is
much debate over how a damages claim is to be leveled. Ogunbanwo (1972) identifies
three particular approaches to the establishment of liability for damages claim. The first
is based on the notion of negligence, and as such a very heavy burden of proof is put in
place on the side of the damaged party. The second approach is ‘res ips loquitar,’ or the
thing speaks for itself. Under this theory there exists a presumption of negligence on the
part of the launching state. The final theory is the principle of absolute liability. This
theory is based on the injured state showing that damages were caused by equipment
launched by another state, and this claim is then brought to the launching state. The
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third theory seems to be supported most heavily by previous treaties that uphold the
concept of absolute liability5.
Morris Forkosch (1981), the foremost authority on liability in relation to outer
space, finds any mention of responsibility of states for liability as prescribed by Article VI
to be loose, precisely in its lack of clarifying language about state responsibility. He also
finds the relationship between non-state actors and SPTs to be lacking, as there is no
regimented and regularized process by which NSAs should gain permission to conduct
outer space activities from SPTs. Forkosch notes that the situation as created by Article
VI leaves NSAs free from international liability for their actions in outer space (p47).
While any action or liability by a NSA would be held to the standard of national law, in
the international arena, it is the SPTs themselves that bear the brunt of international
liability. If a state’s domestic laws put the liability directly on the NSA, then the true
international burden of liability remains in doubt. Forkosch concludes his examination of
Article VI by noting that there are many consortium structures, i.e., International
Organizations and Transnational Corporations which might have an interest in
conducting space activities, and that the current legal regime, as laid out by OST 1967,
does not even begin to address the question of liability in such cases.
Article VII, while shorter than Article VI at only one sentence long, actually deals
with liability in a much more direct manner, yet one that is still found to be truly
inadequate for the purpose of dealing with liability in outer space. First and foremost,

5

IE. The Rome Conventions on Damage cause by Foreign Aircraft to third parties on
the Surface of 1952, The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear energy, 1960; Brussels Convention on the Liability of operators of Nuclear
Ships, 1962; International Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna,
1963. Etc.
64

this article is limited to SPTs, and as such any non-SPTs are not subject to the
conditions of liability as established by this treaty. Forkosch also points out that the term
“internationally liable for damage” has no true legal meaning, merely serving as highminded language that does not exclude other law (p53). Article VII may establish a
separate set of law for SPTs, but non-signatories are clearly not to be excluded from
making claims for damages. The creation of a dual system of international liability,
whatever that may be, creates further confusion around legal liability for space activities.
As Forkosch elegantly states “…a cacophony of legal voices may join in a paen of
discord to partial remedies and improper law”(p52). It becomes apparent at this point
that OST 1967 serves merely as a stop-gap measure of a document with regard to
liability in space exploration. Yet even with subsequent treaties coming into place, such
as the Liability Treaty of 1972, the law as established by OST 1967 has not been
completely replaced. As such, the principles established above stand to this day, as
problematic a situation as that may be. A more in-depth discussion of the changes
brought into place by the Liability Treaty shall be found in the last part of this chapter.
Notification and Registration
One of the major principles for space flight as laid out by OST 1967 is the notion
that SPTs shall inform other SPTs and the broader international community of their
actions in space. This principle is laid out in Article IX, whose full text reads as follows:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to
the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
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resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary,
shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty
has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another
State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may
request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

It appears that the primary purpose of notification and registration of space launches
and discoveries is based primarily upon the notion of safety, both for astronauts and the
general public. Due to the early and uncertain nature of spaceflight at the time of writing
OST 1967, it made sense for all SPTs to share scientific data about the dangers
encountered during spaceflight. While Hurwitz (1986) suggests that SPTs are not
necessarily required to notify other SPTs of their outer space activities, Article V does
require states to disclose any information that may cause danger for any astronauts.
Article IX requires, among other things, that any information and discoveries made in
outer space that could possibly create public health concerns, especially due to
“contamination from extraterrestrial matter.” Perhaps most interestingly, Article IX also
allows states to request consultation in the event they believe another SPTs actions
would cause harm to either the Earth or other outer space activities.
According to Ogunbanwo (1972) the last notion of consultation based on harmful
actions, is also the most contentious part of Article IX. First and foremost, this clause
does seem to create an awareness that as launches become more commonplace
moving into the future, any new launch could potentially interfere with previously
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occurring space activities. This clause presages the notion of space junk and orbital
debris that has accumulated in the half-century or more since the launch of Sputnik. The
treaty as a whole, and Article IX in particular, is predicated on the notion that SPTs
should work together in outer space activities, especially in coordinating missions for the
safety of both astronauts and the general public.
While the idea of working together to keep astronauts and the general public safe
during outer space activities is not a radical idea, a problem does arise when focus
shifts toward the idea of consultation between SPTs. The treaty itself does not provide
any method for consultation, nor does it establish any institution to evaluate any
potential experiments for possible harm. OST 1967 lays the legal foundations for
institutions governing space exploration, but does little in the way of creating the more
tangible aspects of institutions. While some SPTs have suggested using the Committee
on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions’ Consultative Group
on Potentially Harmful effects of space experiments,6 little has been done by way of
actually setting up an institution to deal with these issues. Ogunbanwo (p108) notes that
this issue will be of interest to future researchers and policy makers in the field of space
law. It should be noted that eventually a framework for a brick and mortar physical
institution, in the guise of the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), was
established, but the original language of OST 1967 does not have much to say on how
these consultations and oversight should take place. A further exploration of UNOOSA,
and other physical institutions that govern and regulate spaceflight will follow in the next
chapter.

6

henceforth referred to as COSPAR
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One other article is highly relevant to the exchange of information between SPTs
Article XI reads as follows:
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the
international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable,
of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the
said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared
to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

This article furthers the principles of scientific discovery that permeate the entirety of
OST 1967, requiring any results of outer space activities to be disclosed not only to
other SPTs, but also to the Secretary-General of the UN and the “international scientific
community.” Like many of the preceding articles, while the sentiment may be for the free
flow of information, the method by which this information flow takes place is not
elucidated. OST 1967 does not establish a protocol or institution through which to
provide notification and results. Nor does it provide for any way to verify that the data
being disclosed is valid data. Yet this sharing of information is specifically an obligation,
which legally speaking lies in the murky area between being purely voluntary and
mandatory (Ogunbanwo : p. 115). So the actual degree to which SPTs are required to
report their findings, and where they should report them, remains up for debate.
Rescue and Return
Building on the principles of safety and cooperation already elucidated in OST
1967, especially the notion of “for all mankind,” the treaty takes great care to establish
rules for the rescue and safe return of astronauts should they become stranded in
space or land outside the territories of the launching nation. OST 1967 itself only
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spends the barest of time establishing rules for rescue and return in Article V, which
reads as follows:

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in
outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or
on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and
promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of
one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other
States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to
the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena
they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
This article focuses primarily on safety issues, and is comprised of three distinct parts.
First is the notion that all SPTs should regard astronauts as “Envoys of Mankind.” The
new legal fiction of such an envoy raised many questions among those states that were
parties to the treaty but not space powers themselves. Most notable was the objection
by Austria that if astronauts were to be envoys of all mankind, then should not nonspace powers have a say in what these astronauts should be doing (Ogunbanwo:
p125). Perhaps the most telling response to this objection came from Argentina, another
non-space power which stated that this term had no actual definition, something that
seems to be supported by other drafters of the treaty. This interpretation does not,
however, have much bearing on the notion that SPTs should help astronauts in need. A
distinct obligation is placed on all SPTs to render assistance in the event that astronauts
require rescue or help. This obligation is placed on all SPTs, as it refers specifically to
accident, distress, or emergency landing in the territory of the non-launching country or
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on the high seas. This paragraph is fairly limited in scope, but still has a much larger
audience than subsequent paragraphs.
The next paragraph in Article V has a much more limited scope than the first
paragraph, but a scope which is much more high-minded and idealistic, while still
having safety concerns for astronauts as paramount. This paragraph is aimed squarely
at states that have the capacity to put astronauts into space. At the time of drafting, this
audience consisted solely of the United States and the USSR. While the audience of
this paragraph is rather limited, the implications are rather large. Simply stated,
astronauts should help other astronauts in carrying out their missions. This simple
principle, however, has great bearing on geopolitics. As the United States and the
USSR were the only space powers at the time capable of putting astronauts into space,
as well as the world’s only superpowers who were locked in a cold war, this paragraph
could have essentially remained ignored. Yet this was not the case. This paragraph was
used to foster fairly amicable relations between the space programs of the United
States and the Soviet Union, including many reciprocal agreements and several joint
missions, namely the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (Ezell and Ezell, 2010).
The final paragraph of Article V has already been discussed in the previous
section on notification and registration. This paragraph deals with notification of any
discovery that may be harmful to astronauts. As was previously noted, the manner in
which this disclosure is to take place, and the framework to assist in this disclosure is
not established by OST 1967, and though the treaty states that such disclosure should
take place immediately, this is still rather legally ambiguous. Yet the overall sentiment
and meaning of the treaty remains, all activity in space should be done for the common
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good of all mankind, and great care and attention should be paid both to the public and
to astronauts specifically.
Other Articles
The other articles in the treaty are of much less importance to the overall legal
structures governing outer space. They are more concerned with the diplomatic
business of concluding a treaty, from the signature process through amendment
procedures. Article XIV delineates the procedures for ratifying and signing the treaty.
Article XV allows for amendment. Article XVI also makes it possible for any SPT to
withdraw from the treaty, given one year’s written notice. Article XVII states that the
official languages for this treaty are English, French, Russian, Spanish and Mandarin.
What should be noted is that no procedure for the settlement of disputes is formally put
into place, though both the United States and the Soviet Union had such provisions in
their proposed drafts. No agreement was ever reached on this subject.
While this concludes the discussion of OST 1967, there do exist several
subsequent treaties that delve into some of the aspects already covered in OST 1967.
The subsequent treaties are the Rescue Agreement of 1968, the Liability Treaty of
1972, the Registration Convention of 1975, and the Moon Treaty of 1979. It should be
noted that the Moon Treaty is considered a failed treaty, having only been signed by
four states, even though two of those states are the United States and the Soviet Union.
The remainder of this chapter shall take a very brief look at the modifications to the legal
body created by OST 1967 as created by these subsequent treaties.
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The Rescue Agreement of 1968
While OST 1967 was under negotiation, the first treaty that would modify
international space law was already under negotiation as well. The Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Space of 1968, hereafter referred to as the Rescue Agreement, seeks to address
the more humanitarian concerns of space travel, namely the bodily safety of astronauts
who might find themselves in danger. While this agreement was adopted by the General
Assembly, the major negotiating partners were practically limited to the only countries
that could successfully put men into space, the United States and the Soviet Union. This
new treaty did not serve as a great overhaul to the rules of conduct as laid out by OST
1967, but instead serves to clarify and elucidate some of the issues of astronaut rescue
which remain occluded by the text of the previous treaty.
The first four articles of the Rescue Agreement deal directly with astronaut
safety, both from the standpoint of launching nations and other SPTs. Article 1 creates
an obligation of any SPT to notify the launching authority and the Secretary-General of
the UN in the event of discovery of astronauts in distress, be they in space, on land, or
in the oceans. This article also expands beyond the simple language of astronaut to
include all personnel of the craft, meaning other persons on board a spacecraft. Article
2 places an obligation for all SPTs to promptly attempt to rescue and recover any
astronauts who might land in their sovereign territory. A burden to assist in such a
rescue is placed on the launching authority as well. This particular article received the
most attention during the ratification process, as there were fears among potential
signatories that this article would allow personnel from the launching nation to freely
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enter any sovereign territory. The article as adopted makes allowances that the
contracting Party, namely the party that is conducting the search and not the launching
state, is responsible for the search. This position allows for states to call in the
assistance of the launching party as necessary, but still allows for sovereign territorial
integrity.
Article 3 deals with landings of astronauts on the high seas. In much the same
way that SPTs that have spacecraft land in their territories must render assistance in
rescuing the Astronauts, those nations closest to the landing site must render
assistance in rescuing and recovering astronauts who land on the high seas. These
SPTs must also keep the launching authority and the Secretary-General of the UN
informed of their actions and next steps in recovery. Article 4 states that astronauts who
land off course should be promptly returned to the launching authority. This article
provides for a speedy return so that any recovered astronauts do not have to worry
about becoming prisoners of the rescuing state.
The final amendment of any real consequence to international space law is
Article 5, which shifts the focus from the astronauts themselves to spacecrafts and their
components more generally. This article follows the same requirements as Articles 1-3,
merely applying that logic to physical objects as opposed to people. The fourth
paragraph of Article 5 removes any requirement to recover and return space objects or
crafts if those objects are of a “hazardous or deleterious nature.” If those objects would
cause harm, then any duty to deal with said objects is removed from that state and
placed fully upon the launching authority. Paragraph 5 of Article 5 requires costs
incurred in recovery of off-target spacecraft or components to be reimbursed by the
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launching authority. This point is meant to help compensate those states less capable of
conducting a recovery operation (read developing nations).
While the remainder of the Articles of the Rescue Agreement deal with standard
treaty operations, two points should be noted. Article 6 sets out to define Launching
Authority, and does so as the states or inter-governmental agency that is responsible for
a space launch. It is interesting to note that private parties do not enter into the logic
applied by this treaty, one of the many problems with international space law that will be
further explored in chapter 6. Secondly, Article 7 paragraph 1 applies this treaty to “All
States,” be they recognized by the United Nations or not. This clause creates a unique
circumstance that could lead to non-UN members being party to a UN treaty. It should
be noted that later negotiation made clear that SPTs could operate within the framework
of the Rescue Agreement and still not recognize other signatories.
The Liability Convention
The question of liability for damage caused by space objects remains unsettled
by OST 1967, but was quickly addressed in subsequent treaties, namely the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972,
hereafter referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention is perhaps the
most complex piece of international space law yet crafted, and is most certainly the
most detailed of the five major UN treaties on outer space issues. It is also the most
legalistic in form and function, as the subject of this treaty, liability, is perhaps the focus
of the majority of lawyers, be they concerned with space or more terrestrial matters. In
its twenty-eight articles, the groundwork for the establishment of international liability for
damage caused by space objects is detailed in such a manner as is consonant with
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OST 1967, placing the burden of liability on the launching state. As is stated by Article
II, absolute liability for damage on the surface of the earth or to aircraft lies solely on the
launching state. Article VII limits claims of liability only to inter-state interactions, and
only when foreign nationals are not invited participants in the space activity. National
law or bilateral agreements will cover those cases.
The majority of this treaty deals instead with issues of in-space damages,
possibly being related to crashes between craft in outer space. In these cases, Article III
makes clear that only states that are proven to be at fault are to be given liability. Article
IX states that liability claims must be made through regular diplomatic channels, and in
the event that no diplomatic ties exist, another state may pass the claim instead, and
such claims will be considered fully legal. Article XIV establishes a one-year statue of
limitations on liability claims. If after that one-year period passes and no action is taken
by the launching state to address the claim, then the claim can be brought to a Claims
Commission as established in Articles XV through XX. The Claims Commission
maintains responsiblity for assessing liability in these cases and meting out penalties as
necessary.
One final note about this treaty should be stated, namely that while the focus is
primarily on state agents, either as claimants or as the launching state, there is an
explicit role for intergovernmental launches. International intergovernmental launching
groups can be given full liability for launches according to Article XXII, with the various
member states sharing liability. This feature of international space law is fairly
consistent with OST 1967, especially with regard to the focus on states being the
primary actors, even within international organizations. While it is clear that the focus of
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the verbiage surrounding international intergovernmental organizations is primarily on
the European Space Agency, there does appear to be a broad applicability for this
approach. Yet one of the major flaws of this approach becomes apparent upon
examination of recent developments in the field of space exploration. As international
non-governmental organizations, namely multinational corporations such as SpaceX,
Orbital, RSC Energia, and Untied Launch Alliance, become major players in space
exploration taking over larger percentages of launches. the question of liability must be
reopened. As the law stands currently, liability can only be assigned and designated
through states. This flaw is one of the most damning for the current international legal
regime on outer space and is representative of many of the other flaws that can be
found, and which shall be addressed in Chapter 5.
The Registration Convention
Addressing one of the neglected mandates of OST 1967, the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1975, henceforth referred to as
the Registration Convention, is actually the shortest and simplest pieces of international
space law. Standing at a mere 13 articles, of which the last 8 deal with the end matters
of enacting the treaty and the first merely sets up definitions in exactly the same way as
in the Liability Convention, only 4 articles actually deal with the details of establishing a
regime of space object registration. Perhaps the most relevant of the various articles in
this treaty is Article II, which establishes the duty for launching states (defined similarly
in the Liability Treaty) to register the objects that they launch into space. They must then
report their registry to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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Article III mandates that the Secretary-General of the United Nations must
establish a Register of space objects to coordinate and collate the data from the various
national registries. This new registry, in turn, must be fully open to access by all. Article
III goes the furthest of any of the outer space treaties in explicitly creating an institution
following the reasoning of liberal international relations theorists as appropriate for
creating institutions. This treaty has the explicit purpose of sharing information to reduce
costs. Article IV details what information must be shared in the registry for space
objects, which includes the following:

Name of launching State or States; an appropriate designator of the space object
or its registration number; date and territory or location of launch; basic orbital
parameters, including: nodal period; inclination; apogee; perigee; general
function of the space object.
With this information, it should become possible to reduce the likelihood of collisions in
outer space between objects launched into similar orbits. Article VI deals with
registration regarding liability claims. Much like all of the other international space law
treaties, Article VII places a particular focus on international intergovernmental
organizations conducting space activities for registration while neglecting even the
possibility of non-governmental organizations participating in launching space objects.
The final five articles, as previously mentioned, deal with treaty signing and ratification
processes for the treaty and follow an almost identical pattern as the other space
treaties. All told, the Registration Convention furthers the general shape of international
space law, while creating a mandate for registration, something that was left somewhat
unsettled by OST 1967
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The Moon Agreement
The final treaty that comprises international space law, the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979, hereby referred
to as the Moon Treaty, is an attempt to clear up many of the previous problems that
have existed with international space law. Yet even as the Moon Treaty attempts to fill
in some of the gaps and deal with the contradictions in previous international space law,
it is not typically considered to be a successful treaty, as it has not been ratified by the
majority of SPTs for OST 1967. Among those states that have not ratified the Moon
Treaty are all states currently capable of placing a man in space, much less onto
another celestial body. While OST 1967 was written prior to any state landing on the
moon, once the reality of states actually traveling to the moon was established, newer,
clearer rules had to be established. It should be noted that the negotiation process for
this treaty was very contentious, with battle lines being drawn with the space powers,
including Cold War adversaries, on one side, and developing countries, on the other.
The primary concern during negotiations for this treaty was addressing the
problems of material exploitation of celestial bodies, specifically Earth’s moon. To
undertake this problem, a shift in language was required. While previously outer space
and all celestial bodies were considered to be held as the Scientific Commons for all
mankind, (OST 1967), the Moon Treaty adopts a new set of language to describe man’s
relationship with outer space and celestial bodies. The newly modified regime places
outer space in the same realm as the ocean’s floor by moving to a new category of
classification, namely the Common Heritage of Mankind, henceforth abbreviated as
CHM. This new approach, while only slightly changing man’s relationship to outer
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space, does allow for the exploitation of natural resources on the moon and other
celestial bodies (Christol, 1982). It should be noted at this point that the general
international consensus is that this treaty, in its references to the moon and celestial
bodies, applies to our solar system only. This scale is much more limited than the
previous treaties, and it is perhaps this deliberate limitation that allows for a shift to
possible exploitation.
In Article 11, the relevant article that shifts the language to CHM, there is a legal
requirement to establish an international regime to manage the exploitation that is
expected to occur in the future. During the negotiations for this agreement it was
realized that the technical capability required to exploit the natural resources that exist
in our solar system, so the necessity of establishing an institution or regime to govern
and fairly administer the exploitation of said resources was not particularly pressing.
This maneuver effectively tabled the tricky negotiation that would be required to
establish an international regime governing non-terrestrial natural resources, delaying
decision-making to a time when this exploitation would be technically feasible.
Article 11 is the major shift in space law that comes from the Moon Agreement,
while the remainder of the Agreement follows very closely to the format as laid out by
OST 1967. This particular agreement as a whole, while adopted without vote by the
General Assembly, is considered to be a failed treaty. Unlike the other four treaties that
comprise the international space law regime, this treaty was adopted and ratified by
only a handful of countries. No country with space flight capability has signed on to this
treaty, rendering it effectively moot. The evolved understanding of space as exploitable
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remains un-adopted by the international community, especially by those who would
potentially be doing the exploitation.
Conclusions
At this point several observations about the International Space Law regime can
be made. First, the regime that was created was very much a product of the cultural and
political forces of the day. In the middle of the Cold War, when relationships between
the Soviet Bloc and the Western countries were tenuous at the best of times, any piece
of far reaching legislation at the international level would require a great deal of
compromise. It is particularly treacherous when the only actors capable of accessing
space were embroiled in a cold war. This balancing act between the goals of the United
States and the USSR led to the creation of a legal regime that ends up serving almost
no one’s real interests.
Secondly, the regime of international space law reflects the general trends of
decolonization inasmuch as the regimes are cognizant of the impact declaring
ownership of space might have on non-spaceflight capable nations. Great care is given
to ensure that the benefits of spaceflight were to be reaped by all mankind, not only
those nations that were capable of launching in to space on their own.
Thirdly, the regime of international space law is not particularly forward-looking
with regard to the technical advancement that would be possible in the realm of
spaceflight. Specific gaps were left on the question of exploitation of space due to
technical inability, and little work has been done to address these legal gaps. There is
also a particular bias towards the nation-state as the entity that would conduct
spaceflight. This situation leaves out advancement in technology to the degree that
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private spaceflight operators might not only be possible, but also commonplace to the
degree that they could be considered to be the leaders in spaceflight, as is arguably the
case today, and described in chapter five.
Finally, and on a more positive note, the vast majority of the international
community has chosen to adopt the legal regime as proposed by COPUOS in OST
1967 and the subsequent treaties. For all the various faults of the legal regime, it is
generally considered to be a successful regime, one that is capable of mitigating
potential disasters of the sole superpowers competing over the boundless frontier of
space. The solutions arrived upon in the realm of space weaponization and
militarization are rather exemplary and represent one of the first major steps taken in
diffusing the tensions and scope of conflict during the Cold War. While the Moon
Agreement is considered to be failed, the remaining treaties create at minimum a
workable base from which state can cooperate in spaceflight and exploration.
Overall, the International Space Law regime is a rather flawed creature that
leaves much to be desired and much to still be negotiated, especially on the front of a
regime to oversee the exploitation of the resources in our solar system. The tensions of
the Cold War, between avoiding conflict between two superpowers and newly
independent states asserting themselves played out to create institutions that have
highly uneven results. While militarization of space is well handled, as the primary
actors with significant power were able to negotiate these clauses well, the question of
resource allocation remains unresolved. Newly independent states were able to
constrain technologically infeasible actions by western powers and assert their positions
in the international system through relatively costless legislation at the time. Also, in
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practice, the laws and treaties as written have little practical effect on the everyday
governance of outer space. The disconnect between the International Space Law
regime and the day-to-day institutional governance of space will be explored further in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: THE (IM)PRACTICAL INSTITUIONAL GOVERNANCE OF SPACE
“Us with our busy, busy little lives, finding no better way to pass our years than in
competitive disdain” – Iain M Banks- Consider Phlebas
This chapter serves as the second part of the three-part case study on outer
space. The primary concern in this chapter is the horizontal integration between
international institutions to create a functional regime for the governance of technology.
As the previous chapter showed, there exists a high degree of dysfunction in the
governance of space exploration. This chapter will reveal how a series of seemingly
disparate institutions work together to create a functional governance regime for outer
space.
The rules and legal institutions crafted to govern often bear little resemblance to
the real world conditions and actions undertaken to govern. This situation has been
often borne out in the governance of men and nations, and the same also holds true for
technology. The practical, day-to-day governance of outer space resembles this
disconnected situation quite nicely. While the previous chapter outlined the contours of
the international space law regime, this chapter will explore the real world governance
of outer space exploration and exploitation. The almost ad hoc hodge-podge of brick
and mortar institutions that seek to practically govern outer space as described in Miles
(1971) represent a series of intercommunicating institutions and agencies that should
theoretically be coordinated by a central institution. Yet in practice this institutional
arrangement experiences a high degree of variation in efficacy and efficiency. This
chapter will attempt to make sense of this web of institutions that governs outer space
by examining the role played by each institution as well as the effectiveness of the
institutions together in governing space.
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The individual international institutions that constitute the overall international
space governance regime are as follows. The central coordinating agency is the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS 7), which is
responsible to the United Nations General Assembly. Three major institutions which
play large roles in governing space, and which should cooperate with each other and
with COPUOS are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO),the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT8), and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), a
subcommittee of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Some other minor
institutions will also be examined, only briefly covered, as they play very small roles in
the practical governance of outer space.
These institutions can be placed into two broad categories, those institutions that
are primarily political in nature and those that are scientific in nature. The political
institutions, in this case COPUOS, INTELSAT, and the ITU, deal directly with practical
governance efforts for outer space activities. The scientific institutions, namely
COSPAR and the WMO, exist to provide scientific advice and input to the political
institutions, but also play a role in the actual governance of scientific activity in outer
space. This chapter will examine the interplay between these different institutional

COPUOS is, as this chapter will bear out, the UN committee responsible for the
oversight of outer space, as well as a sub-group of a larger office that was created to
oversee all matters of outer space from an international perspective. This larger group,
the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, is a rather interesting case in and of itself.
However, for the purpose of this work, the major focus will remain on COPUOS, with
only slight mention of UNOOSA.
8
Until 2001. After 2001 INTELSAT becomes a privatized corporation known as
INTELSAT, S.A. This chapter will deal with the international organization INTELSAT.
Further discussion of the shift to a private space entity will be carried out in chapter 5.
7
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types, exposing the many of the gaps and overlaps in governance mandates that have
emerged from this patchwork approach to the practical governance of outer space.
It should be noted that while a wide variety of institutions have some claim on the
practical governance of outer space, they primarily exist within the framework of the
United Nations generally and UNESCO more specifically. This chapter will examine the
individual institutional structures of each of these governing groups, focusing on the
efficacy of each institution in both fulfilling their mandate and maintaining relevance as
an institution within the larger patchwork of international institutions governing outer
space. Finally, it should be noted that special consideration shall be given to the
examination of the ITU. This consideration is due to the fact that the ITU, for all intents
and purposes, is today the only truly relevant and effective international institution
governing the resource allocation in outer space. The reasoning behind this particular
efficacy will be explored in the conclusion of this chapter.
COPUOS and oversight of outer space governance
Swiftly after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1958, the international
community came to the realization that this action was not merely a scientific milestone
for humanity, but also the first in a series of actions that had international political
implications. Within the next fifteen months, a further eleven space launches were
attempted, of which five were successful. During this period, the international
community did not just stand by idly, but instead took the first early steps in the creation
of international institutions to govern outer space. The first step in the direction of
establishing an international institution came with the 792 nd plenary meeting of the
United Nations General Assembly in GA Resolution 1348, “Question of the peaceful use
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of outer space.” This resolution “Recognizing the common interest of mankind in outer
space and recognizing that it is the common aim that outer space should be used for
peaceful purposes only,” established an ad hoc committee to explore the peaceful use
of outer space, comprised of representative from eighteen countries.
The ad hoc COPUOS was primarily tasked with furthering cooperation and study
of outer space, extending beyond the framework as had been established during the
International Geophysical Year.9 Ad hoc COPUOS was also responsible for studying
the future organizational arrangements necessary to facilitate international cooperation
within the framework of the UN. Finally, the committee was given the job of addressing
the legal issues that might arise from programs of space exploration. This final task
would turn out to be one of the most important functions undertaken by COPUOS, as
has been detailed in the previous chapter.
Within less than a year, based on the preliminary reports of the ad hoc
COPUOUS, the General Assembly passed GA Resolution 1472 “International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.” This resolution formalized COPUOS as
a permanent standing committee of the United Nations, with a mandate to foster
international cooperation in the study of outer space. COPUOS is tasked with helping to
exchange and disseminate information on outer space research as well as fostering
national programs of the study of outer space. Finally, COPUOS was given the mandate
The work that had been conducted in space exploration in the 15 month period
of furious satellite launching was conducted under the framework of the International
Geophysical Year. This 15 month long year of scientific study was meant to act as a
catalyst for research in geophysics. Clearly the IGY had the desired effect, but as in
most of these issues, the scientists did not fully think through the social and political
consequences of their actions. The work of the ad hoc COPUOS was necessary to
allow for further study of outer space, as well as to deal directly with the political and
social implications of man’s activities in relationship to outer space.
9
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to study the legal problems that might emerge from the study of outer space. These
various mandates serve as a permanent extension of the mandate delivered to the ad
hoc version of COPUOS. Yet COPUOS was also tasked with the organization of
conferences to foster cooperation in space exploration, with consultation and cooperation from the office of the Secretary-General. Reports are also to be delivered by
COPUOS at every session of the General Assembly.
COPUOS is largely free to determine the makeup of international institutions
governing outer space. This freedom also includes the ability to alter the makeup of
COPUOS itself. Two major changes have been ongoing since the very first report from
the committee given at the Seventeenth Session of the United Nation General
Assembly in 1962. First, COPUOS has seen fit to further subdivide itself into two
subcommittees to deal with the two particular mandates that have been rendered to
itself. These mandates fit roughly into the scientific and legal categories, and as such
the two subcommittees represent those two mandates. The Scientific and Technical
subcommittee works to understand the technical and scientific issues that are deemed
relevant to space exploration. This subcommittee is responsible for carrying out the
mandate of fostering international cooperation in the exploration of space, and serves
as a primary advising for technical and scientific considerations for the United Nations
on matters of space exploration.
The Legal subcommittee has an obvious, but much more difficult mandate. This
subcommittee is tasked with identifying, studying, and addressing the legal issues that
might emerge surrounding the study, exploration, and exploitation of outer space. The
primary expression of this mandate came in the crafting of the five treaties that
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comprise the institutional framework for the governance of outer space. These treaties
are detailed in the previous chapter. The committee also provides guidance to
COPUOS, the General Assembly of the UN, and those who request it on matters
pertaining to outer space. Finally, the legal subcommittee is responsible to overseeing
the interaction between the various international legal frameworks that govern outer
space, many of which will be further explored within the body of this chapter.
COPUOS was given a specific mandate under the Registration Convention to
serve as a clearinghouse for information about registered space objects. This mandate
was further endorsed by the General Assembly under GA resolution 1721. COPUOS,
acting on behalf of the Secretary-General’s office, is to maintain relationships with both
national and international governmental and non-governmental space agencies in order
to keep abreast of developments in space exploration, as well as to keep a record of
objects in outer space. It is then the duty of COPUOS to report back to the SecretaryGeneral and the General Assembly on these activities. This function further ties into
OST 1967’s mandate to foster communication and the sharing of information regarding
space exploration not only between space-faring states, but also to all mankind in
general, as laid out in OST 1967 Article XI.
In order to dutifully conduct the mandates given to COPUOS, the committee was,
upon its transformation into a permanent standing committee of the United Nations,
turned into the Outer Space Affairs Division, under the Department of Political and
Security Council Affairs in 1968. Less than 25 years later, the Outer Space Affairs
Division was again transformed into the Office of Outer Space Affairs within the
Department of Political Affairs, and was relocated to the United Nations office in Vienna.
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The Office of Outer Space Affairs (OOSA) is responsible for the day-to-day
management and provision of secretarial services for the intergovernmental discussion
within COPUOS as well as its various subcommittees. UNOOSA is also now tasked
with assisting developing countries in using the technologies of outer space in their
development, as well as the provision of information on developments in outer space to
Member States of the UN, international organization, and other UN bodies.
While COPUOS, and its supportive organization, UNOOSA, are responsible for
the political management of much of outer space activities, when it comes to actual
governance of outer space, these organizations do not play nearly as important a role
as other international organizations. For much of the actual decision-making that comes
to the practical governance of outer space, the International Telecommunications Union
plays a much larger role with more actual impact on how activities in outer space are
conducted.
The International Telecommunications Union
The very fact that the International Telecommunications Union has the large
degree of influence over the governance of outer space activities is somewhat counterintuitive, but upon further examination of the various issues over which the ITU has
dominance, the situation begins to resolve in a much clearer light. This section, while
primarily focused on the role that the ITU plays in governing outer space activities, will
also seek to examine how the ITU came to play this prominent role. The ITU governs
outer space come in two major arenas: 1) the location of satellites and outer space
objects in orbit, and 2) the transmissions that these satellites send out. It is interesting to
note that one of these powers, namely the governance of orbits, derives from the
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original power to govern the transmissions of satellites. This power of governing
transmissions is well within the original mandate of the ITU, and is actually the very
reason why the ITU was created in 1865. Only later did the ITU become a subsidiary of
the United Nations, and it still retains significant autonomy to this day. It should be
noted at this point that the ITU is the major institution that will be discussed in both the
exploration of the governance of outer space and the internet, and as such serves as an
interesting institutional bridge between the two case studies.
The primary impact of the ITU in the governance of space comes from its role as
arbiter of satellite and other space objects’ orbits. While space is exceedingly large, the
areas of practical and exploitable value are much less so. Our technical capabilities thus
far have for all intents and purposes kept us locked with the gravity well of our own
planet, save for a few dozen deep space probes. The orbits available within the gravity
well are rapidly being used up, creating a large space debris problem that is going
largely unaddressed. It became clear early on that some organization would need to
take responsibility for the governance of these orbits, as is clearly seen in UN
Resolution 1721.
Yet while the formal mandate to maintain a registry of outer space objects falls to
COPUOS, a more formal and rigorous governance structure would be necessary to
keep objects from occupying the same place in the same orbit, which would result in
catastrophic failure for both objects. Even more importantly, the most useful orbits,
those of the geosynchronous variety, are highly limited, as they can exist only within a
very strict range of distance and inclination from the equator. These highly sought after
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orbits have been a source of much political maneuvering,10 especially by the developing
nations who exist on the terrestrial areas underneath these orbits. While little success
has been achieved in negotiating ownership of orbital space, the task has been taken
up by the ITU section on space issues to oversee the distribution of orbital space in a
just manner.
The method by which the ITU sets up their governance of orbital space is laid out
under the Constitution, Convention and Administrative Regulations of the International
Telecommunications Union (Jakhu, 2013). This set of rules and regulations, however,
essentially centers on a series of bilateral agreements with the parties involved on radio
frequencies and orbital positions. What the rules of the ITU do allow for, however, is that
a first-come-first-served policy is in place on any arrangement, and any latecomers do
not have to be accommodated by the parties who already occupy the orbital and
frequency positions. Yet this situation does not leave out the possibility of dispute, a
situation the ITU is more than equipped to handle. The primary source of governance
for outer space activities, especially orbital placement, comes from the resolution of
disputes, and not through any true procedural action.
The ITU does maintain a database of frequencies and orbits used by space
objects, in much the same manner as COPUOS, but when there is a dispute about
allocation of space that cannot be resolved by the parties involved the ITU steps in and
begins to truly govern outer space, to the degree that outer space is governed. A series
of protocols for negotiation of the settlement of disputes is explicitly laid out in Article 41
of the Constitution of the ITU. Yet even these protocols leave the ITU capable of merely
The Bogatota Agreement of 1976. An attempt by those countries located on the
equator to claim sovereignty over geosynchronous space.
10
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examining the problem and providing a non-binding recommended outcome. This nonbinding outcome is the most enforceable international outcome that can come from any
international institution with regard to a dispute concerning outer space. While there
exists a predefined procedure for the settlement of disputes over orbits and frequencies,
the manner in which this resolution is conducted still appears largely to be ad hoc
(Roberts, 2000).
This ad hoc governance of orbits in outer space, while typical of outer space
resource allocation, is seen to be highly inefficient along several dimensions of analysis.
First, and perhaps most relevant to the problem of trying to govern outer space, is the
high cost of maintaining multiple organizations with similar mandates grows to be quite
high. Both COPUOS and the ITU maintain databases of information regarding both
orbital usage and signal frequencies. The fact that both are offshoots of the United
Nations11 serves to exacerbate this problem of duplicated services.
The ITU lacks procedural efficiency inasmuch as it does not truly serve to reduce
costs in the creation of a regulatory scheme. Because a new set of negotiations must be
entered into with each orbit and frequency allocation, no real reduction in costs is
gained by having the ITU in charge of regulating the allocation of spatial resources in
Earth orbit. In fact a strong argument can be made that the ITU does not truly exist as a
regulatory agency vis-a-vis resource allocation in outer space, but is instead an
arbitration agent for instances of agreement breakdown. No quick process for this
arbitration exists, and even the guidelines in place only work when the participant in

11

While the ITU does predate the United Nations in creation, it has since come
under the fold of the UN, and is considered to be a UN body, even though membership
in the ITU is separate from UN membership.
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negotiations agree to stick to the outcome. The ITU has no legal recourse to enforce its
settlements, and can merely give non-binding suggestions for outcomes. This situation
leads to a highly inefficient regulatory structure for resources in outer space. Yet at the
same time this institution is the most effective and has the largest impact of any
institution that attempts to regulate and govern activities in outer space. At this point it
appears that the practical, everyday governance of outer space can be best described
as ramshackle. Perhaps in examining the remaining organizations, a clearer picture of
the state of affairs of the governance of outer space will emerge, and some conclusions
about effective regulation can be reached.
INTELSAT
One of the earliest non-scientific uses for outer space, especially near Earth
orbit, was for the purpose of allowing humanity to communicate in a faster and more
direct fashion. This new use, the telecommunication satellite, was originally proposed in
1945 by famed science fiction author Arthur C Clarke in Extra-Terrestrial Relays – Can
Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Radio Coverage? (Clarke 1945). In order to make this
vision a reality, distinct and directed work needed to occur to create and place the
geosynchronous telecommunication satellites into orbit. For the administration of this
network of satellites, a new institution was required.
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization was formed in
1964, and was able to place the first telecommunications satellite in geosynchronous
orbit over the Atlantic Ocean on April 6, 1965. From that point on, INTELSAT, as the
organization would come to be known, would become the chief administrator of
international telecommunications satellites, an increasingly important backbone for
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international communication. Beyond its importance for governing and administering
international telecommunications satellites, INTELSAT is also of interest due to its own
organizational history. INTELSAT, while originally created as an international intergovernmental organization, has since evolved into a commercial but public entity, finally
ending up as a publicly traded private corporation.
It is also important to note that a new IGO was created to oversee and guarantee
that INTELSAT provides “public telecommunication services on a non-discriminatory
basis” (ITSO website). The IGO, called the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization, or ITSO, is a vestigial offshoot from INTELSAT becoming a private
corporation, in order to oversee public interests. This institutional evolution somewhat
mirrors the overall governance of outer space, especially in the transfer from a large
governmental agency to being more of a private, profit driven entity. More on this
evolution will be discussed in the next chapter.
In its original incarnation, INTELSAT existed as an international
intergovernmental organization designed to foster an international telecommunications
system backboned on geosynchronous telecommunication satellites. This international
organization was successful in creating the backbone system of the current international
telecommunications regime with a relatively short period and has had a great deal of
success in maintaining this system. Yet as an international organization responsible for
administering some facet of mankind’s activities in outer space, INTELSAT can be
considered much less successful. The primary interest of INTELSAT had always been
focused on the commercial side of establishing a satellite network (GAO 2005). The
original signatories for each member state were primarily telecommunications
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companies, typically part of a public-private partnership,12 much like the French
signatory, France Telecom. This initial practical monopoly was necessary to jumpstart
the commercial satellite industry, and allowed for a great deal of public investment in
this international infrastructure project. Yet within a matter of two decades, the private
aerospace industry and communications industries were capable of producing similar or
better satellites than the international consortium of INTELSAT. This sea change in
private technological capabilities prompted the major private players to lobby for
INTELSAT to be made into a private entity that would be required to compete in the
market for international telecommunications satellites. The ORBIT13 act of 2000 was
passed in the United States and prompted the intergovernmental organization
INTELSAT to become a fully privatized entity. By 2005 the transition from IGO to private
entity was completed, and the de facto monopoly that was held by INTELSAT on the
global telecommunications satellite market was heavily eroded. Furthermore, by 2013
INTELSAT had become a publicly traded company (NYSE : I) now responsible not only
to a board of directors, but also to its shareholders. A more in-depth analysis of this
institutional change will be presented in chapter 5.
While this shift of INTELSAT from an IGO to a public traded company is rather
indicative of the overall shift in the way mankind practically handles its affairs in outer
space, it also shows the erosion and unstable nature of the governance of outer space.
With no single major entity having legal jurisdiction over matters in outer space, when
mankind conducts activities beyond the boundaries of Earth’s atmosphere, only a
12

And in the case of the United States, the primary actor in INTELSAT upon
creation, the signatory power was vested in Comsat Corporation, a newly created
private entity designed for commercial communications satellites.
13
Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of Telecommunications Act
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patchwork of less-than-functional organizations exists to govern these activities.
INTELSAT was created with a specific mandate to create an international
telecommunications satellite network, and greatly succeeded in this goal. However,
along the way, due to the de facto monopoly on the creation and launching of these
satellites, INTELSAT became one of the major governing and enforcement institutions
in outer space, especially in the realm of telecommunications and the placement of
satellites in geosynchronous orbit. The transition away from being an IGO and towards
being a private entity, this has not only opened up the market for telecommunication
satellites, but has also caused the loss of de facto governance of an important area of
mankind’s activities in outer space. The duties that were once covered by INTELSAT
have since transitioned over to the ITU, which as previously discussed is not truly
equipped organizationally to handle the governance of near-earth orbit.
COSPAR
In 1958 the International Council for Science created the Committee on Space
Research (henceforth referred to as COSPAR) to foster the exploration of outer space
from a scientific perspective at an international level. This forum was to discuss the
findings and challenges of space research within an open international community
(ICSU 1998). Undertaking one of the major functions necessary for the exploration of
space as laid out by OST 1967, COSPAR has been a highly important institution for the
governance of mankind's activities in outer space. Yet COSPAR's role is limited to a
relatively narrow area of activities. As is fitting of its name, COSPAR is solely concerned
with the scientific research that takes place in outer space, but within this realm of
scientific research COSPAR serves as a governor par excellence, as the vast majority
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of participants in COSPAR are willing to share and coordinate activities of scientific
research.
In the earliest days of space exploration, the primary focus of space launches
was learning how to operate in outer space. While a large degree of competition
between the primary space-faring countries was predicated on Cold War geopolitical
dynamics, a great deal of cooperation was possible based on the interest of both the
United States and the Soviet Union in furthering man's scientific knowledge of outer
space. This cooperation led to the formation of COSPAR in 1958, less than one whole
year after the launch of the first artificial satellite, and was further enshrined in OST
1967. In what is a bit of a chicken-and-egg dilemma, COSPAR began to govern the
scientific aspects of outer space exploration even before the law on outer space was
written, and continued to be the primary scientific body responsible for coordinating and
governing man’s efforts in outer space. And in a mirror image to INTELSAT, the primary
members of COSPAR are not the states themselves, but subsidiary organizations within
the various signatory states.
While in the case of pre-privatization INTELSAT the signatories were primarily
telecommunications companies, that were generally state owned, the primary
signatories to COSPAR are national science organizations and international science
unions. This situation removes a great deal of politicking at the international level and
allows for the focus to remain on matters of scientific importance. The institutional
structure of COSPAR also plays a role in reducing conflict and increasing the level of
scientific cooperation in regards to space exploration. COSPAR, based on its most
recent charter, signed in 1998, has a structure that should be relatively familiar to all
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academics, as COSPAR has become focused on the academic and research side of
governing space exploration, with biennial conferences as the chief governmental
meeting.
COSPAR is governed by a council made up of members from the various
member scientific bodies. This council then selects through a nomination committee the
Bureau, which oversees the day-to-day functioning of COSPAR, with the assistance of
the secretariat. The primary function of this Bureau is to provide oversight of the various
committees, ranging from publication, to finance, awards and programming. The major
caucus for this organization occurs on a biennial basis, in locations that rotate around
the world. Perhaps the most important group within COSPAR, from a governmental
perspective, is the Scientific Commission. The Scientific Commission has seven
particular responsibilities, most of which align with the governance and coordination of
scientific activity in outer space. According to the 1979 and 1980 COSPAR Plenary the
responsibilities for COSPAR’s Scientific Commission are as follows:
1. To discuss, formulate and coordinate internationally cooperative
experimental investigations in space;
2. To encourage interactions between experimenters and theoreticians, in
order to maximize space science results, especially interpretation arising out
of analyses of the observations;
3. To stimulate and coordinate the exchange of scientific results;
4. To plan symposia and topical meetings for discussion of the results of
space research, with an appropriate mixture of review and contributed
papers;
5. To carry out these tasks in the closest possible association with other
organizations interested in these and related tasks;
6. To select an editor for the "Advances in Space Research" Journal for each
symposium and for each topical meeting organized by the Commission;
7. To prepare a statement on recent scientific developments in the area of
interest to the Commission for the COSPAR Report to the United Nations.
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The first three of these responsibilities align almost directly with articles III, V, VI, IX,XI,
and XIII of OST 1967. The remainder of the responsibilities establish the more
academic nature of COSPAR and assist in the activities that would support proper
research and international scientific cooperation in the exploration of outer space. This
direct mandate and the generally collegial nature of the international scientific
community has lead to COSPAR being one of the more effective institutions that have
some impact on the governance of mankind’s activities in outer space.
The World Meteorological Organization
One of the first benefits gained from the exploration of outer space was the ability
to examine our own planet from a distance for the first time in human history. In fact, the
largest early push for space exploration came as part of the Geophysical Year to focus
scientific research on understanding the processes of the Earth. Part of this push came
from the World Meteorological Organization (the WMO). From the early days of space
exploration, the WMO was concerned with its role in man’s interaction with outer space.
In 1959, the Board of Directors set up their first working group to explore the possibility
of weather satellites, to be launched as early as the next year. (Miles 1980) This
discussion led to the eventual creation of the World Weather Watch, an institution that is
heavily dependent on international cooperation, and which has been a major success
story for this level of cooperation (Landis 1999). While the World Weather Watch
(WWW) is a strictly voluntary organization based on individual members cooperating, it
has seen a great deal of success in organizing states and activities within its particular
niche of outer space activities. It should be noted that the WMO and the WWW are
much more strictly focused entities than COSPAR, but this focus has perhaps led to a
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greater deal of success in governing an area of mankind’s activities in outer space than
has been observed from other institutions.
The WWW organizes three major technical programs that operate in outer space
and require the cooperation of many different states on Earth. These programs are the
Global Observing System, the Global Data-Processing System, and the Global
Telecommunication System. Each of these organizations is specifically tasked with one
of the various facets of the production of meteorological observations and predictions
for the world, be it observation of actual weather conditions, communicating about
findings, or processing the findings and generating the predictions. Two of these facets,
the Global Observing System and the Global Telecommunication System require direct
interface with outer space, with their observation specifically focused on Earth itself.
This system requires the coordination and administration of a system of international
satellites. While this particular aspect of governing outer space exists within a fairly
narrow niche, the effectiveness and success that has been observed in this institution is
an example to other groups that purport to govern space. It is a shame that the example
of international weather watching and their interactions in outer space does not extend
to other areas of outer space governance.
The Delicate Web of International Governance of Mankind’s Activities in Outer
Space
At this point the nature of the governing institutions of outer space activities
should be coalescing to create a picture of a rather incomplete coverage of mankind’s
actual and potential activities in outer space. Some areas of governance are well
covered, specifically scientific activities in outer space, and the results of those
activities. COSPAR and the WMO (and its WWW) seem not only to allow for a large
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degree of cooperation in outer space activities, but also do an excellent job of
preventing overlapping missions. This relationship leads to a much more efficient and
beneficial allocation of resources in the scientific exploration of outer space.
When it comes to the actual utilization of outer space outside of scientific
pursuits, the governance of outer space activities is not quite as exemplary. The primary
utilization of outer space at this point as been the placement of satellites into low earth
orbit, something that has been governed in a somewhat ad hoc fashion by the
International Telecommunications Union. The ITU has created a database of orbital
locations and transmission frequencies for artificial satellites for use in their placement
into outer space. Yet the ITU does not have real international legal authority to
administer this aspect of outer space, but instead has taken on this role as an extension
of its mandate to coordinate the use of airwaves terrestrially. Concerning the most
useful orbits, the geosynchronous orbits, the de facto governance came from an ersatz
monopoly held by INTELSAT, but which has eroded and disappeared due to the
privatization of INTELSAT. This situation has lead the ITU to take up the slack and
expand its role in the practical governance of the placement of satellites within Earth’s
gravity well.
For exploitation of resources other than transmission bands and orbital
placements within the gravity well, the governance situation is even thinner than that of
low earth orbit placements. In reference to Article 11, section 7 of the Moon Treaty of
1980, the international regime for the governance of the exploitation of minerals and
materials in outer space should be established once technology has reached the point
where exploitation is possible. This technological situation has been in place for at least
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the last decade, and even though the actual exploitation has not begun the institution to
govern this exploitation has not been created.
The absence of this international regime creates many problems that will need to
be addressed in the coming years. First and foremost is the actual legality of exploiting
celestial bodies, as defined in OST 1967. Second is the question of ownership of any
profits derived from the exploitation of celestial bodies. While the general property rights
regime in outer space could be classified as a scientific commons based regime, it is
apparent that all parties agree that some degree of exploitation is allowed. But in
allowing some exploitation, the idea of the scientific commons becomes undermined.
Without an institutional framework in place to make decisions about the exploitation of
outer space resources, when companies14 and other entities begin to exploit outer
space, the legal situation will remain ambiguous and will potentially stifle future
advancements in outer space activities. Finally, there is a question of what role private
entities play in outer space activities. The institutions that have been established deal
with space exploration and exploitation as a state endeavor. The realm of outer space
activities has not been the sole provenance of national space agencies for several
decades now, and even manned space exploration is on the cusp of being conducted
by private entities.15 The lack of an institution to deal with these private space
companies, outside of the international oversight committee of INTELSAT, creates a
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Namely Planetary Resources Inc.
Both SpaceX and ULA have planned manned launches to the International Space
Station in 2017, taking over the role of ISS resupply from NASA. This also makes
private entities the fourth member of the manned space club, behind Russia, The United
States, and China. SpaceX is also set to unveil plans for manned missions to Mars,
outside of national space authorities for the coming decades.
15
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real dilemma for the future, especially with regard to potential utilization and permanent
occupation of celestial bodies.
While the international community has done an admirable job of creating or
modifying institutions to govern some areas of space exploration, other areas have
been left woefully unaddressed. The ITU has been a useful stopgap institution for the
first half-century of mankind’s use of outer space, when unmanned satellites have
expanded both the knowledge and interconnectedness of man, and when manned
nation missions have laid the intellectual groundwork for future exploitation of outer
space. However, moving forward into an era of privatized exploitation and exploration of
outer space, the institutions that exist will be taxed beyond their own capabilities. With
the failure, for good or ill, of the Moon Treaty a distinct international legal framework for
the exploitation of outer space has been left without much guidance. From an
institutional perspective on the same issue, this deficit of both legal and regulatory
institutions has left open the question of the legality of exploiting outer space and
celestial bodies. As has been recently witnessed, national regulatory bodies, especially
the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration, have begun to fill this regulatory
void. Balancing the potential benefits from exploiting outer space with the legal
requirements from the treaties on outer space that have been ratified and upheld will
present many problems moving forward, problems that could be alleviated with the
creation of international regulatory bodies.16
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A potential solution to this problem could also be to adjust the role of an already
extant international institution to govern commerce and activities in outer space. The
final chapter of this work will expand on this idea in two ways: 1) expanding the UN
Office of Outer Space Affairs into a true regulatory and coordination agency as seems
103

The question of the impact of private space activities on the legal and institutional
frameworks of outer space will be the focus of the next chapter of the volume. But for
now it would be safe to say that the regulatory institutional framework for activities in
outer space other than purely scientific endeavors is deeply flawed and in need of
revision. Without a quick and thoughtful revision of outer space institutions, the world
and the entire Sol system could become a new frontier free from law and accountability
of actions. Or, conversely the benefits from exploring and exploiting outer space could
be dis-incentivized to such a degree that humanity could remain stuck to the surface of
our home planet. Either of these extreme outcomes could be forestalled by addressing
both the legal and regulatory institutions that have become outdated and underpowered
from almost the time of their inception. It appears that having the correct institutions in
place can truly play an important role in the success or failure of a new technology.

to be the initial intent of this agency or 2) shift the regulatory burden for outer space to
another agency with actual enforcement powers.
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CHAPTER 5: THE COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF SPACE
ACTIVITIES- A TALE OF NEOLIBERALISM
“When something is important enough, you do it even if the odds are not in your favor”Elon Musk
This chapter is the final part of the case study on the governance structure for
space exploration. The focus of this chapter will be placed on the attempt to subvert the
institutions of space exploration. For this case, the dominant actor is the state, with the
non-dominant actor being private interests. Private interests will attempt to change the
way that space exploration is governed and conducted in order to support their
interests. As the international system underwent a normative and geopolitical shift in the
1980s, the subversion should be observed as successful.
Beginning in the early 1980s, a paradigm shift in the types of activities mankind
undertakes in outer space has been underway for over three decades. With the earliest
shifts from national to sub-national and private entities as participants in outer space
activities, space exploration has since left the realm of a purely national activity and has
become something that private and commercial entities could participate in as well.
These commercial and private entities have progressed from merely outside players in
the system reliant on national space programs to grant access in space to the point
where national space programs rely on these private providers to place materials and
personnel into space. Additionally, private space entities are developing parallel mission
to national space programs, and are attempting to leapfrog the capabilities of national
space programs with an eye towards placing humans back on the Moon and on Mars
before national or international space programs.
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The story of this shift to private and commercial space activities will be the
foundation of this chapter, focusing on several important issues. First, the very idea of
privatization and commercialization within outer space activities will be explored. A
distinct definition of these terms will be proposed with examples being given. Second,
an examination of the phenomenon of privatization of space activities will be conducted,
with a focus on the Russian Space Agency as a representation of the privatization of a
national space program, and on INTELSAT on the privatization of the international
institution. Third, an examination of commercial space will be conducted, with a focus
on Space Exploration (SpaceX) as the primary commercial entity. This section on
commercialization will also examine the role of private incentives in spurring on the
commercial space industry, namely the various X-Prizes as a market incentive made to
counter the dis-incentivization that has been built into international outer space law.
Finally, this chapter will examine the interaction between commercial, private, and
national space programs with an eye towards future trends that could potentially create
massive governance problems for a potentially wide-open and unexploited arena for
human activity.
Privatization
The process of privatization in space exploration has been decades-long and is
still undergoing many interesting developments. In order to better understand this
process, a functional definition must be developed and agreed upon. Privatization is not
a new concept on the world stage, but has only fairly recently become important to the
realm of space exploration, although researchers have been examining the question of
privatization of space activities since at least the 1980s (Tatsuzawa 1988). The very

106

nature of the laws and institutions of space exploration has been focused on keeping
space accessible, but almost exclusively accessible by a small cadre of national space
programs. While space exploration is both highly technical and expensive, leading to
the so-called space club to remain a very exclusive group, the laws and institutions of
space exploration have served another important role in keeping the club small. Yet
recent technological developments have seen a shift in who precisely can join the club,
from both a technical and legal perspective. The beginning of this change has occurred
with the initial privatization of space activities.
Coined in the 1930s by The Economist in reference to the role of Germany’s
government in economic policy, the concept of privatization is most commonly
associated with the actions of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s selling off of publicly
owned industry in 1980s Great Britain (Bel, 2006). This definition of privatization is
highly useful for the current situation and circumstances of space activities. When
referring to privatization in the case of space activities, there are two ways to examine
this phenomenon. The first is a specific process of transitioning from wholly publicly and
governmentally owned entities to privately held entities is the sphere that is being
examined. For the time being, this definition shall be termed ownership privatization.
While this can take one of several possible routes, from selling off of a portion of shares
in a public industry, to the start up of new businesses meant to supplant the former
public industry,17 some particular aspects of privatization must be held in common. First,
the entity involved in privatization must begin its life as a governmental organization or
publicly (state) owned industrial concern, be it national agency (such as the Soviet
17

This particular case will be treated as an entirely separate concept,
commercialization, as seen below.
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Space Agency) or international consortium (INTELSAT). Secondly, a distinct policy
decision must be made within the national government or among the international
partners that privatization should occur. Finally, the endpoint of this process is an entity
with at least a substantial private ownership (be it privately held or publicly traded). The
final entity does not have to be entirely private, and can result in a public-private
partnership, with either the public or private aspect being dominant.
The second approach to privatization is at the same time simpler and more
complex. This second definition can be termed mission privatization. Regardless of
ownership of space industries, be they fully publicly owned, public-private partnerships,
or fully privatized (using the previous definition of privatization), the entities can shift
their goals. If they shift away from merely national provision of space services 18 to
providing these services for a fee to either other states or to commercial entities, this
shift can be considered to be privatization. This type of privatization stems from a
change in mission away from the previously understood scientific endeavours of
national space programs towards more commercial goals, hence mission privatization.
Up to this point, the vast majority of space activities have been conducted by
either wholly national entities or by privatized industry. There are several important
examples of privatized space entities that must be mentioned at this time. Perhaps the
most prominent example of a privatized space agency is Roscosmos, the Russian
Federal Space Agency, also referred to as FKA or RKA. While RKA exists as a national
agency responsible for Russia’s activities in space, RSC Energia, itself part of the
recently privatized Russian space industry, undertook a large percentage of its space
18

These services include launches, monitoring, planning, and communication. They can
also include the provision of information, mostly remote sensing data.
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operations. While the reality is that Roscosmos was mostly informally privatized, it still
provides one of the finest examples of privatization of a space agency, indeed, Moscow
has recently decreed that the Russian space industry must be re-nationalized following
gross mismanagement of the industry and the agency as a whole. The story of
privatization of Russian space activities will be further elucidated in a section below, but
is a very interesting tale of privatization and re-nationalization through a joint-stock
corporation.
In the realm of satellite operation, many privatized entities have emerged in the
last three decades. Aside from the international case of INTELSAT, which will also be
further examined below, many other national and international satellite entities have
emerged. The vast majority of these concerns are related to remote sensing
capabilities, and are part of the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japanese
Space Agency (JAXA). The satellites were originally owned and operated by these
various national (and in the case of ESA, international) space agencies, yet their day-today operations have been turned over to private entities. This trend illustrates
privatization in using publicly created goods for private gains.
It is also worth noting that various calls have been made to partially privatize NASA.
While it could be readily argued that NASA has been privatized under the second
conception of privatization as described above, these calls pertain mostly to the first
type of privatization (concerning ownership). Primarily originating with Washington thinktanks with a libertarian orientation, such as CATO and the Reason Foundation, these
calls believe that due to the rapidly evolving nature of space exploration, a much less
bureaucratic entity would be more suited to planning and operating space exploration
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missions (Summers, 2013). Proponents for privatization of NASA also believe that costs
of administration and conducting missions would be drastically reduced with
privatization, possibly opening up outer space to much wider usage. While full
privatization does not seem possible for NASA at this point, another current in space
activities, commercialization, has seen significant movement in the last few decades.
Commercialization
The terms privatization and commercialization are often used interchangeably in
the context of space exploration. While this might work for the layperson, when trying to
understand the processes and effects of the entry of non-governmental entities into the
realm of space activities, a clearer definition must be drawn. While the concept of
privatization has been explored and defined as a governmental entity becoming at least
partially a privately held enterprise, the concept of commercialization must be drawn out
as a separate process. Commercialization has been associated traditionally with the
idea of bringing a new technology into market for commercial and financial gains (Jolly,
1997). While this definition is not an entirely inaccurate portrayal of the recent
occurrences of the last few years in the private space exploration field, it does not fully
encapsulate the process of commercialization as it is currently underway.
A better definition of commercialization points to a wholly private entity, using its
own equipment, selling its services either to other private concerns or to governments
and international agencies. The key difference between the process of privatization and
the process of commercialization is the original condition of the business entity. For
privatization, the agency must have at one point in its creation been a public
governmental agency. For commercialization, the business must begin its life as a
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wholly private concern. Also of great importance is the origin of the equipment being
utilized by the company. For privatization, the equipment can come from in-house,
meaning developed and manufactured by the entity or government agency (as in the
case of RKA), or can be sourced from outside the concern (many of the satellite
corporations in existence today). For it to be a case of commercialization, the equipment
must have been developed in house, and this equipment, and services provided are in
conjunction the primary revenue source for the business. The end user must go through
the commercial entity to operate and achieve their goals.
Perhaps the most important thing to consider when examining commercialization
is that the commercial entity seeks to operate at least to parallel or at best to supplant
any national space agency. An important consideration is that the equipment and
service can be provided at a higher quality and lower price than any national space
agency. Under commercialization we also have the process of a national space agency
turning over some operation to the private and commercial entity. While the primary
actor to be examined later in the chapter to clear up the question of commercialization is
Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX), many other commercial agencies have
provided their service to national and international space agencies. The two other major
and operational commercial space entities of note are Bigelow Aerospace 19 and Orbital
Sciences.20 While other commercial space entities exist, these providers operational
equipment that has already been successfully deployed.

19

Bigelow Aerospace does not exist as a launch provider, but instead focuses on the
creation of usable habitat space in outer space. They focus on inflatable habitats, both
for public (read national and international) and private (tourism and industrial) uses.
20
Orbital Sciences was the first major non-governmental provider of launch to orbit
capability from the United States. Though they have had a large degree of success with
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The nascent space-based industrial sector is primarily theoretical at this point in
time, but future work should focus on this aspect of the commercialization of space
activities.21 It should be noted that previous space-based industries, primarily of the
communication variety, have sought to operate in parallel or supplant national
capabilities, but have also seen themselves become service providers for national
actors.22 Also, there exist many so-called space tourism companies, namely Space
Adventures and Virgin Galactic. These companies focus on providing tourists with rides
into outer space, be they the small sub-orbital hops to be provided by Virgin Galactic or
the longer stays by private individuals aboard the International Space Station as
arranged by Space Adventures. While these examples provide some interesting cases,
especially in infusing private money into public space agencies, these cases are not
really relevant to the commercialization process. This work will not examine the role of
space tourism, but will instead focus on commercial or scientific activities in outer
space.
Now that clear and separate definitions have been created for both privatization
and commercialization, the focus of this chapter will shift to a deeper examination of
these different processes. The next section will look at two prominent examples of the

satellite launches, they have begun to lag behind SpaceX in provision of launches to the
government (mainly resupply missions to the ISS).
21
Both Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries provide interesting cases for
future space industry, namely asteroid mining. But at this point in time neither has
begun full operation. Planetary Resources has begun launching of satellites to remotely
prospect for asteroids containing valuable minerals.
22
The major example of this type of commercial space industry is the IRIDIUM network
as designed and launched by Motorola. This company sought to create a satellite
telephone network for the masses, but the primary buyers have been military clients.
IRIDIUM has since been spun off from Motorola and is generally considered to be a
commercial failure.
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privatization process. For a national agency that has been privatized, Roscosmos will
serve as the deeper case study. Roscosmos also has the interesting characteristic that
it has recently undergone a process of re-nationalization, something that will provide an
interesting insight into the process of privatization. As the example for an international
organization that has been privatized, we will return to a deeper analysis of INTELSAT,
as it transitioned from national, to international, to private, finally ending up as a
commercial entity, but a commercial entity that has a designated oversight international
organization.
ROSCOSMOS, RSC ENERGIA, and Informal Privatization of Russian Space
Activities
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt by
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, many of the important state-run activities of
the newly reformed Russian Federation found themselves in an institutional lurch. The
old Soviet era space industry was not immune to this condition. The activities of the old
Soviet Space Program were lumped together and on February 25 th, 1992, the new
Russian Space Agency was created. Known commonly as Roscosmos, this new
institution was from its earliest inception very poorly managed and funded. The first
leader of this new institution, Yuri Koptev, was not a bureaucrat with institutional
experience, but was instead a designer of Mars landers. The organization itself was not
centrally controlled or organized, but instead had various competing design bureaus, all
constantly struggling to keep their preferred projects afloat.
While Roscosmos was never formally privatized, a large degree of decisionmaking and profit seeking was directed by a storied privatized space industry in Russia,
the OAO S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia, or RSC Energia for
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short. RSC Energia was itself a product of privatization in the same period as
Roscosmos, having been previously known as Scientific-Production Association
Energia (NPO Energia). During the Soviet era, NPO Energia had been the primary
design and construction contractor for the Soviet Space Program. The role played
during the Soviet Era by Energia was so great that there is very little practical
separation between Energia and the Soviet Space Program. This special relationship
between Energia and the Russian Federal Space Program continued once both were
moved out of the Soviet system. But instead of this relationship being one between
various government entities with similar interests, the new relationship reflected a much
more public-private partnership. With decision-making capability at a minimum within
Roscosmos proper, RSC Energia began to play a much larger role in deciding the
direction of Russian space activities (Harvey, 2007).
The era of informal privatization of Roscosmos began with the question of
continued operation of the Mir space station. With the station reaching the end of its
own predicted usable lifespan, but showing signs that it could survive beyond the “useby date,” a decision had to be made concerning the continued operation of the station
by Roscosmos. RKA was at the time in an institutional crisis, with the various competing
factions of design bureaus unable to reach any decision on the operation of Mir in the
future. It was at this point that the private shareholders board of RSC Energia convened
to come to a decision about Mir, as they had been instrumental in the design and
construction of the station, as well as its operation. Seeing that the station was sound
and that there were good financial and scientific reasons to keep it in orbit, the board of
RSC Energia made the decision to continue operations of Mir well past the 1999
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operation window. The board of RSC Energia was also instrumental in the Shuttle-Mir
program, a program that would lay the groundwork for the creation of the International
Space Station, the follow-on project from Mir. RSC Energia also maintained control over
the manned space flight aspects of the Russian Space Program, not only handling the
launch of Russian astronauts, but also expanding manned launch services to other
states and private individuals through a partnership with Space Adventures.
Beyond simply the question of continuing to operate the Mir station, RSC Energia
also expanded its role in the other operations of Roscosmos. While Roscosmos began
to suffer from management issues, larger problems in Russian society also began to
affect the Russian Space Program. From the inception of the Russian Federation until
well into the early years of the 2000s, Russia suffered from massive cash flow problems
related to the wider privatization of Russian industry. This situation saw Roscosmos
privatized in a second informal manner. The mission parameters of Roscosmos
expanded beyond simply operating Russian space missions to become the world’s
largest provider of space launches. On the back of the RSC Energia-designed Soyuz
and Proton rockets, Russia executes in a single year almost the same number of
launches as the rest of the world combined (SpaceFlightNow, 2015). By switching from
strictly the government’s route to orbit to becoming the space travel equivalent of UPS,
Roscosmos was able to counteract the problem of declining cash flow from the
government. Roscosmos continues to supplement its own governmental budget by
acting as the world’s orbital delivery service. Furthermore, Roscosmos has expanded its
orbital delivery offerings, becoming one of the primary operators of the Sea Launch
initiative. This expansion into money-earning activities, both commercial and tourism-

115

based has been crucial in keeping Roscosmos afloat and growing during several
periods of turmoil since the creation of the Russian Federation.
Roscosmos has been rather successful during the period of two-pronged
privatization, but, as with all things in Russia, the situation is contingent of political
activity. With the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term, a push originating from
Roscosmos itself has begun to change the status quo of both Roscosmos and the
Russian space industry as a whole (Harvey, 2007). In dealing with the various problems
of mismanagement that have come from both the institutional structure and poor
leadership of Roscosmos, Vladimir Popovkin, the then head of Roscosmos, called for
RKA to be made into a wholly state-owned corporation for a period of five-seven years.
Following this period of re-nationalization, RKA should then be turned into a joint-stock
company. The argument put forth by Mr. Popovkin is that it would take a period of
government direction to correct the systemic mismanagement that has characterized
Roscosmos up to this point in time. State ownership would also allow the country to
restructure the space industry to remove much of the redundant capacity left over from
the Soviet Era (Interfax 2012).
On September 3, 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced that
the entire space industry in Russia would be nationalized under the United Rocket and
Space Corporation or URSC (Messier, 2013). This renationalization plan is slated to
consolidate and reorganize the redundant elements of the old Soviet aerospace
industry. RSC Energia was also leveraged into this new corporation, less by federal
dictate and more by the government purchasing a controlling interest (up from the
previous 38 percent state ownership) (Henry, 2015). Initially the head of RSC Energia,
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Vitaly Lopota became the head of URSC, but was removed in an attempt to shake up
the overall decades-long mismanagement of the Russian space sector.
By focusing the efforts of the Russian space industry’s infrastructure on a new
lean-manufacturing concept, the hope is that URSC could remain competitive as an
international commercial launch provider in the face of purely commercial launch and
service companies entering the field. Furthermore, in January of 2015, URSC was
merged with Roscosmos to create a unified space industry in Russia, eventually to be
held under the newly minted Roscosmos Space Corporation. It is hoped that by unifying
the space industry in Russia, many of the chronic problems that have plagued the
industry can be solved. Dmitry Rogozin has characterized this move as the beginning of
the second stage of reform of the space sector. The merger of URSC and Roscosmos
into one entity has been proclaimed to be the beginning of reforms not only to the
Russian space industry, but to the entire space sector (Henry, 2015). URSC and
Roscosmos can best be viewed as two parts of a larger whole of the nationalized space
sector, with URSC responsible for design and manufacture of space equipment (the
material side of space), and with Roscosmos responsible for the services necessary for
space operations.
While these reforms have been hailed as good and necessary by those within the
organizations, the heavy-handed reorganization and renationalization has been view by
some outside the industry as “radical centralization,” even in the mainstream Russian
media (RIA Novosti, 2013). This centralization is aimed at making the Russian space
sector competitive with purely commercial providers while restoring integrity and
innovation to the industry as a whole. Even the renationalization of the space sector is
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at the service of a privatized interest, namely making money with these public goods.
Yet the plan does not end with Roscosmos Space Corporation remaining wholly
nationalized. From its very inception, the end goal has been to have Roscosmos Space
Corporation be a joint-stock company and, after the reforms and reorganization have
been completed, within a decade to have a public offer for at least partial stake in the
company. This public stock sale to take place at an unspecified point in the future would
result in a second wave of privatization for the Russian space industry, taking this story
full circle and resulting in a much more clearly privatized Roscosmos.
The previous chapter of this work has focused on the governance oriented role of
INTELSAT, yet did mention the interesting shift that took place from international
organization to publicly traded stock company. At this point a more detailed look at this
interesting case is appropriate and necessary.
INTELSAT, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, and $I
Upon its chartering in 1964, the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization would set out to create the geosynchronous telecommunications satellite
network that would serve as the backbone for the interconnected contemporary world.
In the following five decades, international society has been massively transformed due
in no small part to the actions undertaken by INTELSAT. During that same period, a
large degree of institutional change has occurred, as the rest of the world has not only
adopted and caught up to the technical capabilities of INTELSAT, but has in many ways
surpassed the former international organization. In order to adapt and compete in this
new world, INTELSAT has undergone a complete transformation in the privatization of
space activities.
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Beginning in the late 1980s, the technical capabilities of telecommunications
providers and private space satellite firms had reached a rough parity with INTELSAT.
The institutional structure of INTELSAT, however, allowed for an unfair market
advantage for the institution in the face of competition from commercial providers of
telecommunications satellites. In the United States, the position of COMSAT, the
signatory to the body of INTELSAT, was previously held as a joint position between the
federal government representing the public and private telecommunications companies.
A similar situation existed in most other state signatories to INTELSAT, although many
states, e.g. Great Britain and France, were represented by wholly state-owned
telecommunications companies. In 1985 the Federal Communications Commission in
the United States, following a letter by President Reagan in 1984 officially allowed
competition against INTELSAT by private companies.
A decade later, President Clinton began negotiations with other parties within
INTELSAT to initiate a privatization process. These negotiations were completed and
approved by the Assembly of Parties in Malaysia in 1999 (DalBello, 2013).
Domestically, the United States Congress passed the ORBIT Act in 2000 to manage the
privatization of the COMSAT seat within the United States23. This act would also impact
the overall privatization process for INTELSAT guiding it into a more competitive
position in the overall telecommunications satellite market. The competition that had
been driven by the creation of PanAmSat in the late 1980s had finally reached a peak
when INTELSAT itself recognized the need to become a private entity in order to better
compete in the market (Hinson, 1999).

23

The seat on the governing board of INTELSAT.
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Yet unlike many other privatizing organizations in the 1990s, INTELSAT had
distinct mandates that had to be upheld beyond making a profit. The primary mandate
that impacts INTELSAT is termed the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation, or LCO. This
obligation ensures that international public telecommunications services will be
available to the entire world. While certain provisions of the LCO expired in July 2013,
there still remains the obligation for INTELSAT to maintain global satellite coverage and
global connectivity. The manner in which these obligations were to be met created a
great deal of frustration during the process of negotiating the privatization of INTELSAT.
When it became clear that INTELSAT would have to privatize, several options were
proposed. Of the major options presented to the governing board, only two were
considered realistic. These options were (1) creating a private INTELSAT with a
vestigial IGO to offer oversight and ensure LCO was maintained, and (2) creating a
private INTELSAT that had LCO as corporate values. In the end, the board of
INTELSAT adopted the option creating a vestigial IGO for oversight (Hinson, 1999).
Once a path was chosen for full privatization of INTELSAT, many other distinct
problems had to be dealt with, especially the issues of governance and the
maintenance of ITU orbital registrations. These issues were quickly dealt with and by
2001 INTELSAT was fully privatized. Private INTELSAT was initially based out of
Washington DC, where its primary regulation came not from international norms, but
from the dictates of the FCC. More importantly, the market protections that had been
afforded the IGO INTELSAT were revoked, causing INTELSAT to compete freely in the
telecommunications satellite market. At this point, INTELSAT was still primarily held and
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owned by public ownership blocks. A further amendment set INTELSAT on the road to
full private ownership.
Over the course of the 2000s, INTELSAT established itself as one of the primary
providers of international telecommunications satellites, based on previous work as an
IGO. INTELSAT also remained committed to the concept of LCO as a key feature of
their services. Corporate headquarters were moved to Luxembourg, with administrative
headquarters being moved to Tyson’s Corner, VA. Finally, in 2013, an initial public
offering brought INTELSAT into the fully privatized and commercial world. Yet this is not
the end of the story, for INTELSAT does not exist fully on its own.
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization remains as a
vestigial, but nevertheless important oversight IGO. ITSO’s mandate is now focused on
verifying and maintaining access to the international telecommunications regime as
established by Intelsat, Ltd by making sure that decisions made by Intelsat, Ltd. are
made fairly and on a global non-discriminatory basis (ITSO, 2013). The ITSO, an
organization freely joinable by any UN member state, also guides Intelsat, Ltd. in the
provision and improvement of future services to fill the information and communications
needs of society. While Intelsat, Ltd. is free to make business decisions on its own, if a
decision was made that was deemed counter to the interests of ITSO, then perhaps
some tension would emerge. But in the last decade and a half since the privatization of
INTELSAT was initiated, this situation has not been the case.
The transition of INTELSAT from internationally managed and publicly owned
IGO to publicly traded telecommunications satellite company Intelsat, Ltd. provides an
excellent case to illustrate both types of privatization. With competition in the market
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against commercial entities, we see INTELSAT acting in a way to seek profits for the
IGO. On the other hand, this competition drove the creation of the privatized entity
Intelsat, Ltd. In an interesting twist, Intelsat, Ltd. has chosen recently to shift their launch
provider away from their traditional provider, NASA, towards a new commercial entity,
SpaceX, launching a satellite aboard the very first commercial launch conducted aboard
their Falcon 9 rocket. SpaceX is of great importance to this chapter, as it will serve as
the primary example of process of commercialization in space activities.
Space Exploration Technologies, Ansari X-Prize, and the birth of a new
Space Race
In the early 1990s, the very notion that a privately designed and operated
spacecraft could safely put a man into space and return him to Earth’s surface would
have been considered science fiction. But this era of space exploration was a time of
great promise for change to the status quo. Peter Diamandis, a former medical student
and aerospace engineer, believed that a new era of space exploration could be coaxed
into existence in a manner similar to the early days of manned flight nearly a century
earlier, through privately funded barn-burning competitions. On May 18, 1996 the XPrize was announced for the first team to successfully place a manned spacecraft into
suborbital space twice within a two-week period. With the financial assistance of
Anousheh and Hamid Ansari, the $10 million Ansari X-Prize attracted over 26 teams
into a competition to complete this once unthinkable feat. Mojave Aerospace Ventures,
a design team run by Burt Rutan and funded by Paul Allen, won the prize on October 4,
2004 (Solomon, 2012). While the ship and launch system were successful, little
commercial potential for this type of craft existed beyond space tourism, as exemplified
by Virgin Galactic.

122

The successful completion of this competition served not as an end, but as a
beginning for a new type of space race, leading to the creation of a proliferation of
commercial space ventures. Perhaps the most interesting of these ventures, and the
subject of this case study, is Space Exploration Technologies, or SpaceX. Founded in
June of 2002 by Elon Musk, the goal of this new company was to make access to space
much more affordable, making space commerce a much more realistic proposition.
While SpaceX was not part of the original X-Prize competition, Musk set his sights a bit
higher than simply winning the Ansari X-Prize. SpaceX seeks to introduce the idea of
creative destruction into spaceflight by reducing launch costs by over 90% from their
own initial costs, much less the cost of a NASA launch, over the course of a decade
(Solomon, 2012).24 To accomplish this industrial feat, a new approach to space
launches would be required.
In order not only to compete with, but to hopefully supplant,NASA as a provider
for space launches, massive cost reductions for weight-to-orbit would be necessary.
The key to this cost reduction, SpaceX believes, is a shift towards fully reusable launch
vehicles. Although this idea of reusable launch vehicles is a dream that extends back to
the Space Shuttle program, great increases in actual reusability would be required over
the Shuttle. Whereas the Space Shuttle relied on a disposable external fuel tank and
extensive reconditioning of the orbiter itself, SpaceX has sought to create a rocket that
would return to its own launch pad and be reusable with only minimal reconditioning and
refueling. Over the course of the first decade of SpaceX’s existence, great progress has
24

Musk set his sights on unseating Lockheed Martin and Boeing as the primary
providers of launch services to NASA, viewing them as “…operat[ing]…with
horrendously poor efficiency” and “the bureaucratic tendency to cling to obsolete
hardware” (Solomon 2012)
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been made in that direction. This progress has also occurred during a time of stagnation
in both vision and funding for NASA, causing a disruption in the traditional order of
access to space.
After the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February of 2003, the
decision was made to retire the Shuttle fleet following the completion of the International
Space Station, limiting the ability for the United States to place both material and
personnel into low Earth orbit. While President Bush proposed the Constellation
Program to replace the Space Shuttle, the economic crisis in the late 2000s, paired with
sever design flaws in the program caused this route to space to be cancelled as well.
This loss of capacity to launch to orbit opened up a new avenue that was ripe for
exploitation by commercial space providers. While NASA could rely on Roscosmos to
give astronauts access to the ISS, and could continue to uses its non-shuttle rocket fleet
to place material into orbit, the administration opened up competition to provide a
commercial solution for access to low earth orbit and the ISS.
This competition and program, known as Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services or COTS, was initiated in 2006 to award contracts to three companies who
demonstrate the capability to service the ISS with resupply missions. This program
infused $800 million into the coffers of the competitors, and resulted in what is
considered to be an unqualified success (NASA, 2014). SpaceX and Orbital Sciences
eventually became the two commercial entities to receive the contracts, and as of April,
2015 have both had several successful resupply missions to the ISS.25
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Several companies have contended for the third spot, but the two closest competitors,
Rocketplane Kistler and Sierra Nevada have both had significant funding and design
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While SpaceX has won a contract for several resupply missions to the ISS, this
economic role is not the end goal for the company. A large part of the corporate mission
has also been to develop a manned spaceflight capacity. Using the same Falcon 9-r
rocket system and a variation on the automated Dragon capsule used for resupply
missions, SpaceX has also won contracts for another NASA program, the Commercial
Crew Development Program. SpaceX currently plans to launch its first manned mission
to the ISS in 2017, fulfilling the first of several contracted resupply and re-crewing
missions for NASA. This commercial crew program cost NASA approximately $1.5
billion, of which $544 million was awarded to SpaceX. In contrast, the Orion program,
NASA’s attempt to regain manned spaceflight capability totals $12 billion. SpaceX is
capable of completing very similar missions for a fraction of the developmental costs of
the government-created program, even before accounting for the reusability of the
launch vehicles.
These demonstrated capabilities for launch at much lower prices have not only
begun to affect NASA, conducting launch operations and missions the governmental
agency would have traditionally conducted internally, but they have also begun to
gather a large non-governmental manifest of missions. This 50+ manifest of missions
includes many satellite launches to geosynchronous orbit that would have typically been
conducted by NASA, including the first completely commercial launch of an Intelsat, Ltd.
telecommunications satellite (SpaceX, 2015). Not only has SpaceX successfully caught
up to NASA’s launch capabilities in the course of less than a decade, but they have also
begun to supplant NASA as a launch provider for both commercial and NASA payloads.
issues. This has resulted in their being dropped from contention, in the case of RpK
after a contract for resupply had already been signed with NASA.
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The rapid advances and innovations that have come from the commercial space field
have seen NASA change its own policies and strategic plans, abandoning low Earth
orbit launches to commercial entities in preference of deep space missions such as
asteroid capture and exploration. Yet SpaceX and most other commercial space entities
are not content to stay in the realm of LEO and launching of commercial satellites.
One of the primary missions within SpaceX’s corporate identity is to make
humanity a multiplanetary species (SpaceX, 2015). In order to accomplish this feat,
SpaceX would need to be able to provide transportation of personnel and material
safely across interplanetary space to Mars within a reasonable timeframe after launch,
as well as being able to make a return trip. This transportation capability will require a
much more powerful and reusable launch system than even the planned Falcon-9
heavy rocket. The proposed launch system, the Mars Colony Transporter, is expected
to be operational by the mid-2020s, much faster than a NASA-funded and developed
competitor (Thomson, 2014). With NASA shifting towards strategic mission goals that
do not support a trip to the moon or an eventual landing on Mars 26, it appears that
commercial entities, especially SpaceX, are poised not only to run in parallel to
government space entities, but could very well surpass publicly operated space
exploration missions (Binzel, 2014). The earliest hoped-for ARM would occur in 2025,

26

While both Moon landings and Mars missions have been proposed, the only currently
scheduled mission is that of asteroid capture in Lunar orbit. This mission is considered
to be a dead end mission, as it has no real applicability as a stepping stone to more
deep space exploratory missions.
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barring further NASA cuts; while Musk believes that his first MCT launch to Mars could
occur the same year27.
As a privately funded commercial space provider, SpaceX gives the best real
world example of the commercialization of space activities. Beginning as the brain-child
of a Silicon Valley startup millionaire, this company has rapidly innovated in the space
field, one which had been stagnant for several decades. Musk’s company has not only
managed to catch up to the capabilities of public space agencies such as NASA, it has
begun to supplant them as a launch provider. The launches that are being provided are
not merely to other commercial entities, but to the public space agencies themselves.
Distinct plans are underway in the coming decades not only to supplant NASA and
other public agencies as a launch provider, but to surpass the exploratory
achievements. This switch towards commercial space provides many distinct
challenges to the current governance regime for outer space, as capabilities to reach
space have rapidly spun out of governmental control.
Challenges to the Governance Regime of Outer Space from Non-Public
Space Entities
Under the four primary treaties governing mankind’s activities in outer space, the
primary assumption is that national entities will be the primary participants in space
activities. It is often noted that international and non-governmental organizations can
become signatories to the treaties, but only real international participants are
consolidated national space programs such as ESA. This institutional state of affairs, it
27

SpaceX would fund development for these missions to Mars by utilizing the profits
from the 50+ mission manifest. While most companies would be beholden to a board or
stock holders, Musk has no such limitations, as his board are currently aligned with his
plans to have manned missions to Mars. Musk in on record stating that no public offer of
stocks will occur until boots are on the ground on Mars and the MCT is regularly flying.
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should be clear at this point, is fundamentally under attack by new commercial and
privatized entrants into the space field. When the current legal regime was created,
access to space was a very difficult undertaking. To quote Richard Branson, CEO of
Virgin Galactic, “Space is hard”(Cheng, 2014).28
But in the nearly fifty years since the signing of OST 1967, great changes have
occurred in both international politics and in the technologies of space travel. Many of
the most important signatories of the various treaties have undergone fundamental
changes in the way they access or deal with outer space. The Soviet Union has become
the Russian Federation and 14 other countries, and the Soviet Space program has
become Roscosmos. Various European states that signed the treaty have joined an
international organization to pool resources in order to access outer space. NASA and
the United States have lost the capacity to put astronauts into space, and have suffered
a severe crisis of funding and vision.
On the other hand, great innovation has been seen by commercial space entities.
This innovation is driving down the costs necessary to reach into outer space, and more
nations and organizations will soon be able to utilize outer space in ways that were only
science fiction when the treaties were signed. As the capacity to explore outer space
becomes the ability to exploit outer space for commercial gain, the question of who will
benefit from this exploitation will become highly salient. The world as envisioned by
policymakers and elites in the 1960s, 70s and early 80s held the state as the primary
actor in a world of slow, deliberate action within international institutions. By the end of
the 1980s the world had already begun to shift, as policy makers within states and
28

Richard Branson addressing the media on October 31, 2014 following the crash of
Spaceship Two.
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international institutions lost control over actions within the international system. Nonstate actors, namely corporate commercial entities, began to increase their prominence
in directing the shape of the world. With an increase in technological capacity of nonstate actors, and a shift in the overall state in world politics, the treaties governing outer
space have begun to erode.
Questions of liability have also been raised about the participation of commercial
and privatized actors in space activities. The treaties as they stand place the onus of
legal liability on the states where launches occur. This assignment of liability is clearly
predicated on the notion that any launches that occur from within national boundaries
will be conducted by national space agencies. Yet with a privatized entity like
Roscosmos conducting launches from within the borders of another country,
Kazakhstan,29 the assignment of liability could technically be argued. Roscosmos Sea
Launch launches, occurring in international equatorial waters, provide an even more
questionable case. More importantly, fully commercial space programs could potentially
shirk legal liability by placing the liability on the state from which they have launched.
While these cases will most likely be settled within domestic courts, the international
nature of liability caused by non-state space launches could become highly
complicated.
Perhaps the largest issues caused by commercial space entities comes not from
liability or questions of exploitation, but from the very fact that their activities are most
likely to supplant and out-pace state space agency missions. This problem is
exacerbated by a lack of funding that has become emblematic of national space
29

Baikonour Cosmodrome, while located in Kazakhstan, is technically Russian territory.
This example is merely to provide a thought experiment.
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programs. With a lack of funding comes a decrease in vision and possibility of grand
scientific missions. Most traditional space exploration scenarios place national space
programs or international cooperative missions at the fore of human exploration of the
solar system and beyond. But in the last few years it has begun to seem that individuals
outside of the state system will be the ones to drive mankind beyond Earth. With
stagnation from NASA, a focus on robotic missions by both NASA and ESA, and
political difficulties surrounding Roscosmos, the formerly national and international
nature of space exploration is in great jeopardy. As states abandon their leadership role
in space exploration, new entrants who were not considered in the creation of the legal
regime governing space exploration have stepped in to keep mankind moving towards
the stars.
Since the 1980s, a shift in the way that states deal with one another has
occurred. Where states once chose to act in a cooperative manner, building institutions
and trusting that the state would continue to be the primary actor in the international
system, now the role of markets, individuals and companies have become much more
important. This process of privatization of once national or international space
organization has accelerated in the face of economic hardship. Commercial space
entities have come to play an increasingly important role in space activities, a trend
which does not appear to be weakening. On the back of individuals with large personal
economic bases, space exploration is once again becoming a focus for mankind, and
with the innovation being created by these individuals and their commercial space
entities, space may become accessible to a much wider portion of humanity. The
institutional structures created at the dawn of the space age reflect an outmoded view of
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how mankind should interface with the realm beyond our own atmosphere. The gaps in
law and institutional mismanagement of outer space must be addressed soon, or they
will be left far behind as elements of mankind leave Earth behind when they head
further out into the solar system.
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CHAPTER 6: THE INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET, ODiis, AND
THE CREATION OF A NEW INSTITUTIONAL TYPE
“The ‘Net is a waste of time, and this is exactly what is right about it”- William Gibson
This chapter serves as the first part of the case study for the governance of the
Internet. Much like chapter 3, the focus will be on answering the question “How can
technology best be governed?” To answer this question, this chapter will take the
approach of a historical and functional institutional analysis of the creation of the
institutions governing the Internet. Of particular interest to this story, and providing an
interesting challenge to the traditional literature on institutional formation. Is the end
result of the so-called organically developed internet institutions following the
multistakeholder model.
Originally a brainchild of various US military agencies and academic groups,30
the interconnected network of interconnected networks known today as the Internet
provides an interesting case of the governance of technology. Unlike the institutions
governing space exploration, the international community has created very little formal
governance structure for the Internet. States, other than the United States of America,
have not been major players in the creation of the governance structures of the Internet.
What has been seen instead are the roles of individuals and interest groups in the
creation of a workable and beneficial governance structure for the Internet. While the
medium of the Internet would seem to fall naturally under the control of a treaties based
regime, namely the ITU, a much different process for the creation of governance was
observed.
30

Primarily DARPA- the Defense Advanced Projects Administration and ISI- Information
Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California.
132

The problem of governing the rapidly evolving information technologies of the
Internet can be divided roughly into two separate concerns. On the one hand is the
question of root access of the Domain Name System (DNS). This question deals with
how computers and systems are named and how they can be accessed, primarily a
software issue. The other question is of a more technical hardware nature, dealing with
the technical underpinning and standardization of Internet Protocol (IP). Other technical
standardization issues also exist, e.g., transmission technologies such as undersea
cables and Wi-Fi standards.
This chapter will examine the creation of the formal structure of the most
important governing body of the Internet: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers, or ICANN. The relationship between this privately owned and
administered governance agency responsible for DNS issues on the one hand, and
both the United States government and the international Internet community on the
other hand, will be explored. A discussion of the non-governmental self-regulatory
nature of this corporate governance structure will also be highly important. The Internet
Society, or ISOC, will also be examined for its role in the governance of Internet
Protocol. It should be noted that ISOC is an even more loosely governed organization
than ICANN. This highly unorthodox governance structure should serve as an
interesting case of how open collaboration can create a different, and perhaps more
efficient, way of governing new technologies.
Governance before ICANN
From the earliest days of the Internet, questions of governance abounded. The
very concept of the Internet, an interconnected series of networks to allow for easy
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transmission of data and collaboration between various research institutions, requires a
distinct set of hierarchies and clear rules for operation. While these questions may not
be political in the way that political scientists typically deal with governance, the unique
interaction between government, academia, and technologists created a fertile ground
for the creation of new and innovative governance structures for a technology poised to
remake society. The primary method for Internet governance from the very beginning
was a continuous series of collaborative papers called Requests for Comment, or
RFCs. These RFCs would define the actual realities of the Internet in ways that
government authority was simply incapable of doing.31 The original players in these
RFCs were researchers at DARPA and ISI, and include many of the fathers of the
Internet such as Vint Cerf, Jon Postel, Steve Crocker, and Robert Kahn (Mueller, 2002).
Cert, Postel, et al. would, through their technical contributions and the level of respect
they generate in the early Internet field, greatly direct not only the technical aspects of
the Internet as we know it today, but also the governance structures that would
eventually emerge for the Internet. These RFCs continue to be highly important in the
governance of the Internet, and have been adopted as a technology for the governance
of most technical projects within the realm of information technologies.
In the days before the creation of ICANN, the governance structures for the
Internet were much less formalized. Building on the early working groups within the old
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RFCs are essentially ideas postulated by one thinker, who then through a collegial
series of interactions with other participants would attempt to arrive at a workable
consensus about whether and how these ideas of Internet functioning should be
implimented
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ARPANET,32 IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) was created by participants
in the Internet Activities Board (Mueller,2002).33 Upon the opening of the Internet to
commercial entities in 1991, IANA would take on the responsibility of governing the
Internet, primarily at the root and top-level domains. First referenced in RFC 1083,
dated December 1988, IANA was stated to be headquartered at the Information
Science Institute in Marina Del Rey, California, under the administration of Jon Postel
(Mueller, 2002). This new institution would carry on the previously contracted work of IP
and DNS assignment functions between DARPA and ISI.
Yet in the RFCs, IANA would not derive its authority from these previous DARPA
contracts, instead drawing governance authority from the work done in the IAB.
Although authority was initially given by the government, in the main through DARPA,
the operating community of the Internet began to think of itself as “an autonomous, selfgoverning social complex” whose “claims on the right to manage name and address
assignments were being made by an authority structure that existed solely in Internet
RFCs and lacked any basis in formal law or state action” (Mueller, 2002 p93). This RFC,
and subsequent actions of IANA would set the Internet down a path of governance that
is highly different from traditional treaty-based governance structures that have been
observed for many other technologies. While government managers played a role in the
management of the Internet, the model was much less supervisory and much more
participatory, leading to the impression of the Internet as “working anarchy” (Kapor,
2000).

32

Advanced Research Projects Administration Network, the DARPA created precursor
to the modern Internet.
33
Internet Activities Board-IAB
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Yet Cerf and Postel realized that this new organization could not function on its
own. As the entire project of the Internet was the product of, and under the guiding arms
of the National Science Foundation, and with DARPA beginning to wrap up its work on
supporting the early Internet, the end goal was for the Internet to become a selfsufficient project. The funding that had originally been provided to establish and
administer the Internet was sure to dry up. By 1990, Cerf had written to colleagues
about his idea for “the Internet Society” which could hopefully be a funding avenue for
the continued “operation of IAB/IETF/IRTF” (Cerf et al., 1992).34 This Internet Society or
ISOC, would become an independent corporation that could also be used to limit
individual liability around standards decisions, as per the contribution of Noel Chiappa,
and could act as a liaison between the established telecommunications standards
organizations35 and the Internet community. The chartering of ISOC took place in
January of 1995, establishing a board of trustees with many familiar players in the early
Internet, and by June of that year had made great strides in unifying the activities of the
IAB and ISOC.
The self-privatization of the Internet’s governing structures would expose many
problems that would eventually lead to the downfall of IANA and ISOC, setting the stage
for the almost inevitable creation of a new institution. Interestingly, the majority of
problems would not be disagreements of a technical nature. Any technical problems
could be easily dealt with inside the RFC system. The biggest problems for ISOC would
show themselves to be of a political nature. The selection of leadership would prove to
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Internet Research Task Force
Namely the ITU. The role of the ITU in the Internet, though limited, will be examined
in a later section.
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be one of the largest problems for ISOC; self-selection by the old elite was preferred by
some participants, while new participants advocated for a much more democratic
process. RFC 1396 would state that “IAB and IESG members should be selected with
the consensus of the community.” While this was certainly not a call for fully democratic
elections of leadership, it did demonstrate that rank-and-file participants in ISOC wanted
to have some voice in the selection of leaders. This democratic movement ran counter
to the wishes of the previous elites, with Postel on record as saying they would refuse to
run for any democratically elected positions, betraying a mistrust in democratic methods
and public accountability. These actions would serve to discredit ISOC and IAB until
well into 1996, leaving a bit of a leadership vacuum in Internet governance.
ISOC, IANA, and IAB provide only part of the picture for early Internet
governance. Prior to 1991, the Internet was still primarily militarized and not open to
commerce. The battle to control the definition of the root zone file36, and who could
therefore authorize new top-level domain registries would begin to have a great deal of
importance for both governance and commerce. Prior to the early 1990s, the Internet
was vastly different than the Internet of today. Direct access to documents and text was
limited to a specific technical class, and very little commercial activity was even
possible. File Transfer Protocol was the order of the day, and file swapping was the
primary purpose of the early Internet. The concept of a World Wide Web as understood
today was created by physicists at CERN in 1990. This new approach to the Internet
was based on hypertext transfer protocol or HTTP. A graphical web browser utilizing
HTTP, Mosaic, was released to the public in early 1993, and within two years made up
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The tool for defining top-level domains on the Internet.
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the majority of packet transfers on the Internet. HTTP’s introduction spawned a new
industry of browsers and web software, with Netscape at the vanguard, leading to a
commercial boom in the late 1990s.
The introduction of this new application for the Internet brought in technological
and governmental issues requiring their own solutions. HTTP and the web allowed for a
new standard of access, Uniform Resource Locators, or URLs, that functioned in a
manner similar to networked file extensions on a computer file name. The domain
names would become top-level directories to access information on the Internet. Access
to information was made easier with the introduction of HTTP and URLs, causing a
proliferation of domain names, far beyond their original intention of designating
computers and networks. Along with a proliferation of domain names came a huge
increase in users, many of whom did not understand the concept of DNS. To alleviate
many of the growing pains and smooth the learning curve for new users, browser
manufacturers began to make .com the default top level domain, autocompleting
searches for terms as cheese to be cheese.com. This process, while beneficial for uses,
would create many intellectual property issues moving forward, requiring the creation of
a new governing process for DNS, as the default use for DNS shifted from location of
hardware for FTP to access of Web sites for HTTP.
The confluence of these two trends, governance struggles of the root DNS and
the commercialization of the Internet exacerbated by a switch to HTTP, led to the NSF
suggesting that a fee should be charged to register domain names, starting with .com
and later expanding to all other domains. Charges for registration began on September
14th, 1995, creating a new industry of registration of domain names, and the industry of
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deciding correct ownership of domain names. It should be noted at this point that this
commercial process of domain name registration does vary from country to country, and
wildcat speculative domain name registration for commercial domain names can be
greatly restricted by some states. In other countries internationally, proof of a legitimate
claim to a certain domain name, such as http://www.jamesgilley.com37 could be
required. From 1991-1997, IANA and IAB attempted to deal with many of these issues
of registration on their own, especially the issue of registration of new top-level domains.
But over these years their “informal chain of authority” failed to convince leaders of
commerce and government that they could capably govern the root (Mueller, 2002
pp125). It is at this point that calls for a new organization began, one that would have a
much more formal position and chain of authority. Internet engineers, while still
important to the system, would no longer have sole governing authority over the
Internet’s root.
From ISOC to ICANN38
While ISOC was able to consolidate the actions of IAB, IETF, and IRTF, the
attempt to move IANA under the umbrella of ISOC was much more complicated, as
IANA had distinct obligations to fulfill based on contracts between ISI and the NSF and
DARPA. The attempt to charter IANA into ISOC began in July 1994 driven by Postel
(Mueller, 2002). The explosion of domain names in the period beginning in 1994 proved
that a distinct institutional home for root governance was necessary, and at the time
37

In an interesting turn of events, the author of this document does not own the
aforementioned website. It is owned by a Knoxville, TN based percussionist, with no
known relationship to the author. For the authors website, please visit jamesgilley.co
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This section will only cover briefly the transition from ISOC to ICANN. For a more
complete treatment of this interesting tale, please consult Mueller, Martin. 2002. “Ruling
the Root” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Cambridge, MA.
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ISOC appeared to be the natural fit. The Internet Society put forward the idea that
through the IAB and IANA, they would be able to control the commercial selling of
domain names, under the name draft-postel (Mueller, 2002). ISOC would function as a
warehouse for top-level domains, to be sold off to other competing registries. It would
also collect fees from these licenses and establish itself as the root-level DNS manager,
all without any formal governmental approval (Mueller, 2002). This audacious plan to
expand the role of ISOC would not go uncontested, as the Federal Networking Council’s
Robert Aiken would ask “Is ISOC claiming it has jurisdiction and overall responsibility for
the top-level address and name space? If yes, how did ISOC obtain this responsibility; if
no, then who does own it?”(Aiken, 1995).
Once these questions of root ownership came into view, demands for answers
began to come from many different quarters. More importantly, questions about the
international standing of the Internet Society with regard to their authority for the root
also appeared, driven by Aiken and DARPA’s Mike St. John at the 1995 NSF
conference on Internet governance. International representatives also urged
participants at this conference to take an international perspective, as the discussion on
root ownership had begun to trend in the direction of US government intervention (Kahin
and Keller, 1997). Draft-postel, upon going live for comment using a similar system as
RFC, was quickly under assault from many parties, including the ITU who believed they
should play a role in Internet governance and standards creation. By the end of 1996,
draft-postel was effectively killed, leaving a gap for actual governance of the root.
In order to fill this gap, and as an attempt to keep ISOC in a position of authority,
the International Ad Hoc Committee was formed. The IAHC was to be comprised of 11
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members representing a wide variety of interests, from ISOC itself, the NSF, the ITU,
the World Intellectual Property Organization, IETF, and other interests. Representatives
were predominately from the technical community within the Internet governance
structure, but they stepped beyond the traditional procedures. This body met in closeddoor meetings with an aggressive timetable to address issues of Internet governance
(Mueller, 2002). The final report was issued in early 1997, laying out a new plan for root
DNS governance, one treating the top-level domain (TLD) as a public resource subject
to public trust. This language reflects the role played by the ITU participant in IAHC,
introducing concepts in common to other telecommunications methods to the
governance of the Internet.
IAHC’s proposal established a clean break between wholesale DNS registration
and retail domain name registration, and created a global cartel for retail sale of domain
names. Strict rules about ownership of TLDs were put into place under the new plan,
with a 60-day delay between purchase and activation, allowing the WIPO to deal with
intellectual property claims. Institutionally speaking, IAHC recommended a corporate
structure which could straddle the line between the public and private sectors. The
structure proposed by IAHC was known as the Generic Top-Level Domain
Memorandum of Understanding (gTLD-MoU). The gTLD-MoU was fairly well received
by the Internet community, but did have several challenges from outside, with the
largest challenge coming from the United States’ Department of Commerce. In 1997 the
United States published the so-called Green Paper, proposing an alternative solution for
root governance, a plan that looked much more like clear-cut privatization. In response
Postel attempted to pull control of the root under IANA’s authority unilaterally. This
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attempt at shifting root ownership resulted in threats of criminal prosecution from the US
government towards Postel should he ever attempt to manipulate the root without
government approval.
This period of uncertain root-level Internet governance created a movement to
institutionalize the root, and led to the early working negotiations for the creation of
ICANN. While many US domestic players welcomed the framework of the Green Paper,
some technical and international players viewed it as an attempt by the United States to
usurp the international nature of the Internet, and as an overreaching governmental
intervention into what had until that point been a mostly self-governing community
(Muller, 2002 pp165). While gTLD-MoU was still in play, and had fairly widespread
support, two major constituencies resisted it, namely the US government and the large
business coalition spearheaded by AT&T and IBM. Agreement was reached that any
new institution governing the root should be a continuation of IANA, and in February of
1998, a transition advisory group was formed for IANA, the IATG. During this time, the
US government released its final draft recommendation on the governance of the
Internet, the White Paper, which formally recommended that private stakeholders
determine the institutions necessary to govern the Internet. This relatively surprising
outcome lead to the creation of the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP).
Competing processes by IATG and IFWP, with the former being closednetworking based and the latter being open consensus building, continued through the
summer of 1998. A negotiation session was then held in mid-September in an attempt
to reconcile the disparate goals of the two groups. The negotiations were held behind
closed doors at Harvard University’s Berkman Center, so little is known publicly of what
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occurred within the negotiations. But from this process emerged the draft articles for the
incorporation and the bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers. A very contentious process of transition driven by large personalities and
competing institutional interests resulted in the creation of the current institutions
governing the root level DNS of the Internet.
ICANN’s Institutional Corporate Structure
In a somewhat ironic turn of events, the acceptance of the ICANN proposal for
Internet governance was in direct contradiction of the recommendation of the US
government’s White Paper. While the White Paper called for the establishment of an
open and democratic international corporation to be established, the end product was a
backroom, closed deal leading to a private non-profit corporation. The overall structure
of ICANN fit with the goals of the White Paper, but the means used to achieve these
goals were not in accordance with the wishes of the US government and the
international Internet community. In the closing days of 1998, the US government
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN to transfer root-level
governance of the Domain Name System to ICANN. ICANN then went on to meet with
the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California to take over
the role of the Internet Assigned Numbers Agency, moving IANA into ICANN’s
organizational structure.
ICANN was formally chartered on November 21, 1998 with the signing of the
Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
More important than the simple chartering of ICANN, the US Commerce Department
accepted ICANN as the governance agent for Root Level DNS on February 26,1999.
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After a long and contentious process of dueling proposals for DNS governance, ICANN
emerged as the representation of the Internet community’s consensus building, even if
the process did not follow traditional consensus-building methodology. ICANN was
established as a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation under its Articles of
Incorporation with the expressed:
… charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and
promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by
(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to
maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing
functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space;
(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the
Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for
determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to
the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS
root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in
furtherance of items (i) through (iv).

These broad goals established a large and far-reaching role for ICANN, placing the
corporation in a role of responsibility for the international stability of the Internet. To
accomplish this task, many specific steps and institutional programs would have to be
established. The remainder of this section will explore the institutional nature of ICANN
and the various programs established to meet the goal of maintaining operational
stability of the Internet. As opposed to analyzing a treaty, as would be the normal
approach for institutional analysis, due to the corporate nature of ICANN, the major
focus will be placed on analyzing the By-laws and functioning of ICANN.
Corporate Structure- Board of Directors
Borrowing heavily from the corporate structures that emerged in Silicon Valley
during the early days of the Internet, ICANN predicated its corporate structure on a
Board of Directors meant to represent the various stakeholders in the Internet
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community. While the traditional focus of representation for international organizations
are the various states who become party to treaties, for the non-profit corporation
governing the deep structures of the Internet the major constituencies are other Internet
organizations.39 Article III of the By-laws of ICANN lay out that sixteen members
comprise the Board of Directors, hence referred to as the Board. These sixteen
members of the Board each have an equal vote, and represent various Internet
constituencies. There are also an additional four non-voting liaisons, representing the
internal committees of ICANN.
Section 9 of the ICANN By-laws states that seats 1-8 of the Board are selected
by a nominating committee made up of the following: one non-voting chair appointed by
the ICANN board, a non-voting advisory Chair-elect, a non-voting representative of
ICANN’s Root Server System Advisory committee, a non-voting representative for
ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory committee, a non-voting representative from
ICANN’s Government Advisory committee, five voting members from the At-Large
Advisory committee, one vote for the Registries Stakeholder Group, one vote for the
Registrars Stakeholder group, one vote representing small business and one vote
representing large businesses, one vote for Internet Service Providers, one vote for
Intellectual Property, one vote for consumer and civil society groups, one vote for the
Council of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization, one vote for the Council
of the Address Supporting Organization, and one vote for the Internet Engineering Task
Force.

39

Many of these organizations, such as the Generic Names Supporting Organization,
Address Supporting Organization, and the Country-Code Names Supporting
Organization, will be the subject of Chapter 7.
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Seats 9 and 10 are selected by the Address Supporting Organization. Seats 11
and 12 are allocated to the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization, while Seats
13 and 14 are given to the Generic Names Supporting Organization. An At-Large
Community representative occupies seat 15, and the final seat belongs to the President
ex officio of ICANN. Along with the representation of constituencies of the Internet
community, the Board is also to be representative of the international community, with a
diversity requirement laid out in Article III, Section 5 of the By-laws, namely that no more
than 5 Directors may be from the same geographic region. These Directors are
expected to act and vote in the best interest of ICANN, not as representatives of the
organization that selected them. As of now, each Director serves for a period of 3 years.
This focus on diversity in board members illustrates how the mulitstakeholder model
functions best, specifically in representing a wide variety of stakeholders in the decision
making process, a departure from classical international institutions focused on states.
The Board itself is required to meet annually to conduct business, but also more
frequently as required. Any Board member has the right to inspect all books, records
and documents of any kind produced by ICANN, and has the right to inspect the
physical premises as well. As to the actual responsibilities of the Board, according to the
Board Governance Guidelines of ICANN, the Board members are:
…to exercise their business judgment to act in what they reasonably believe to
be the best interests of ICANN and in the global public interest, taking account of
the interests of the Internet community as a whole rather than any individual
group or interest. Actions of the Board reflect the Board's collective action after
taking due reflection.

Specific core values are also established for the Board, such as preserving the
operational security and interoperability of the Internet, seeking broad and diverse
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cooperation on decision making, and relying on market mechanisms to promote a
competitive environment. The Board itself must balance the business nature of the
corporate structure with the goals of being an international governance organization,
and this tension is highly reflected in the expectations and core values for Board
members. This tension between corporate and governmental interests is especially
played out in the ultimate core value laid out in the guideline “While remaining rooted in
the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible
for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities'
recommendations.” The Board functions as the primary decision-making body for
ICANN, and as such is perhaps the most important single group of people for the entire
Internet. Yet much like normal corporations, the Board of ICANN does not take a heavy
hand in the day-to-day operations of the organization. Instead, much discretion is given
to the corporate officers.
Corporate Structure – Officers and Members
Continuing on building an institution in the mold of a corporation, ICANN has
explicit corporate officers. The three specific corporate officers as laid out in the By-laws
are the President, Secretary and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). All corporate officers are
elected by the Board of Directors, and hold office until resignation, death, or
replacement. To replace an officer, a two-thirds majority vote is required by the Board.
Other additional officers may be created and appointed at the discretion of the Board.
The President of ICANN also functions as a voting member on the board, the only
officer capable of holding both an office within ICANN and a seat on the board. T
President of ICANN, also functions as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the
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corporation. The President is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of ICANN, is the
person to whom all ICANN personnel report, and has the ability to call meetings of the
board. In all, this office functions in a manner that is compliant with common corporate
governance procedures.
The Secretary is responsible for the keeping of minutes for the Board, as well as
maintaining the procedural records books. As is often the case with organizational
secretaries, ICANN’s Secretary also performs duties as prescribed by the President of
the organization. The Chief Financial Officer is responsible for the financial activities of
ICANN as dictated by the President and the Board of Directors. ICANN’s CFO
maintains the books, and keeps receipts of all financial intakes and disbursements. The
CFO is also responsible for assisting the President and the Board in drafting the annual
budget, as well as forecasting future financial needs for ICANN. Finally, the CFO is
responsible for conducting any institutional audits for ICANN and any of the Supporting
Organizations. Again, the officers of ICANN operate according to common corporate
governance practices.
Corporate Structure- Advisory Committees
Perhaps more important than even the officers of ICANN for the governance of
the Internet are the Advisory Committees of ICANN. Established by Article XI of the bylaws, these committees have no legal authority to act in place of ICANN. They do,
however, serve as the primary providers of advice and recommendations to the Board
and officers on matters that might not be a core competence for the various Directors on
the Board. The Board has the ability to create more advisory committees, but four
permanent committees were originally established by the By-laws, dealing with a wide
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variety of technical and political issues. These committees are as follows: the
Government Advisory Committee (GAC), the Security and Stability Advisory Committee
(SSAC), the Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC), and the At-Large
Advisory Committee (ALAC). Each committee has a distinct area of jurisdiction and a
distinct set of restrictions placed upon them.
The first of these committees, the Government Advisory Committee (GAC) has a
somewhat different advisory focus than the other committees. Instead of focusing on a
technical problem, the GAC deals directly with political issues, a set of issues that lies
outside of the core competency of the majority of Directors. The GAC has a
membership open to all national governments, Distinct Economies,40 multinational
governmental organizations, and treaty organizations. Members then appoint to the
committee one representative, who must be an accredited member of the public
administration of the member state or organization. The chief responsibility for the GAC
is to make the Board aware of any public policy activities that might affect the operation
of ICANN, with an eye towards requesting public comment on political activities. If
important political or policy issues emerge, the GAC is capable of taking these issues
directly to the Board. Finally, the GAC is supposed to play an important role in the
formulation and adoption of policy matters for ICANN. When the Board and the GAC
have a difference of opinion regarding policy, there must be a good-faith attempt to
reconcile these differences in a timely manner. If the advice that is given by the GAC is
not taken, then the Board must state the specific reasons why the advice was not
followed.

40

Distinct Economies i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, etc.
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The Security and Stability Advisory Committee is the first of the major technical
advisory committees with the distinct goal of advising on matters of the security and
stability of the Internet. Their specific focus lies on issues of security and integrity for the
name and address allocation systems. Unlike the GAC, SSAC interfaces not with
governments and legal bodies, but directly with the Internet technical communities
directly. SSAC is responsible for gathering and articulating requirements for technical
provisions of the DNS protocols and address allocation. Threat assessment and risk
analysis for Internet naming and address allocations services are also a primary
concern for SSAC. This committee must also communicate with the organizations
directly responsible for the naming and address allocations security,41 making sure that
all security issues are synchronized with the latest security activities being taken by
ICANN and other Internet governance bodies. Finally, SSAC provides advice and
makes policy recommendation to the Board, with no procedure or guarantee for dispute
resolution between the Board and SSAC. Membership of SSAC is not determined by
other actors in the system, but are instead appointed to a three-year term by the Board,
perhaps explaining the lack of a need for a dispute resolution mechanism between the
Board and SSAC.
The Root Server System Advisory Committee is the third permanent advisory
committee to the Board of ICANN. RSSAC is very similar in nature to SSAC, but instead
of focusing on security and stability issues for the DNS and the name and address
allocation system, the primary focus is on maintaining integrity of the Root Server
System. Put more clearly, SSAC is responsible for security and stability, whereas
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IETC, RSSAC, RIRs, name registries, etc.
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RSSAC is responsible for interoperability of the Internet, as well as making sure the
Root Server System, a hardware consideration, maintains functionality. This committee
does not represent governments or legal bodies, but directly liaises with the Internet
technical community. Responsibility is given to RSSAC over matters of the Root Zone,
as well as the processes and procedures of the Root Zone file, the fundamental
networking system for the Internet. RSSAC must also participate in threat assessment
and risk analysis for the Root Server System, as well as provide advice and policy
recommendations for the Board. Again, much like SSAC, the membership is appointed
by the Board for three-year terms and, thus, no procedure is in place for differences of
opinion between the Board and RSSAC.
The final permanent advisory committee for ICANN is the At-Large Advisory
Committee. ALAC is meant to be the home within ICANN to represent individual Internet
users. The advice provided to the Board by ALAC is meant to advise the interests of the
individual who uses the Internet, not for governments and legal bodies, and not for
technical advice about Internet architecture. ALAC is meant to be an accountability
method for ICANN, and is meant to coordinate outreach to the Internet community.
Membership of ALAC is made up of two members from each Regional At-Large
Organization (RALO) comprising of five organizations representing the five geographic
regions and five members selected by the Nominating Committee as describe in a
previous section. The five Nominating Committee seats are to represent each
geographic area as well. Each Regional At-Large Organization is responsible for setting
its own membership criteria, but should attempt to allow every individual Internet user
the ability to participate in the RALO. Overall ALAC is responsible for reporting the
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activities of ICANN to the public, as well as participating in policy development for
ICANN. There is no method for ALAC to resolve policy disputes with the Board; it
appears that the major role for ALAC is more public outreach than true policy crafting.
The real avenue for public input for ICANN policy seems to come from the Request for
Comment system. ALAC is responsible for the maintenance of the RFC system, as well
as other avenues for public input on ICANN policies.
Corporate Goals and Abilities
The primary goal stated by ICANN upon its inception was the preservation of the
“self-governing” and “self-regulatory nature” of the Internet. While it might seem on the
surface that this is the case, given the At-Large Advisory Committee’s input into policy
decision, in actuality ICANN has helped to subvert these very characteristics of the
Internet. ICANN, being predicated on a non-profit corporate structure and acting as an
international governance institution, appears to be an entirely new institutional type in
the international system. Yet it has a perhaps unexpected set of governance goals for
the Internet that may not be precisely what is expected. Milton Mueller observes in
Ruling the Root:
ICANN is not primarily concerned with technical coordination, not is it a
standards setting organization. Rather, it is an institution that ties the need for
technical coordination to regulation of the industry built around the resources it
manages…ICANN is not pioneering a radically new and better form of global
policy making. It is simply a resource-based international regulatory regime… its
creators have succeeded in building a rough facsimile of an international treaty
organization without a treaty.
While ICANN may be in practice a regulatory regime, the major goal as stated in the Bylaws is to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s identifier systems: the
DNS, IP and protocol port and parameter numbers. In essence and actuality this
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situation requires ICANN to maintain control over the operation and evolution of the
DNS root name server system (Root), the primary controlling architecture of the
Internet.
In order successfully to control the DNS root name server system, ICANN retains
the authority to be the sole policy setting organization for the Root. It should be noted
that ICANN does not control the actual root servers, but merely sets the policy for the
operators of the servers. A large degree of delegation of policy authority to directly
affected Internet constituencies is built in to the decision-making process of ICANN, as
described in the sections above. The authority to set policy for the Root was given to
ICANN in a series of Memoranda of Understanding between ICANN and the United
States Commerce Department. Under these MoUs, the Department of Commerce gives
ICANN the private sector leadership and coordinating ability to make policy for the
development and stability of the Internet. The majority of the focus for this policy-making
authority rests in maintaining the Root, as well as setting policy for Top-Level Domains
(TLDs). Yet the US Department of Commerce merely allows ICANN to be the regulating
body for the Internet, in much the same way the Federal Reserve Bank has been given
the private ability to regulate the monetary supply from the United States’ Congress.
Were the Department of Commerce to decide that they did not agree with ICANN’s
actions, the DoC could pull ICANN’s authority and destroy overnight the system as it
stands.
The other important goal for ICANN, the administration of TLDs, has seen a great
deal of corporate policy change since TLD authority was vested in ICANN. From its
inception, the major policy for ICANN has been to create artificial scarcity for TLDs in
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the name space (Milton, 2002 pp255). These TLDs, i.e., .com, .org, .edu, .uk, etc.,
serve as the highest routing level for all addresses on the Internet. In the earliest
commercial http configuration of the Internet, these TLDs were very limited, with only a
handful of domains being available for use. A constant struggle for the Internet
community has been the proliferation of TLDs, so that greater access could be given to
the Internet, and scarcity could be reduced. It has been in the best interest of ICANN to
keep TLDs limited, as it has the authority to release more domains to their approved
oligopoly of domain name registries and registrars. It should be noted that this question
of TLD proliferation is not necessarily a technical problem, although it does abut the
technical problem of IP address scarcity due to the prevalence of IPv4.42 Computers
and networks have no preference for addressing their information flows. It is almost a
purely political and social issue that humans have ownership over certain names.
The proliferation of new TLDs creates massive intellectual property issues for
ownership of domain names in these new top-level domains. In order to combat these
issues, ICANN had a policy of artificially limiting the number of TLDs that would be
available. This policy would not last more than a few years, as domains would be rapidly
populated to the point of being essentially “sold out.” The eventual expansion of the TLD
was carried out in a many phased process, from adding a few new TLDs such as .biz
and .law, to adding country code TLDs (ccTLDs) like .tv, .uk, and .fr. The final stage of
this process has occurred only recently, allowing for essentially unrestricted TLDs to be
used, such as .search, .live and .amazon. Finally, non-roman character domains are
now being allowed, presenting a new host of technical problems for Internet
42

This technical problem and the political negotiation to switch away from the 48-bit
architecture of IPv4 to 128-bit IPv6 will be addressed under the next section, the IETF.
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architecture, but alleviating a political problem caused by the forced use of roman
characters for domain routing. While this process of domain name proliferation seems to
be coming to a close, with the new, nearly unrestricted TLDs being introduce, the
political problems still exist.
To solve the political problems with TLD proliferation, ICANN has stepped
outside its original charter, establishing a committee to deal with these domain disputes.
While this expansion seems to step on the institutional aspirations of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the system that has been put into place
seems to be highly effective. The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy as established by
ICANN does much good in keeping the disputes over domain names at a fairly low
level, shifting authority away from any international institution, towards arbitration or
local courts. ICANN, in holding the TLD and Root, is able to force dispute resolution
policies on registries and registrars. While ICANN has done a decent job of
administering Root Level governance of the Internet as well as TLDs, the still very
bureaucratic nature of the corporation derived from the GAC’s interactions with the
Board has led to a slow-down in the pace of disruption and innovation within the Internet
and technology sectors (Mueller, 2002).43 But the fundamentally privatized nature of
Internet governance structures has left it free to adapt more readily to the dynamic
realities of technological change than perhaps a true treaty organization would be
capable of adapting.
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Interestingly, Mueller seems to pre-sage the coming of Web 2.0, with a radical shift of
disruption coming from outside the system that had already been created. This in turn
prompts institutional change at ICANN, namely in forcing TLD proliferation in both 2006
and 2014.
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ISOC, IAB, IRTF and the IETF
Aside from questions of Root governance and TLDs, one other major area of the
Internet requires distinct governance, namely Internet Protocol. Internet Protocol, or IP,
is the assignment of numbers to machines, as well as the manner in which the various
networks and networked machines access each other. The current IP, IPv6, has a long
and storied political adoption story that has been driven primarily by the Internet
Engineering Task Force, a subdivision and independent work group in conjunction with
the Internet Architecture Board. Whereas ICANN is a more political body focused on
administering the Root and TLDs, the IETF and IAB are more technical working groups
that focus on technical standards adoption for the Internet. And instead of having a
distinct corporate structure in the manner of ICANN, or an international treaty
institutional structure, the IAB functions as an operational committee of an international
professional society, the Internet Society.
The Internet Society, as previously mentioned in sections above, began its life as
an institutional working group supporting the activities of the Internet community created
at ISI by many of the “Fathers of the Internet” (ISOC, 2015). ISOC is comprised of over
65,000 individual members in 100 chapters, as well as 145 organizational members.
Through the system of Request for Comments (RFCs) organized and administered by
ISOC, decisions concerning technical issues for the Internet are made collaboratively by
the primary users of the Internet. This much more active system of RFCs allows for
ISOC to funnel the self-governing nature of the Internet into actual user policies in a way
that is much more directly connected to users than ICANN’s claims of supporting
Internet self-governance. It should be noted that all RFCs are the intellectual property of
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ISOC, but are freely available for all, members or non-members to view.44 While ISOC
claims three particular goals, namely standards setting, public policy creation and
advising, and education, the most salient goal vis-a-vis Internet governance is that of
standards setting. ISOC as a whole does not itself set standards, instead delegating this
task to three smaller committees that cooperate to set standards. These committees are
the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
IEFT
The IETF is perhaps the most nebulous, but most important of these groups for
the technical governance of the Internet. Unlike the other groups that will be examined
for this chapter, the IETF has a very loosely defined membership, and could best be
described as an open working group for Internet technical standards. The majority of the
working group is made up of freely contributing volunteer engineers. While there are
three official meetings each year to coordinate on projects, the vast majority of the work
is done within the mailing lists for IETF. Various working groups are generated to deal
with specific issue areas, and are overseen by Area Directors, who are members of the
Internet Engineering Steering Group. IETF deals directly with the technical problems of
the Internet from an engineering perspective, working towards resolving these issues
and producing RFCs for eventual adoption as official protocols and standards. It should
be noted that the IETF does not function completely independently. The IESG serves to
direct the activities of the IETF, acting essentially as project managers, herding the
Internet cattle to make accomplish work on pressing issues. IANA interfaces with IETF
44

This is especially useful for the comedy RFCs that are traditionally submitted on April
Fool’s Day.
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to coordinate assignment parameters for Internet protocols, even though IANA’s
assignment function has been primarily subsumed by ICANN. Finally, the IETF
interfaces with the IAB to be given architectural oversight.
IAB
The Internet Architecture Board is a much more organized committee than the
IETF working group, but is in actuality a subcommittee of IETF. The IAB’s membership
is also much more limited than that of the IETF. A nominating committee from the IETF
selects the IAB, and in turn the IAB functions as the oversight board for the IETF, and
assigns the area directors for the IESG. IAB is responsible for architectural issues for
the protocol and procedures for the Internet, and was a highly instrumental group for the
adoption of IPv6’s hexadecimal protocol to replace the rapidly filling dot decimal
protocols of IPv4. In addition to the standards oversight role, the IAB also serves as the
editorial board for the RFC system, giving a great deal of de facto control over the
Internet’s future to the members of the IAB. Much of the work done by the IAB is
conducted in 90-minute phone conferences that are held twice monthly, on the first and
third Wednesday of each month. IAB does not have any official role in operational or
commercial matters for the Internet, and merely serves as an advisor in policy matters.
While the IAB does have oversight authority for technical Internet matters, it do not itself
set policy and standards, merely guiding the policy and standards making process. The
primary work of both the IAB and the IETF is focused on near-term technical problems
and standards setting for the Internet. For more long-term evolutionary concerns, the
IAB has the ability to set tasks for the Internet Research Task Force.
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IRTF
The structure of the IRTF is very similar, if more limited in numbers, to that of the
IETF. These two organizations are generally considered to be parallel organizations
with differences in terms of the scope of its activities. While IETF is concerned with the
short-term standards adoption for the Internet, the IRTF is concerned with long-term
development and evolution for the Internet. Much like IEFT, IRTF’s membership is open
and composed primarily of individual engineers. These members are then tasked into
one of the nine currently chartered research groups, each headed by a research
director who sits as a member of the Internet Research Steering Group. These research
groups deal with long-term issues like encryptions, global access to the Internet, and
Internet congestion mitigations. The IRTF was responsible for anticipating the problems
that IPv4 would cause due to eventual scarcity of IP addresses, and for pushing forward
research into a new Internet Protocol. Their recommendations and research are
coordinated by the IAB and then turned into short-term engineering problems for IETF
working groups.
With the collaboration between these various groups, the technical problems of
the Internet are addressed in an open and collaborative way. ISOC oversees this work
and promotes the results to the outside and lay world. Building on decades of history,
ISOC and these various committees promote a particular type of problem-solving and
institutional approach that appears thus far to have been unique to the Internet. In what
has become a cliché, it appears that these technology groups, through their open
collaborative problem solving approach, are attempting to save the world. The actual
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humanitarian contribution may be suspect, but the technical advances facilitated by this
approach have had a great deal of impact on the way that society functions.
Conclusions
The two major governance problems for the Internet, managing the Root and
adopting technical standards have led to the creation of two vastly different regimes. Yet
these regimes are connected by an interesting history of evolution driven by a handful of
participants who are considered to be the “Fathers of the Internet.” ISOC, the Internet
Society and all its constitutive committees were the original institution for the Internet,
setting early technical standards and eventually making a claim for the governance of
the Root under the guidance of John Postel. While this play for governance authority
failed, the same group of participants did lead to the eventual creation of ICANN. Both
of these institutions, while significantly different in practice, make a similar claim to
furthering the self-governance of the Internet. The Root governance aspect of the
Internet appears to have fallen away from self-governance, with a good deal of control
being exercised by political players, especially the US Department of Commerce. But on
technical standards adoption and Internet Protocol, the Internet, through ISOC, has
retained substantial control and self-governance.
What is clear about these institutions is that they are the outcome of attempts at
fairly novel approaches to institution creation for governance issues. ICANN chose the
route of creating a non-profit corporation to assign names and numbers on the Internet
as well as securing governance for the Root. ISOC has attempted to retain the early
decision-making institutional nature of the Internet, relying on open participation from
volunteers. Both institutions reach back to the Request For Comment method of
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decision making that has been adopted heavily by the technology industry and the
open-source movement. It is important to note the RFC system was used by the
“Fathers of the Internet” from the earliest days of the technical inception of the network
of networks that would eventually form the modern Internet. The use of RFCs is a rather
important and fitting tribute to the creation of this new industry and medium, and its
adoption by the larger community could, be seen above and beyond the creation of the
internet, as a very important contribution to the world. These two institutions, ISOC and
ICANN, are not, however, the only participants in Internet governance. While they may
be the largest and most important, other institutions play important roles as well. These
other institutions and their role in governing the functionality of the Internet will be the
primary focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: INTELLECUTAL PROPERTY, TRANSMISSION, AND COMMERCE:
THE LESS TECHNICAL GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET
“I spend a lot more time than any person should have to talking with lawyers and
thinking about intellectual property issues” – Linus Torvald
This chapter serves as the second part of the case study of the governance of
the Internet. Much like the chapter 4, this chapter will examine the institutions of internet
governance within a horizontal context, operating in conjunction with a series of wider
international institutions. This approach should aide in the understanding of the
institutional context of Internet governance, extending beyond technical governance to
more political questions.
While the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and
the Internet Society (ISOC) accomplish much of the technical governance for the
Internet, namely governance of the Root and the creation of technical standards for
operation, there are still many aspects of the Internet that require a good deal of
governance. Most of these questions come not from the technical operation of the
Internet, but are more ephemeral in nature, originating from conflicts between people as
opposed to technical conflicts. Three of these major problems are (1) the protection and
assignment of intellectual property, (2) the maintenance of data transmission worldwide,
and (3) the regulation of commercial activity on the Internet. Each of these problems
correlates with a particular institution that has sought to ameliorate the issues that could
potentially bring the Internet to a screeching halt due to political problems. The problem
of intellectual property on the Internet, while dealt with in part by ICANN as described in
the previous chapter, is the primary concern for the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), a subdivision of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.
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Ensuring the maintenance of data transmission internationally falls under the purview of
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The United States Department of
Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), attempts to deal with commercial issues for Internet use, but many other
international bodies also attempt to deal with these issues as well, leading to significant
political tensions for the international Internet community.
This chapter will examine the role played by these various organizations in
governing specific political problems that have emerged from the Internet’s expansion
into a large part of the global society and economy. First, the question of intellectual
property will be explored, examining the role of WIPO in dealing with IP45 disputes, as
well as how WIPO interacts with ICANN for IP issues. Second, the question of data
transmission and International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) will be examined
by focusing on the ITU. The particular problem of ITRs, namely their status as the global
treaties regulating telecommunication, and their creation prior to the proliferation of the
Internet will be examined in greater detail by examining the WCIT-12 process, an
attempt to draft new regulations that would function more properly in an Internet world.
Finally, regulation of commercial activity on the Internet will be explored through an
examination of the US Department of Commerce, with a main focus on NTIA. Other
international actors’ impact on commercial activity regulation will also be explored.
Some brief conclusions about practical Internet governance will be included to complete
the chapter.
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For this chapter, the acronym IP will stand for Intellectual Property. This is not to be
confused with Internet Protocol from the previous chapter. Internet Protocol will be fully
written out for this chapter.
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Intellectual Property on the Internet and WIPO
With the commercialization of the Internet in the early 1990s, a massive
proliferation of users and websites occurred, generating many intellectual property
disputes. The structure of the Internet from its inception relied on an essentially free
market, but a free market limited by artificial scarcity in Internet real estate. The primary
IP issues that emerges from the commercialization is that of domain name ownership,
an issue that is controlled by ICANN. Yet the solution of ICANN being responsible for
domain name dispute resolution was not the only proposed plan, nor is it complete in its
dominance for dispute resolution. The World Intellectual Property Organization also
plays an important role in domain name dispute resolution. More important, however, is
the role WIPO plays on other IP disputes in relation to the Internet. As Internet traffic
speeds have increased, and overall use for the Internet has skyrocketed, WIPO has
found itself responsible for dealing with IP issues not about the Internet itself, but those
which are caused by the Internet.
WIPO itself is a specialized agency of the United Nations, and is a replacement
organization46 meant to enact the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, the
primary conventions enacting global IP laws. The Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization was signed in 1967 at Stockholm, and WIPO was
brought into full force in 1970. This organization, based in Geneva, is responsible for the
administration of 26 treaties, each dealing with various aspects of intellectual property.
The majority of these treaties are focused on traditional types of media and works of
intellectual property. It is only very recently, within the last 15 years, that WIPO has
46

The original organization for this role was BIRPI, but was eventually supplanted by
WIPO.
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begun to be responsible for issues concerning IP on the Internet. Yet from the earliest
days of the commercial Internet, WIPO has attempted to play a large role in Internet IP
disputes.
Early Play for Domain Name Ownership
Before the creation of ICANN in 1998, the ownership and maintenance of the
DNS Root was very much in dispute. While the Root had been created and
administered by elements of the Internet Society, namely IANA, and was funded by the
United States government, the international community was less certain of the role that
the United States should play in further governing the Root. Much of the story of the
governance of the Root is covered in the previous chapter, and in much greater detail
by Mueller 2002, yet the political maneuvering by WIPO in its attempt to rule the Root is
of great importance to questions of administering IP disputes on the Internet to this day.
With the issuance of the US government White Paper in 1998, WIPO saw the
opportunity to open up the Internet to a much greater degree of international oversight.
WIPO’s counter to the gTLD-MoU, the 1998 Interim report, proposed a much different
approach to Internet governance than was eventually agreed upon. Due to the nature of
the institution, WIPO’s report was focused very heavily on Intellectual Property
concerns, and proposed to give WIPO a very large degree of power.
WIPO’s proposal focused on securing complete and accurate information from
domain name registrants, with very large penalties levied for false information provision.
Along with this information collection, the database of registrants should be cheaply
available to determine if an IP violation has occurred. A separate arbitration process
overseen by WIPO for IP disputes would be part of the contract for purchasing a domain
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name, and exclusion rights could be given to famous people for a one-time fee (WIPO
1998). While WIPO focused on alleviating domain name disputes in a very open format,
this proposal was met by much backlash from a broad spectrum of the Internet
community (Mueller,2002 pp191). The focus of WIPO remained firmly on IP dispute
resolution, even at the expense of privacy concerns and the notion of fostering
competition to the DNS. Although the Internet by this point had been commercialized,
the US Commerce Department still had authority over the infrastructure of the Internet,
without which WIPO could not implement its plan and the Commerce Department found
itself aligned with ICANN’s goals for IP dispute resolution. In the end, WIPO lost its bid
to control the Root to ICANN, and its role in IP on the Internet was greatly reduced.
Instead of having overall DNS Root authority, ICANN’s Universal Dispute Resolution
Policy was put into place and WIPO was reduced to trademark concerns in the
resolution process.
Trademark concerns in the DNS registration process were one of the original
ways that WIPO interfaced with the Internet community. Under the Madrid Agreement
and Protocol, one of the chief treaties administered by WIPO, corporations may register
their trademarks internationally. While in 1996 these trademark disputes were limited to
entities within the United States, it was already foreseen by Robert Shaw that many
international trademark disputes would emerge in the coming years. Alexander Gigante
was also quick to point out in that same year that there was an ongoing conflation
between domain names and trademarks. It would become clear that some
internationally accepted practice for dispute resolution would become necessary.
William Foster suggested that WIPO play an important role in this process, as it was
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already adept at international IP dispute resolution. The major real-world impact of
WIPO on Internet IP rights has not come from dispute resolution however much the
early Internet community might have liked it to. Once ICANN implemented the UDRP,
WIPO transitioned into another role, that of shepherding Country Code Top Level
Domains47 over into the ICANN system of gTLDs. While it could be interpreted that
WIPO lost its bid for the Root, it have since come to have a “symbiotic relationship” with
ICANN (Mueller, 2002 pp 227). WIPO undertakes the policy initiative to create new
rights in domain names, and ICANN provides the control necessary to actually
implement these plans. For the first two decades of the commercial Internet, the scarcity
of domain names drove this relationship to be highly successful. But ICANN has since
done away with the artificial scarcity of domain names, and has accordingly left WIPO
without much of a role to play in IP domain name dispute resolution. WIPO made a
valiant bid for control over the Root, but in losing has now found itself without a role to
play in domain name intellectual property.
The Internet Treaties
Although WIPO had lost its place in the realm of domain name IP, a much larger
role for interaction with the Internet was underway within the international community.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s new technologies came into being that made the idea
of intellectual property theft a much more expansive idea. While IP had already been
expanded to cover a large variety of intellectual output, technology had begun to make it
possible not only to plagiarize, but outright to steal others’ works of IP. This new type of
theft quickly adopted the piracy moniker, and caused a great deal of new law to become
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necessary (WIPO 2002). As technology began to progress, especially in the realm of
information technology, piracy began to become an even more important problem to
address. For several decades, the policy followed a principle of “guided development,”
but by the middle of the 1990s, it was clear that this policy would no longer function.
Accordingly, two new treaties were drafted to update modern IP law for the computer
age. These treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), are collectively known as the Internet Treaties.
Both of these treaties were adopted on December 20, 1996, during the period of
chaos when the institutions of Internet governance were undergoing a period of
reformation. Taken together these two treaties enhance the protections of IP rights as
created under the Berne Convention. These treaties deal specifically with what is called
the “digital agenda” and seek to expand and clarify the role that intellectual property
rights play with regard to the expanding role of computers and networked computing to
media proliferation and consumption. The rights of communication with the public and
the distribution of intellectual property are two of the major rights at play in the WCT,
and are extended under the so-called “Umbrella solution.” This solution reserves IP
rights to the authors or creators of the work regardless of transmission method, and the
timing of consumption of the work by the individual members of the public. It also allows
the transmission to be contractually negotiated out to third parties, while the creator
retains the rights. Perhaps more important than simply guaranteeing IP rights for
creators, WCT allows for technological solutions to prevent piracy, namely the creation
of Digital Rights Management systems. The treaties make breaking the DRM systems a
crime, as well as the act of piracy itself.
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While WCT built primarily off of the Berne Convention, the WPPT builds primarily
off of the Rome Convention, securing rights for phonograms (sound recordings) and
performances. The WPPT functions almost as a mirror to the WCT, accomplishing the
same goals of expanding IP rights to phonographs and performances that the WCT did
for copyright holders in traditional mediums. Under the WPPT, making a digital copy of
a phonogram or performance is to be treated the same way as copying these to a
cassette tape. To determine if any reproduction is justified, Article 16 of WPPT suggests
the “three-step test.” Many explicit rights for performers and producers are laid out by
the WPPT, and these rights, often called the neighboring rights, are extended under the
same “Umbrella solution” as laid out in WCT. These rights deal with certain moral and
economic rights to intellectual property that should be reserved to the performers, such
as the right to be identified as the performer and the ability to authorize the distribution
and communication of the performance. The sole right to copy their performance is also
guaranteed, along with the right to distribution of their work.
Current Activity
With the expansion of IP rights to artists through digital mediums, WIPO’s
Internet treaties have secured WIPO’s places as the institution responsible for IP rights
on the Internet. This position has created several new opportunities and roles for WIPO
as the Internet and information technology have continued to advance. Perhaps the
most important position for WIPO is that of spearheading an expansion of IP rights to
broadcasters. Currently very little IP protection is afforded to broadcasters, and WIPO
has begun to campaign for a new treaty or rights regime to expand the rights and
protections of broadcasters. They believe that this expansion would also further benefit
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the performers and producers of the material (WIPO, 2013). WIPO has also been highly
instrumental in helping various nations enact legal provisions to support the Internet
treaties, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the EU Information Services
Directive.
Finally, in roundabout fashion, WIPO has begun to work heavily to help shutter
websites that promote digital piracy. While WIPO has little by way of enforcement
mechanisms for fighting piracy, it does have one potentially useful tool. WIPO still plays
a large role in domain name disputes at the international level. If a well-known piracy
website, such as www.ThePirateBay.se, comes into a domain name dispute, WIPO can
find against the website and give control of the domain name to another party. Such a
case occurred in 2012, when ThePirateBay was forced to relinquish control over
fuck.timkuik.com to Tim Kuik, a well-known advocate for anti-piracy activity (Ernesto,
2012). This trademark dispute represents a potential future avenue for WIPO to directly
fight digital piracy.
While WIPO’s position in the current activity of practical Internet governance
appears to be waning, the past contributions to the Internet, from challenging Root
governance to the creation and administration of the Internet Treaties, have had a
significant impact on the shape of the Internet today. WIPO’s symbiotic relationship with
ICANN in the promotion of merging ccTLDs with gTLDs was highly instrumental in
making the Internet truly international. ICANN may exercise important control over IP
disputes for domain names, but WIPO still handles IP disputes through the Internet, a
role that is expanding into the future. With an important role in administering the Internet
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treaties, and a position to expand IP rights to broadcasters, WIPO continues to play a
highly important, if diminished, place in Internet governance.
Data Transmission, the ITU, and WCIT-12
Once again the International Telecommunication Union, the institution created in
1865 to coordinate standards for international telegraphs, finds itself in a position of
international importance. In this instance, as opposed to that of space exploration and
satellite orbits, the role of the ITU appears to be actually less prominent than it should
probably be. The ITU does play an important role in governing the Internet, but instead
of actually governing the Internet directly, a position taken up by ICANN and ISOC, ITU
serves as an advisory group to both of those other bodies. While ISOC plays a
significant part in standards setting for the Internet through ITER and IETF, the ITU’s
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) serves as the global Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT) standards setting body (ITU, 2015).
The way that the ITU-T functions is surprisingly similar to both ITER and ITEF,
utilizing a contribution driven and consensus based environment overseen by a
particular study group chairman. While this second string standards setting is of passing
importance to the ITU’s place in governing the Internet, a more important and
interesting role comes from the creation and enforcement of International
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) and their negotiation under the World
Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT-12). It should also be noted
that the ITU has expressed the opinion that its own contribution to Internet governance
should be larger, and it has also made an attempt to wrest control of the Root from
ICANN. The remainder of this section will address these two issues: ITU’s attempt to
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remove control of the Root from the US and ICANN, and the WCIT-12 process of
rewriting the ITRs.
ITU’s Power Play for the Root
From the very beginning of the commercialized Internet, it was clear that new
institutions would be necessary to govern this rapidly expanding realm of human
activity. While the Postel plan was out for comment, and WIPO was making an
overreaching play for the root, participants in the process from the ITU were
instrumental in pushing through the original gTLD-MoU (Mueller, 2002). Throughout the
process of negotiation for the creation of ICANN, as guided by the US Department of
Commerce, ITU participants48 sat on the International Ad Hoc Committee responsible
for negotiation. The ITU were even capable of negotiating a position on the Board of
ICANN, securing for itself an important say in the governance of the Internet. Yet with
the creation of ICANN, many problems emerged that the ITU believed it could leverage
to gain more control over the governance of the Internet. The foremost of these
problems was the large role played by the United States in overseeing ICANN (Mueller
2010). This privileged position facilitated the ITU in calling a World Summit on the
Information Society in 2002-2005. The ITU was the spearhead organization for this
summit meant to address the digital divide through worldwide redistribution of
technology in the old UN model. This World Summit would end up being dominated by
the issues surrounding ICANN, and would evolve into the World Summit on Internet
Governance.
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The ITU, while playing a role in ICANN as a stakeholder still exists “as a redoubt
for supporters of an intergovernmental solution…” to the problem of ICANN’s oversight
being solely held by the United States (Mueller, 2010 p 216). There appears to be
significant institutional drama caused by the non-traditional structures of ICANN, and
ITU is at the forefront of calls to change the system to international oversight for ICANN.
The treaty-based institutions of governance cause a great deal of friction with the
Organically Developed Internet Institutions (ODii), such as ICANN and ISOC, resulting
in attempts to subvert the system that has evolved. These subversion attempts from the
international level will be one of the primary foci of the next chapter. For now, attention
should shift to the WCIT-12 process and the ITRs.
WCIT-12, ITRs, and conflict with ISOC
One of the primary responsibilities of the ITU is the creation and implementation
of International Telecommunications Regulations. These ITRs serve to make
communication work at an international level, ensuring technical compatibility of various
states’ telecommunications networks. The most recent widely adopted set of ITRs was
adopted at the Melbourne World Administrative Telegraphy and Telephone Conference
in 1988. At that time, the Internet was still in its infancy and hardly a pressing concern
for international regulation. Telephone networks were predominately national
monopolies and not a large concern for new regulation. The ITRs that exited from this
meeting would serve as a foundation for regulating the modern communication system,
but upon the rise of the Internet and the break-up of telecommunications monopolies, a
new set of ITRs became a pressing need. Along with changes in technology that had
occurred, massive changes had also been undertaken in institution creation. The ODiis
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emerged as a multi-stakeholder model for governing the Internet, and privatization

became the order of the day. This new world situation would cause fundamental
problems with the WCIT-12 process, which was to be driven by ITU in the old world
model of a large international treaty making conference.
Convened in Dubai in December of 2012, WCIT-12 is perhaps best viewed as a
power struggle between the ODiis and the ITU over what the future of Internet
governance should look like. However, as opposed to focusing on the problem of US
control of the Internet, the major issue in this instance would be the types of
stakeholders who should have a say in Internet governance. The ITU, building on
almost 150 years of experience regulating international telecommunications and acting
as the organizer of the conference, would support a model very familiar to that of the
post-world war period. States as the primary stakeholders for the Internet, the so-called
single stakeholder model, would be supported by the ITU as 85 national participants in
the conference. The ODiis and the remainder of the states present would push for the
new model, the multistakeholder model, that had emerged with the Internet, and which
had to that point been the predominate method of Internet governance. This model
supports the notion that the Internet is not the sole provenance of nation-states, and
that a wider variety of players are stakeholders in the Internet (Wentworth, 2013). These
new stakeholders include international institutions, corporations, non-profit
organizations, and even individuals bounded together into interest groups (Mueller,
2010).
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It is interesting to note that the conference began with an address by the
President and CEO of ICANN, Fadi Chehade, in which he called for an era of increased
cooperation between ICANN and the ITU. In his address, he also calls for the
organization to be “… open and vital; let’s remove the walls; open the windows; build
organizations that are welcoming and transparent” (Chehade, 2012). This call is rather
ironic due to the very opaque process actually put into place by the ITU, resulting in the
creation of a new website wcitleaks.com that would attempt to leak as many of the
working documents of both WCIT-12 and the ITU as a whole. These leaks began once
it became clear that the ITU’s openness and transparency extended only to the nationstate members and observer groups of the ITU.
Aside from this issue of transparency, several major proposals for the ITRs were
brought forth by the ITU, and opposed by ISOC, the primary participating ODii. While
the ITU pushed for the ITRs to apply to Member States, and ISOC generally agree,
ISOC recognized that the Internet is fundamentally different, and requires regulations to
apply more broadly than to just recognized operating agencies. Accordingly, ISOC
proposed operating agencies should be referred to in the ITRs more generally, in an
attempt to capture groups that would be otherwise unregulated (ISOC, 2012a). The ITU,
as previously discussed, also plays a standards setting role through ITU-T, and does so
in a much less open and transparent way. ISOC pushed for ITU-T recommendations to
be treated as recommendations and not have the same legal status as Regulations.
One of the largest differences in policy is seen in the realm of regulation of
private commercial arrangements. The ITU proposed as a matter of treaty law that the
ITRs have the ability to regulate IP interconnections. ISOC vehemently opposed this
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change, as private commercial arrangements had thus far allowed for a great deal of
growth in the Internet. It argued that creating a one-size-fits-all policy would remove the
ability of local market conditions to be reflected by policy (ISOC, 2012b). On top of
these considerations, an attempt was put forth by the ITU to deal with unsolicited bulk
electronic communications, or spam emails. ISOC recognized that spam is a very large
problem for quality of life on the Internet, but did not agree that it should be part of a
treaty, representing a much larger push that content not be party of any international
treaty effort.
The ITU pushed for certain quality of service requirements to be put into place by
the new ITRs, a move opposed by ISOC. While it might seem just from a political and
social standpoint to require certain standards of service, this move by the ITU was
viewed by ISOC as a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Internet actually works.
By putting into play the proposed standards the ITU would be attempting fundamentally
to change the way that Internet interconnectivity functions, and would actually increase
the cost of Internet traffic (ISOC, 2012b). Along with the push for standards of service,
the ITU attempted to pass a motion for Member States to know how traffic is being
routed across their territories. Again, ISOC pointed out that this is not how the Internet
actually works. Routing does not conform to national boundaries and is dynamic in
nature, constantly changing the flows as necessary. The networks upon which this
traffic flows often involve more than one country as well, and data packets do not leave
a footprint where they have gone.
Finally, the ITU attempted to pass various changes to the ITRs that would
enhance cybersecurity. The focus for these cybersecurity issues would be on nation-
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state level actions. Accordingly, ISOC was against a host of the changes proposed by
the ITU, primarily on grounds of reliance on a single stakeholder model (ISOC, 2012).
The specifics of cybersecurity, particularly digital defense, national security, content and
cybercrime should be handled by the international Internet community in a
mulitstakeholder model. The only area of cybersecurity deemed worthy for the ITRs by
ISOC is that of network robustness and the maintenance of the international
telecommunications networks. ISOC holds that the ITRs should remain high level
regulations and guidelines, and that specific policies should be adopted through the
multistakeholder model (ISOC, 2012). ITRs, in the view of ISOC, should function as
constitutional rules, the rules for rule making. All other regulations should be arrived at
by consensus of all parties involved, not just strictly Member States of the ITU (ISOC,
2012).
The vast difference in policy goals between the ITU and ISOC betrays a
fundamental divide in approaches to global regulation. The ITU, a long-standing
international treaty organization is fundamentally oriented to produce treaties and
regulations in a traditional Member State-centric methodology. ISOC, on the other hand,
is representative of the multistakeholder model of the organically derived Internet
institutions, where consensus decisions are made from a wide variety of actors, not
strictly nation-states. This fundamental divide left the process of revising the ITRs at
WCIT-12 as a non-starter. While the conference went off relatively well, the outcome
was a set of ITRs that were not acceptable to all parties. While many developing
countries did sign on, none of the major players in the Internet, including the United
States, Japan, Korea, and many EU countries, did so. The main cause for this defection
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can be placed on an abandonment of the mulitstakeholder model of decision making, as
well as on an overreach by the ITU in the types of regulations that would be passed.
This broken treaty revision process has left the world in a bit of a lurch for international
Internet governance of data transmission.
It is clear that the ITU, apart from its position within ICANN as an advisor, has an
important role to play in governing the Internet. But the most recent failed ITR revision
process has revealed that the ITU must fundamentally alter its understanding of how the
Internet actually functions. A revision of the governance model of the Internet must be
taken by the ITU, and it must reconcile reality with its own institutional inertia to remain
relevant to Internet governance moving forward. Only with these revisions can the future
of the Internet and its ability to be interoperable across national boundaries be assured.
The United States Department of Commerce, ICANN, The FTC and Digital
Commerce
The question of commercial regulation of the Internet leads to many interesting
answers. While the Internet is by its very nature international, with the possibility of data
flowing across national boundaries with extreme ease precipitating the flow of goods in
a similar manner, the primary regulators of this commerce are national entities. For
simplicity’s sake, this section will focus on the United States’ regulatory entities, the
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission. But this is by no means
an exhaustive case study, as the European Union, Russia, China, Singapore, and Brazil
among many other examples also have highly important commercial regulatory
agencies for the Internet. Yet due to the interesting relationship between the United
States Department of Commerce and the ODiis, the primary focus of this section will be
placed on US regulatory agencies for Internet commerce.
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Due to its essentially anonymous nature the Internet creates many avenues for
criminal activity, especially when put into combination with economic activity. Problems
with purchasing goods and services through the Internet, identity theft, and security of
financial information abound. The Federal Trade Commission has various rules and
regulations to combat these problems, and exists as part of the International Consumer
Protection Network (ICPEN). But these problems are not the only commercial problems
facing Internet governance. Perhaps an even larger issues is that of free and open
competition between services on the Internet. The questions of competition and
regulation of criminal activity on the Internet have served to create some of the largest
regulations and governance moves by the FTC in recent years, including several antitrust cases against Microsoft and Google. This section will examine the consumer
protection regulations of the FTC and their relation to ICPEN, the competition-fostering
regulations of the FTC, and the unique relationship between the United States
Department of Commerce, the Internet Policy Task Force (IPTF), and ICANN.
Internet Consumer Protection Rules in the US and Internationally
With the opening of the Internet to the world, and the accompanying proliferation
of websites, came a new avenue for commerce, what would come to be known at ecommerce. E-commerce would precipitate a period of economic growth and increase in
trade for much of the world, allowing individuals around the world to connect in
marketplaces that would not have ever been possible without the Internet. But with
economic growth also came the growth and evolution of new economic problems and
crimes. In order to deal with these new developments, the United States Federal Trade
Commission created new consumer protection rules that would serve as the foundation
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for legal protection for e-commerce. The most important of these rules are the Mail,
Internet or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, the CAN-SPAM rule, the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA), and the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act. All of these rules are administered by the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection for the benefit of securing e-commerce transactions for consumers.
The Mail, Internet or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule is designed to protect
transactions for goods that are ordered on-line, allowing for reasonable shipping times
to be expected, or for the prompt refund of payment. This rule is built on old rules from
1975 to expand mail and telephone transaction to Internet transaction, solving an old
problem in a new media with previously proven rules (FTC, 2015). With the anonymity
of transactions that characterize the Internet, even while requiring personal identification
documentation, it becomes much easier to steal and assume identities. To combat this
problem, and deter criminals, the FTC-administered Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act of 1998 serves to increase the penalties for these crimes in an attempt
to deter potential criminals. The CAN-SPAM rule is an attempt to reduce the amount of
unsolicited advertising emails received by consumers, a goal originally expressed by the
working groups for the WCIT-12 conference.
The old adage about activity on the Internet states that “On the Internet, no one
knows you are a dog,” betraying the supposedly anonymous nature of Internet users.
Yet this anonymity has proven to be more fictitious in the decades since that phrase
was coined. This loss of privacy is especially relevant in relation to children’s activities
on the Internet. To increase the protection of children’s privacy online, the FTC has
created COPPA. These rules prohibit the collection of information online for persons
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under the age of 13. In order for operators of web services to collect information from
persons under the age of 13, verifiable parental consent must be obtained. Participation
in online activities for persons under the age of 13 may not be made conditional based
on the collection of information. Any information obtained by operators may not be
disclosed to third parties.
These rules taken together regulate a good deal of consumer-level commercial
activity on the Internet, from data collection and dissemination to exchange of goods.
But the FTC does not operate alone on these issues. The International Consumer
Protection Network (ICPEN) serves as an international coordination body for the sharing
of information and best practices in relation to consumer protection activities.
Established in 1992, and revised in 2006, many of the world’s largest economies,
including the Unites States, the European Union, Russia and China, have all signed on
to ICPEN. Going beyond simple intelligence sharing and advocacy, ICPEN also works
with the OECD to deal with cross-national breaches of consumer protection laws
(ICPEN, 2015). This international framework serves to allow for variation in national
consumer protection, but also works to extend consumer protections internationally,
especially in the face of international consumer activity facilitated by the Internet.
Competitive Commercial Regulation
The other major arm of the FTC, the Bureau of Competition, is concerned with
the fostering of the free market economic system. The Bureau of Competition serves to
enforce the anti-trust laws in place in the United States. Problems of competition on the
Internet create many interesting issues for both regulators and Internet companies.
Perhaps the largest example to date of the FTC enforcing anti-trust laws on Internet
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corporations is the Microsoft anti-trust case (US v Microsoft, 2000). Microsoft was found
to be acting in the role of a trust by bundling the program Internet Explorer as the
default browser option in its Windows operating systems. This anti-trust ruling forced
Microsoft to break up into several smaller companies, as well as make Internet Explorer
a much less prominent program in the operating system. While this might be a rather
clear-cut case of monopolistic activity in the technology sector, the rise of Internet
commerce makes questions of trusts much more complicated.
The great example of what could possibly be a trust in the Internet today comes
from Google. While Google has been previously investigated for trust activity, Peter
Thiel raises the question as to Google being a trust in which realm of activity (Thiel,
2010). If one were to consider Google as a mere search engine, then perhaps due to
sheer market share the company could be considered as a trust. If Google were to be
considered an online advertising company, then the argument could still be made for its
status as a trust. While the vast majority of Google’s revenues do in fact come from
advertising, this is not the full extent of Google’s economic activity. Taken in the context
of all advertising firms, Google represents a very small portion of the revenues taken in
in the United States, much less globally. If Google is considered to be a technology and
devices company, then its revenues are very small compared to the rest of the market.
So the question becomes: under which economic activity is Google acting as a trust?
A further complication, as also pointed out by Peter Thiel,50 is the nature of the
technology and Internet industry itself. In order to be a successful company in the
technology sector, it behooves companies to create new and novel technologies that
50

An excellent rumination on this subject of innovation and market dominance in the
tech sector can be found in Peter Thiel’s “Zero to One”.
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will become the dominant player in an entirely new activity. Google represents one of
these successful companies, becoming the dominant player in Internet content
searches through the creation of a new algorithm for the sorting and presentation of
search results. While other search engines existed prior to Google, and others have
since entered the field, Google remains the dominant market player by far through the
high quality of their product (Thiel, 2010). This situation has contributed to Google
occupying the position of a trust in the search field, resulting in investigations by the
European Commission into Google’s monopolistic activity. Yet Google did not attain this
position either by being granted a government exclusive contract to search results or
through collusion with other players. Google has achieved this position through market
dominance based on a superior product.
This important distinction in capitalism, between a naturally occurring monopoly
and a nefariously produced monopoly, can be rather difficult to discern. It is the job of
the Bureau of Competition to determine whether this is trust activity, as it has been by
the European Commission, or if it is just a by-product of the capitalist system. Thus far,
the Bureau of Competition has been loath to declare these types of monopolies as
trusts, but this could change drastically in the future based on changes in the political
winds or if an international consensus begins to emerge. It is important to note that the
FTC and the Bureau of Competition also collaborate with similar institutions globally, but
do not always come to similar conclusions.
US Department of Commerce and ICANN
As has been previously explored, the United States Department of Commerce
has a very special and interesting relationship to the ODiis, essentially acting as the
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sole oversight body. While the Internet was originally developed by DARPA and the
Department of Defense, once it became clear that the potential for the Internet to impact
society as a whole becomes clear, financial and oversight responsibilities for the
Internet were transferred to the Department of Commerce under the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration. These responsibilities ultimately
included authority for the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The previous
chapter details how IANA came to be under ICANN, but this section will examine the
specific relationship between ICANN and the United States Department of commerce,
with particular attention paid to the Affirmation of Commitments (AOC) between the two,
as signed in 2009.
While a memorandum of understanding was signed between ICANN and the
Department of Commerce in 1998, and official recognition of ICANN occurred the next
year, these documents did not fully grant authority to ICANN to govern the Root, even if
they did establish a great deal of authority for ICANN (Mueller, 2002). It was not until the
AoC a decade later that a strong series of affirmations was established between the two
entities. In this new document, the Department of Commerce fully affirms the
multistakeholder, private sector model for Internet governance, believing that this model
can be appropriately used to make quick decisions about the rapidly advancing
technology of the Internet. ICANN agrees, under this AoC, to remain a non-profit
corporation that will be headquartered in the United States.
The chain of authority for the Department of Commerce and the NTIA in their
control over the Internet is a convoluted tale, but authority is ultimately derived from
United States Code title 15-1512 and title 47-902. 14 USC 1512 establishes the
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Department of Commerce and gives it authority over national and foreign commercial
matters, and all subsequently necessary bureaus and agencies. 47 USC 1512 creates
the NTIA and grants authority to that agency over telecommunications issues. In part b
Sections H and I:
(H)The authority to provide for the coordination of the telecommunications
activities of the executive branch and assist in the formulation of policies and
standards for those activities, including (but not limited to) considerations of
interoperability, privacy, security, spectrum use, and emergency readiness.
(I) The authority to develop and set forth telecommunications policies pertaining
to the Nation’s economic and technological advancement and to the regulation of
the telecommunications industry.

Once DARPA released IANA authority based on the United States Code, the natural
home for this authority falls to NTIA. With the foundational work for the Internet having
been a US military project, the vast majority of early Internet infrastructure was located
in the United States, with legacy contracts for governance resting with the Information
Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California. Accordingly, the United
States has an authoritative claim for ownership of the governmental structures of the
Internet. Yet the AoC shows that there is a commitment to a multistakeholder model for
Internet governance, taking in a wide variety of international and non-governmental
opinions. But the AoC concludes with a statement that the Department of Commerce
could terminate the relationship between itself and ICANN given 120 days formal written
notice. This situation produces a tenuous authority for ICANN to govern the Internet, an
authority which could be easily pulled to the Department of Commerce should political
opinions change. It is no wonder that there are attempts both by other nations and by
international communities to wrest oversight control from the United States Department
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of Commerce to some new Internet governance body. These attempts at subverting the
ODiis as they exist currently will be the primary focus of the next chapter.
Conclusions
While the ODiis that serve to govern the technical aspects of the Internet for the
most part accomplish their goals in an elegant, if unorthodox, manner the political
aspects of Internet governance have been characterized by the older model of
governance. This is not to say that these older models are deficient by any means, but,
given the mulitstakeholder model that has been generally adopted by Internet users and
advisory groups, the traditional treaty law model might be slow to react to particular
technological and political issues that emerge from the Internet. Conflict around the
political aspects of Internet governance has thus far been relatively minimal, allowing for
significant innovation to occur in the realms of commerce and communication facilitated
by the Internet.
Intellectual Property issues, especially those revolving around domain name
registration, have been predominantly dealt with by ICANN in coordination with WIPO,
and those that concern IP theft through the Internet have come under the purview of
WIPO in conjunction with law enforcement agencies. Data transmission and
standardization issues have fallen to the ITU, with ICANN and ISOC playing important
roles. Yet a change in regulations for telecommunications has caused a split in the
global community, resulting in the latest set of ITRs negotiated at WCIT-12 to have
sparse adoption. Commercial issues are predominantly dealt with by various national
agencies, such as the FTC, but there is a great amount of international cooperation
between these agencies to resolve any potential issues. While these more political
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aspects of Internet governance are from the old single stakeholder model, so far these
institutions appear to be functional.
Yet the final issue, that of NTIA’s control over the Internet’s main infrastructure,
and the Department of Commerce’s AoC with ICANN create a possibly tenuous
relationship between one national government and the mulitstakeholder governance
ODiis. This relationship has caused the much consternation in the international Internet
community, possibly leading to a reevaluation of the oversight structure of ICANN. The
final chapter of this work will examine some policy prescriptions that could ease the
tensions surrounding the Department of Commerce’s relationship to ICANN as well as
bridge the divide between the single stakeholder models of WIPO and ITU and the
mulitstakeholder model of ICANN. The next chapter of this work will bring this case
study of Internet governance to a close by examining the various national and
international attempts at subverting the current governance structure of the Internet.
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CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUBVERSION OF OPEN
INTERNET GOVERNANCE: BRICS, PRISMS, AND GREAT FIREWALLS
“That's something that tends to happen with new technologies generally: The most
interesting applications turn up on a battlefield, or in a gallery.”- William Gibson, Spook
Country
This chapter will serve as the final part of the case study on internet governance.
It will examine the attempts to subvert the ODiis, both by national and international
actors. In this case, the private-oriented international institution is attempted to be
subverted by public interests. Unlike the case of subversion in space exploration
institutions, the end of these subversion attempts has not been observed, so no
conclusion about the resilience of the ODiis can be drawn.
While the Internet has primarily developed an open and organic governance
structure, these Organically Developed Internet Institutions (ODiis) do not exist within an
institutional vacuum. Outside of the realm of the Internet the traditional actors for
governance, nation-states and international organizations, still maintain dominance for
other governance structures. These traditional actors have long sought to play a larger
role in governing the Internet, openly attempting to subvert the ODiis as the drivers of
Internet governance. This chapter will examine these ongoing attempts at subverting
the ODiis, at both the national and international levels. Several examples will serve to
illustrate the various methods of subversion that have emerged in recent decades.
At the international level, what follows will focus on attempts by the Internet
Governance Forum, the World Summit on Information Society and its precursor
organizations and summits to centralize control of the Internet in the hands of a United
Nations treaty organization. The attempt by the BRICS countries to create an alternative
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to the ICANN and US-controlled Internet will also be examined due to interesting
intersections with both national subversion and distinct international political problems
caused by the impact of the US on the Internet. At the national level, several different
subversive approaches have been utilized, and as such several examples will be
presented. For attempts to heavily censor Internet content by a national government,
the People’s Republic of China will serve as the primary case, especially on the socalled Great Firewall of China. Attempts to create separate and parallel networks of
networks will be examined with Iran as the primary case. Finally, and perhaps most
interestingly, the back door attempts by the United States to use the Internet as an
intelligence gathering network, known as PRISM, will be examined. While this final case
may not be subversion in the sense of undermining the governance structure of the
Internet, the subversion in this case comes from undermining the organically
determined norms of the Internet.
While these cases may represent only a small sample of the attempts and
methods to subvert the ODiis as well as the more traditional institutions of Internet
governance as discussed in the previous chapter, taken together they present a clear
picture that the institutional shift represented by the ODiis is not considered to be a
universal shift in institutional norms. The traditional, modernity styled norms still exist
and have institutional inertia not only to continue operating, but also have and existential
mandate to try and expand their governance territory. This tension of institutional
interplay between the ODiis and the traditional institutions illustrates the idea that
institutions are not set in stone and must be capable of adapting to both technological
and political inputs. The future of international institutional norms depends on the
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outcome of this institutional conflict, a conflict that is still being played out today. While
the theory of institutional subversion, as discussed in chapter 2 does predict subversion,
the outcome relies on the international normative and geopolitical context. If the ODiis
are being subverted, the true question becomes: is the international community
experiencing a shift in norms and geopolitical contexts? Only time and further research
will be capable of answering that question. This chapter will attempt to illustrate the
institutional conflict theater as represented by Internet institutions.
International Subversions
When attempting to subvert the Internet’s ODiis at the international level, there
are two major categories of subversion that can be observed. The first category is that
of wresting policy-making authority away from the United States. The previous chapters
have detailed early attempts at this activity by both WIPO and the ITU. Contemporary
cases of this activity are represented in the World Summit on the Information Society
and the Internet Governance Forum. It should be noted that NTIA, the ultimate authority
on Internet governance, has resolved to give up this authority, so a shift on this front is
likely to occur in the future. The second category is that of creating an alternative
network apart from the US dominated Internet. The laying of the BRICS cable
represents this strategy, creating a network backbone between the BRICS countries
outside the US-created system. It is unclear at this time whether the intent of this project
is to actually create an alternative Internet, or merely to connect the BRICS countries to
the United States in a more direct manner. These different cases will be examined
below.
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WSIS and IGF
As discussed in the previous chapter, the World Summit on the Information
Society meetings in 2003 and 2005, while nominally held to address the digital divide,
resulted in calls for the United States to play a less exclusive role in controlling the
Internet. From the Tunis phase of the Summit came the call to create a regularly
meeting forum, sponsored by the United Nations and following a multistakeholder
model. The result of these calls was the creation of the Internet Governance Forum
(IGF) in 2006. Building from Article 19 of the UN Charter, the article expounding the
freedom of expression and information for all citizens of Earth, the UN put forth a
mandate for the IGF to serve as an open forum for the discussion of problems of
Internet governance.
While the IGF does exist as perhaps the only truly multistakeholder forum for
discussion of Internet governance issues, inasmuch as there is no formal membership
of the IGF and the meetings processes are open to any and all comers, the mandate
also puts forth a particular agenda for the forum. Much of this mandate focuses on the
free exchange of ideas for Internet governance, from dispute resolution to promoting
growth in the developing world. One particular element of the mandate is to promote
and assess the embodiment of WSIS principles in the Internet governance process. The
Declaration of Principles for Building the Information Society presents a series of
principles that seems to support the multistakeholder model of the Internet. Several of
these principles, especially those found in section B6- Enabling Environment, present
interesting questions for the continued ODii system of Internet governance.
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Principle 39 promotes the rule of law in creating “a people-centered Information
Society”, but in doing so relies on national governments to build “policy and regulatory
framework reflecting national realities”. Also, “Governments should intervene, as
appropriate… to serve national priorities.” While attempting to foster a multistakeholder
model, this principle appears to grant authority for Internet policy to national
governments. While in many cases, such as the United States and much of Europe, this
policy results internally in multistakeholder models, this policy could also result in
national governments heavily subverting the free-flow-of-information nature of the
Internet, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Principle 48 reiterates the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, with
particular attention paid to managing the Internet in a “multilateral, transparent and
democratic (way), with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil
society, and international organizations…taking into account multilingualism,” While this
language seems rather benign and in accordance with the multistakeholder model
properly understood, it is also rather subversive of the extant ODiis. While the ODiis are
relatively open and predicated on this very multistakeholder model, ICANN is still under
the ultimate control of the United States Department of Commerce. This situation runs
counter to the idea of a multilateral governance structure for the Internet as proposed in
the Declaration of Principles. Principle 49 also promotes the claim that “policy authority
for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States,” and that the
“private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the
development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields.” Civil society
should play an important role at “the community level” while IGOs should coordinate on
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Internet-related public policy issues. Finally, International Organizations should play a
role in developing technical standards and relevant policies.
The roles envisioned in Principle 49 are much better defined than what occurs in
the extant ODiis. While much of the practical governance of the Internet actually occurs
in a multistakeholder model through ICANN and ISOC, WSIS principles envision a world
with clearly defined roles for the various realms of stakeholders. At the top, as intimated
by Principle 50, should be the IGF to coordinate all activity between the stakeholders.
Individually, none of these principles do much damage to the extant ODiis, but taken
together they tend to usurp the authority that has been granted to the ODiis. The world
as envisioned by the IGF is still recognizable as a multistakeholder model of Internet
institutions, and these institutions can and should remain organically derived. But a
greater degree of power should be granted to states to control their own Internet policy
and ultimate authority for international Internet governance should be derived from the
IGF.
The actual mechanics of this shift in policy authority present much of the difficulty
faced by the IGF in establishing itself as a true player in Internet governance. The
funding for IGF comes not from the UN, but from contributions from interested parties in
the process. Among these contributions, generally from national governments and
private sector players, is a sizable contribution from ICANN totaling $330,000 for fiscal
year 201551 (ICANN, 2014). Secondly, until March 2014 the NTIA had not expressed
interest in giving up control over the root DNS, the key component to Internet function
and the lynchpin of all Internet governance. As previously discussed, the NTIA, a
51

This represents a $50,000 increase from FY2014. ICANN views IGF as an important
forum for free discussion and dialogue within the multistakeholder model.
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division of the US Department of Commerce, had ultimate authority over the root, and
merely delegated this authority to ICANN. This shift in NTIA policy, along with its
mandate from the US congress to assure that no proposal for authority transition would
include a national or inter-governmental agency as the recipient of authority, allows for
the IGF to gain more authority for Internet governance. ICANN, and many other
stakeholders have proposed that the IGF be used to settle the question of ultimate root
authority.52
Another major problem faced by IGF is the existence of a 5-year, renewable
mandate from the UN. This mandate has been renewed once before, in 2011, leading to
the current mandate nearing its natural end. Unlike the previous renewal, there appears
to be some concern from certain stakeholders that IGF’s mandate should not be
renewed. The parallel process of the WSIS as administered by the ITU seems to cover
much of the same ground as the IGF, and IGF adopts the principles of WSIS in its
operation. But due to the clear actions and administration of WSIS by the ITU, IGF
appears to be the truly free multistakeholder forum (Badii, 2014). The notion has been
floated that IGF is hindered in its operation by having a 5-year as opposed to permanent
mandate, as it could theoretically hurt fundraising. Yet the Internet Governance Project
points out several other UN projects, such as the UN Relief and Works Agency and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, that function on temporary mandates and which
have little problem raising funds (Badii, 2014). It is almost certain that IGF will be given
a renewed mandate in 2015, and some stakeholders have argued that it could perhaps
52

The current proposal for IANA transition states that IANA functions would be spun off
from ICANN and would be given to a new legal entity. This entity would be a wholly
owned subsidiary of ICANN, thus giving full control of the Root DNS to ICANN, leaving
out any of the other potential claimants i.e. ITU, IGF, UNESCO etc.
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be beneficial to keep the IGF on temporary mandates to keep the process open and
effective (Badii, 2014).
The other international process, WSIS, is now entering its plus 10 phase, holding
large meetings to continue the work and assessment of the impacts of the original
WSIS. These meetings are organized by ITU, UNESCO, UNDP, and UNCTAD in
Geneva to continue the multistakeholder model of the implementation of activities
derived from the original WSIS process (ITU, 2015). In order to facilitate these activities,
networks called action lines have been established to coordinate and collaborate across
a wide variety of Internet activities. The action lines are as follows: Stakeholders roles in
ICT development, Infrastructure, Access to information, Capacity building, Confidence
and Security, Enabling Environment, ICT applications, Cultural Diversity, Media, Ethics,
and International and Regional cooperation. While these action lines provide a clearer
path for the enacting of policy recommendations from the international Internet
community represented by WSIS, there exists little chance that WSIS could on its own
actually subvert the system of ODiis.
These two groups, IGF and WSIS, represent a possible shift in the international
Internet governance structure. Both seek to create a forum for the multistakeholder
model of Internet governance to play out, and have succeeded to varying degrees. But
they also seek to move the focus of authority away from the US Department of
Commerce to the larger Internet community. Being grounded in the United Nations, they
still prefer states and IGOs in the multistakeholder model, though they do attempt to
include the other types of stakeholders as well. And with a shift in policy in the NTIA,
there remains a possibility that either IGF or WSIS, or possibly some other international
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organization, could become the ultimate authority for the Internet. This shift would not
represent a fundamental shift in Internet governance, however, but would merely be a
relocation of the source of authority away from a single state towards the international
community. Other attempts by international groups have begun to subvert the overall
makeup of international Internet governance, namely a move by the BRICS countries to
establish their own Internet structures.
BRICS Cable- an Internet alternative?
The BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa represent
a rising economic and political bloc that could potentially disrupt the global power
dynamic. Currently, they also represent one of the major threats to the institutional
governance of the Internet through their creation of the BRICS Cable. First proposed in
April 2012, this project would run submarine cable between the five countries going
outside the current infrastructure network as created by the so-called “American
Internet” (Bloomberg, 2012). The cable would connect Miami, USA to Brazil and would
then carry on towards Vladivostok connecting together information linkages between the
BRICS nations. Originally proposed to further link these growing economies to the
United States in a much more direct fashion, since the revelations by Edward Snowden
of massive data collection and spying by the United States this project has taken on a
different context.
Instead of fostering trade between the BRICS and the United States, the BRICS
Cable now allows for data transmission between BRICS countries outside of the
infrastructure where the United States could enact its spying and data collection
programs (Falkvinge, 2013). While this new network would be free from the possibility of
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spying programs such as PRISM that will be discussed at a later point in this chapter,
the BRICS Cable also brings with it fears that the Internet could become fragmented,
with a separate Internet emerging for the BRICS countries (Clark, 2013). Perhaps even
greater than circumventing US spying efforts, the BRICS Cable also begins to break the
stranglehold the United States has on Internet infrastructure. As early as 2011, the
BRICS countries had begun to call for the US to lessen its control on Internet policy and
for a greater role in policy-making for themselves (Prodhan, 2011). In her opening
address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2013, President of Brazil Dilma
Rouseff referred to both reasons of surveillance and institutional domination by the
United States for the establishment of an alternative network of networks.
While the creation of an alternative Internet by the BRICS might seem as if it
could be detrimental to the overall Internet structure and the BRICS specifically, it
should be noted that approximately 45 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent
of global GDP rests in these countries, and this share will only continue to rise in the
future (Gibbs, 2013). The BRICS-net would suffer somewhat from balkanization from
the main Internet, but not nearly as much as the world would suffer from the BRICS
departing the main Internet. Along with a physical separation of networks, these
countries, led by Brazil, are attempting to strong-arm important tech companies like
Google and Facebook to store their data locally, removing the need to communicate
outside the BRICS system (AP, 2013). Apart from the direct assault on the infrastructure
of the Internet represented by the BRICS Cable and the attempt to change policies for
tech companies, questions of the free and open nature of the Internet also emerge from
this new system.

197

Several of the BRICS countries have authoritarian leanings, which could be used
to control informational access on the new network of networks. China’s relationship to
the open Internet will be examined later in this chapter, but could only be buttressed by
the creation of a separate Internet. A new agreement between China and Russia also
precludes these two states from attempting cyber espionage and cyber-attacks on each
other (Razumovskaya, 2015). This agreement also promotes these two countries to
work together to counteract technology that might “destabilize the internal political and
socio-economic atmosphere,” “disturb public order” or “interfere with the internal affairs
of the state”, essentially agreeing to help each other censor the Internet to prevent
internal unrest that might challenge the regimes.
It should be clear that the BRICS countries view the Internet as it currently stands
as an American affair, an interpretation not entirely divorced from reality. However, as
should also be apparent by now, the Internet is primarily governed in an organically
developed, multistakeholder model that is dramatically different from traditional
international institutions. The BRICS do believe that they should have a greater say in
the governance of the Internet, for various reasons, much like the majority of non-ODii
cases examined thus far. Yet as opposed to merely agitating for change, the BRICS
have begun the process of laying cable for a direct connection outside of the USInternet infrastructure.
This process will be completed during 2015, setting up a possible confrontation
over Internet governance at the same time as the NTIA is attempting to divest its control
over the Internet (Vorster, 2013). It should be noted that the BRICS Cable does not, on
its own, establish a separate Internet, but merely represents a new pipeline through
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which data can flow. Yet the BRICS Cable does form a backbone of a network for the
establishment of a new network, one that goes outside the structures of the so-called
US-Internet. The coming few years should be highly important for questions over the
future of the Internet, and global politics as a whole, as this example of a possible new
Internet being formed could represent an outside challenge to the hegemonic system as
operated by the United States and the United Kingdom for the last century or more.
National Subversions
While the attempts at subverting the ODiis at the international level fit into two
fairly neat categories, authority subversion and creating alternative networks, attempts
at the national level to subvert ODiis fit into other categories altogether. Three major
categories can be identified: (1) creating alternative networks to censor Internet content,
(2) sever content censorship while connected to the main Internet, and (3) surveillance
and massive data collection. The first two of these categories attempt to subvert the
institutions as they stand, either by splitting off from the established institutions, or very
selectively filtering and censoring content (effectively creating a side branch of the main
Internet). These attempts at subversion will be represented by examining the cases of
Iran’s halal Internet and the Great Firewall of China, respectively. The third category,
surveillance and data collection, represents an assault not on the institutions of the
Internet, per se, but on the principles of a free and open Internet. Representing this
category is the United States and its PRISM program sponsored by the National
Security Agency. This final example has already had an impact on Internet governance
in its spurring on of the previously explored BRICS Cable. The PRISM program will be
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explored, examining how its system of data collection has undermined the way the
Internet functions, while also creating new avenues of behavior on the Internet.
Iran- the Halal Internet
Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to control the morality
of its people through coercion and censorship. The Internet has allowed for a much
freer flow of information across the world, Iran included. As it became clear that the
Internet was no passing fad, and that the Internet could potentially be used to
destabilize authoritarian regimes in the wake of the Tahrir Square uprising in Egypt, Iran
has sought to censor the information available to its people on the Internet. While some
states like China have shown that it is possible, given enough political will and capital, to
restrict data flows, Iran has taken steps in creating a clean or Halal Internet (RSF,
2011). This network, also known as a National Intranet, would separate Iran from the
US-dominated Internet, creating a new network with content approved and curated by
the Iranian Revolutionary Regime. The Halal Internet would represent one of the major
assaults at the national level on the free and open Internet, both by causing the
fragmentation or balkanization of the Internet and by subverting the international
Internet norms of free and open informational flows.
While the idea of a national intranet is not a new one, as North Korea, Cuba, and
Myanmar have all established walled-garden type networks, the notion that Iran would
like to disconnect from the main Internet leads to some interesting considerations for the
future of the Internet as it currently exist (Rhoads and Fassihi, 2011). It should be noted
at this point that Iran has not successfully created its Halal Internet, but has taken
marked step in that direction over the first half of the 2010s. The first of these steps
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occurred in 2011 in the run up to parliamentary elections, a signal that more than
religious purity and moralizing was at play in the decision to clamp down on Internet
users (Dehghan, 2011). These measures included the collection of detailed personal
information on patrons of Internet cafes, logging the websites visited, the storing of this
information for at minimum 6 months. Along with these data collection mandates, at the
same time major slowdowns in service speed occurred. While the official explanation for
these slowdowns was placed at the feet of early efforts to establish the new national
intranet, there still remains the possibility that service disruption could have been
intended to halt anti-election activities. Attempts to organize boycotts against those
elections were criminalized, and bloggers posting satirical content was prohibited
(Dehghan, 2011). This period also marked the beginning of the official push to establish
the national intranet to provide “appropriate” services for the population (Rhoads and
Fassihi, 2011).
The initial plans for the intranet53 would see it operating in initially parallel to the
main Internet, with access to the main Internet maintained for banks, the government
and large companies. Citizens would be forced off the main Internet and onto the
national intranet in a very short period of time, disrupting the already well-developed
and vibrant, if rather small at 10 percent population usage, Internet culture that existed
in Iran. This change would be the culmination of over a decade’s worth of attempts to
stifle Internet usage in Iran, usage that often served to attack the regime. While initial
work began on this national intranet in 2005, it was not until 2012 that great strides
began to be taken to finalize the construction of the network, which while functioning on
53

Intranets function similarly to the Internet, but are instead a network of networks that
is isolated from the Internet at large.
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internet protocols, would operate under a different Root structure altogether (Rhoads
and Fassihi, 2011). Although some outside connections will be allowed, these
connections will be heavily censored, and Iran-produced alternatives to major providers
such as Google would be implemented (Paul, 2012). The primary censorship and
curating of this national intranet would be carried out by the Supreme Council of
Cyberspace as created by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a body of religious and political
leaders loyal to the goals of the revolution.
By 2013, the censorship efforts of the Iranian regime had become strong and
sophisticated, with sites like Google not only being effectively blocked, but the tools that
had often been used by Internet participants in Iran being “effectively squashed” as well
(Carrington, 2013). National websites were still made readily available, but service
speeds were also drastically slowed. As national elections approached, once again
efforts to restrict access not to the main Internet, but internal network activity, were
heavily underway, indicating a pattern of information suppression that runs with large
political events. In what appears to be remarkably similar to attempts to guide
consumers to better choices, the slowdown in service speed on the main Internet in Iran
seems to be designed to push Internet users to the national intranet with higher speeds,
lower prices and a greater ability for the regime to control access to information. This
strategy of not pulling the plug on users’ access to the main Internet, but instead making
the choice to switch to the intranet much more appealing to users has been underway
since at the very least 2011’s elections and has continued in the face of other large
political events to this day (Bernard, 2015). A final step taken in 2013 was for the Iranian
public to be registered for government email accounts using their real identities,
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ostensibly to allow citizens better communication with their leader (Rafizadeh, 2013).
This move would perhaps begin to shunt even more people onto the national intranet.
While much as been made of these attempts to create a national intranet, as of
2015 Iranians are still capable of accessing the main Internet, albeit with severe
censorship that finds its roots in the 2011 Internet crackdown (Bernard, 2015).
Alternative services to main Internet staples such as Google and Bing have begun to
come online. Most recently, the Iranian-born search engine “Yooz” or Cheetah has been
offered up to the public. These tools are, at face value, meant to provide greater access
to Persian language material to Iranian users at faster speeds and in a more secure
way (Sridharan, 2015). It is also stated by state officials that Yooz will allow Iranians to
circumvent many of the sanctions that had been placed on Iran by the West. This new
push for domestically sourced software solutions represents a slight shift in the attempt
to create a Halal Internet for Iran, away from a wall-garden style national intranet and
towards a vastly filtered version of the internet or “filternet” (Bernard, 2015). By creating
a seemingly quicker and more secure connection to the Internet, as seen by the
populace of Iran, it should be theoretically possible for Iran to censor and filter the
content that is available to the population. With the transition within the regime from the
more hardliner Ahmadinejad to the more liberal Rouhani, perhaps the approach of
abandoning the creation of a national intranet in favor of a filternet represents a shift to
a less heavy handed method of censorship (Small Media, 2015).
One final element of the push towards a national intranet comes from fears of
Western intervention in Iranian networks. Much like a moat around a prison serves to
keep people in; it also has the effect of keeping people out as well. Such is the idea
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behind the national intranet, as it would allow the regime to better control the access
and activities of its population; it would also serve to harden Iranian security networks
from outside attacks (Rhoads and Fassihi, 2011). This fear of outside intervention into
Iranian networks is not entirely unfounded, as the 2010 Stuxnet virus attack on Iranian
nuclear plants shows (Zetter, 2014). Stuxnet, an insidious computer virus originating
from somewhere in the West54 has been called the world’s first digital weapon, a
weapon aimed squarely at disrupting the Iranian nuclear program. The infiltration of this
virus into Iranian systems has been a source of great frustration for the Iranian regime,
and has served to foster calls for Iran to remove its networks from the overall main
Internet (Dehghan, 2012). Calls by the United States to foster the free Internet in Iran
have reinforced the view that the West intends to infiltrate Iran through electronic means
(Rhoads and Fessihi, 2011). Separating Iran’s security networks, and the rest of the
country’s networks as well, would allow defenses from these infiltrations to be enacted
in more efficient manner.
Iran views itself as the recipient of constant attack and animosity from the West,
from highly restrictive sanctions to deliberate cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet being a part
of everyday life. In order to push back against the digital infiltration of their society, the
plans to subvert both the institutions and intentions of the main Internet have become
official policy. By creating a balkanized and fractured portion of the Internet, Iran could
to a much higher degree filter and censor content available to the citizenry. The ability of
Iran to monitor the networked communications of its people would also be increased by
enacting the Halal Internet. This network would also allow Iran to fight the influence of
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the West within its own country, reducing information flows and going a long way to
prevent malicious software attack from penetrating vital systems. Even if Iran is unable
to divest fully from the main Internet, the creation of a filternet appears to be well
underway and causing similar outcomes as a national intranet. The case of Iran’s
subversion of Internet institutions and norms represents perhaps the most extreme case
seen, especially in the context of a state that had previously heavily embraced the main
Internet.55
China- The Great Firewall
The People’s Republic of China has long been the world standard for official
censorship of the Internet for its citizens, spurring the idea of the Great Firewall of
China, first termed in a Wired article in 1997(Barne and Ye, 1997). While this language
brings to mind images of an iron-clad defensive structure that might be more in tune
with the idea of a national intranet, the reality is more complex and more intertwined
with the main Internet than the name might suggest. In practice, as opposed to a heavy
filtering mechanism as might be seen in Iran, China relies more on a series of traps and
key word filters to use a gentler, but no less effective hand to censor information flows
on the Internet. The most important element of this censorship effort is known as the
Golden Shield Project, running from 1998 through 2003. The Golden Shield Project,
now a part of offensive cyber capabilities for China, will be discussed below, along with
other important elements of the Chinese Internet censorship program. Along with the
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Iran presents an interesting case, as it officially adopted the Internet in the early
1990s. The hope was that it could be a medium of spreading Islamic propaganda to the
West. Instead it has had almost the opposite effect, with Western ideas flowing in
steadily, and the younger generation in Iran has adopted Internet culture consistent with
the rest of the world.
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creation of the “biggest prison for netizens,” China’s censorship program also has the
benefit of protecting Chinese Internet businesses like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent
(Gracie, 2014). It should be noted that without the cooperation of foreign Internet
companies such as Microsoft and Yahoo, China’s censorship policies would not be
nearly as effective, a phenomenon that will also be examined below.
The collective censorship and surveillance programs that are known as the Great
Firewall of China find their roots in the latter part of the 1990s. The Internet itself did not
find its way to China until 1994, and over the next three years a period of lawless
activities on the Internet heralded the spread of the Internet. In 1997, the National
People’s Congress passed CL97 the only law pertaining to the Internet in China. These
laws criminalized cybercrimes, a set of very broadly defined crimes fitting into two
categories: (1) crimes committed against computers and networks, and (2) crimes
committed on computers and networks (Keith and Lin, 2006). While some judges within
China felt the law was too vague, making it unenforceable, the regime stated that the
law was left “flexible” to allow for future interpretation and development. The second
category of cybercrimes, crimes through the computer, is the primary justification given
by the regime for the Great Firewall, requiring severe censorship and surveillance to
prevent cybercrime and to catch cyber criminals.
The early stages of enforcement of the provisions of CL97, and the subsequent
subversion of the institutions and norms of the Internet, began with the inception of the
Golden Shield Program (GSP). In 1998, beside fears that the Internet could embolden
and organize a renewed push for democracy in China, the Golden Shield Program was
initiated with the goal of monitoring Internet traffic within the country and censoring the
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information that would flow in from the West. The Golden Shield Project established a
series of network firewalls preventing IP addresses from routing through to the Internet
at large, capturing and rerouting through six proxy servers (Hoffman, 2013). The actual
hardware used to support GSP originated in the United States, provided by Cisco
Systems as well as other technology companies, and was operated by a large cadre of
technology officers (August, 2007). While the censorship and monitoring of network
traffic on the Internet are conducted by GSP, perhaps more important are the cultural
elements that have been derived from such a program.
With the widespread knowledge that for at least a decade (from 1998-2008) GSP
was actively monitoring Internet activity in China, the population adjusted to the
panopticon nature of Internet monitoring (ScienceDaily, 2007). The public knowledge
that Internet activities were being monitored had the effect of causing the population to
self-censor their activities online. Widespread self-censorship has led to China and GSP
having only to selectively censor the Internet, a process less resembling a firewall and
more similar to a series of ever smaller sieves. This less intrusive censorship has left
Internet users with a fairly wide range of freedom, but with certain topics being
immediately censored by the state, leaving most censorship up to the individual Internet
user (ScienceDaily, 2007). After completing its two phases (for a total of 10 years of
operation), GSP officially came to an end, and the majority of hardware and personnel
have since transitioned to carrying out probing offensive cyber-attack on the West, as
witnessed in the Man-on-the-Side DDos attack on GitHub (Netresec, 2015). The
introduction of GSP has led to a successful transformation in the Internet activities
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within China, causing a great deal of self-censorship leading to a reduced need for
actual censorship and surveillance.
A crackdown on usage of Internet cafes, similar to that seen in Iran after 2011,
began in 2008 under the banner of Operation for Tomorrow (Yu, 2008). The major
purpose of this crackdown was to prevent minors from utilizing Internet cafes to play
online games. But the crackdown expanded to include a wide variety of Internet
behaviors and the playing of online video games more broadly. Registration
requirements were made for users of Internet cafes, including the provision of full
identification to the proprietor. The cafes themselves were not only forced to keep this
information, but were also limited in the type of software that could be loaded onto their
computers. While nominally successful, this operation caused a proliferation of black
market Internet cafes to cater to the displaced youths and their gaming predilections
(Cody, 2007). Over 130,000 Internet cafes were shut down over a 6-year period ending
in 2011, demonstrating the success of this program (Kan, 2011). In a similar move,
while it remains legal to post using anonymous Internet handles, the service provider
must know the real identification of the end user before allowing the provision of an
anonymous handle (Bradsher, 2012). Attempts to disguise Internet activities, through
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or by utilizing the Tor network, have been severely
limited by China, and the method of throttling Internet speeds to users also has a
desired outcome of destabilizing attempts to circumvent the various censorship
methods employed by the regime. This technology has recently become more
sophisticated and automated, subsequently making life more difficult both for private
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Internet users and businesses, leading to a preference, at least among Chinese
citizens, for homegrown software solutions (Dou, 2015).
The success of the Chinese Internet giants such as Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent
could perhaps be directly attributed to the existence of the Great Firewall (Gracie,
2014). These companies have not had to compete on a direct playing field with their
similar services offered from abroad, (e.g., eBay, Twitter, and essentially late 1990s era
America Online, respectively). With great limitations placed on international Internet
companies by the Chinese government as well as by the difficulties of operating a
business that straddles the Great Firewall, the Chinese Internet companies have found
a great deal of success. China has a locked-in and growing user base of over 600
million users, one with growing economic power, and this user base leans heavily on
domestic websites to conduct their commerce due to reasons of both official and selfcensorship (Gracie, 2104).
At the same time, extreme restrictions are placed on foreign technology
companies such as Microsoft, Yahoo, and formerly Google. In order to operate in China,
Western companies must agree to strict conditions and assist in the Chinese program of
censorship (Phys.org, 2005). While many companies agree to these terms in order
subsequently to access the largest single Internet market in the world, there have been
notable cases of companies withdrawing their agreements with the regime. The most
prominent example of this is seen in Google, which formerly existed as a major player in
the Chinese Internet, agreeing to strict censorship terms. In 2010, Google stopped selfcensoring, and as a result was heavily censored by the Chinese government. This
change in situation resulted in Google’s Chinese market-share dropping from 37
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percent of all searches in early 2010 to approximately 10 percent today (Incitez China,
2014). Alongside strict software censorship agreements, it should also be noted that
hardware inspection of technology entering the country is also required, making
business deals all the more onerous for international technology firms.
The Great Firewall of China has earned its reputation as one of the most severe
and restrictive Internet censorship regimes at the national level in relation to the
Internet. This program has been successful by openly spying on and curtailing Internet
users activities and content availability, as well as acculturating the population into a
condition of self-censorship. By forcing foreign Internet companies to become complicit
in order to access the growing Chinese market, the regime has been successful in
preventing possible subversive activity from occurring as well as protecting the
homegrown Internet industry in China. All of these actions combine to create a massive
subversion of both the institutions and norms of the main Internet. While the Chinese
public can theoretically access the main Internet, the levels of restrictions placed on this
activity have essentially served to create a filternet, where censorship and surveillance
reign supreme, only tangentially connected to the main Internet. By creating these
restrictions from the beginning while growing their Internet usage, China has been quite
successful in maintaining control over its citizens’ Internet behaviors and the information
available on the network. And with the creation of the BRICS cable, the possibility of
China further subverting the main Internet will only continue to increase in the future.
Yet it is not only authoritarian regimes that participate in the surveillance and censorship
of their citizen’s Internet activity. The next section will detail how the United States has,
through large and insidious spying programs as well as manipulations in
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telecommunications law, subverted the norms and institutions of the very Internet that it
had created and helped to grow.
United States- Patriot Act Section 215, PRISM, and Net Neutrality?
In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many steps were
taken immediately by the US government to increase its ability to combat terrorism. The
largest legal steps taken by the US Congress fell under the umbrella of the PATRIOT
Act of 2001. This act began many programs utilized over the next decade to combat
terrorism, but one particular section of the PATRIOT Act, section 215 had a distinct
impact on the institution of the Internet. Section 215, the so called “library records”
provision of the PATRIOT Act, modified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or
FISA to allow for a much wider scope of surveillance than had been previously allowed
(PATRIOT Act, 2001). A further modification of FISA occurred under the Protect
America Act of 2007; it led directly to the creation of a new power of surveillance of
disposable cellular telephones and Internet communications. From the expansion of
surveillance came a distinct program of systematic spying on Internet users under what
has been revealed as the PRISM program of the NSA by Edward Snowden in the
summer of 2013 (Hopkins, 2013). While Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act was allowed
to expire in June 2015, significant damage and alterations of Internet institutions had
already occurred. This section will examine the functioning of the PRISM program, as
well as other programs of surveillance in the post-9/11 world, and how they impact and
subvert the institutions and norms of the Internet. In parallel, the impact of so-called Net
Neutrality legislation will also be examined, inasmuch as US net neutrality impacts the
overall functioning of the Internet globally and within the United States itself. While both
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of these strands appears to be primarily domestic programs within the United States,
due to the degree of control over the Internet as a whole exercised by the US, there are
certainly implications and consequences for the Internet as a whole.
PRISM, ECHELON, and NSA Surveillance Programs In the 1960s, at the
height of the Cold War, the United States National Security Agency (NSA) established a
program to intercept diplomatic telecommunications of Eastern Bloc countries. Over the
subsequent decades this program, known as ECHELON, expanded beyond simple
diplomatic telecommunication interception to become a monolithic program in
cooperation with the five signatory countries of the UKUSA Security Agreement for the
capturing of all global communications (NSA, 2010).
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Occupying an almost mythical

role in the global surveillance system of the West, ECHELON provided the backbone for
the collection of data globally, with listening stations placed in at least twelve countries.
These stations have the capability to intercept telephone, email, radio, and satellite
communications (Bamford, 2008). While this early and highly capable system of data
collection remained in the realm of conspiracy theorists, the actual collection of data
was much more directed than subsequent surveillance programs employed by the NSA.
In a somewhat ironic turn of events, upon being publicly disclosed in the late 1990s this
precursor to contemporary (Post-9/11) mass surveillance systems was viewed as
degenerate by US lawmakers due to ECHELON’s ability to monitor US citizens. Later
programs, namely PRISM, would set out in a much more overt manner to collect data
and metadata on US citizens’ communications in an attempt to combat terrorism.
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Signatories include the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
Each country agreed to collect data for the others, so that none could be considered to be spying
domestically.
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While the United States still refuses publicly to admit that ECHELON exists, the
Snowden revelations of 2013 show that not only was ECHELON real, but also was only
the tip of the surveillance iceberg (Greenwald, 2013). Questions were raised by the
Bush administration in 2007 about the ability of the United States to monitor
communications on newer technologies that had come to exist since the creation of
FISA in the 1970s. In late 2007, the Protect America Act modified the contents of FISA
to allow for surveillance of disposable cell phones known as burners, as well as Internet
communications. While ECHELON had been capable of collecting information from
these communication mediums, a new program was created specifically to collect
information from these new types of communication. This new program, as revealed in
2013, was known as PRISM (Hopkins, 2013). While the US was the primary beneficiary
of this new program, the other four members of UKUSA also greatly benefitted and
participated in PRISM. Unlike the national programs of surveillance and censorship as
undertaken by Iran and China, PRISM does not attempt directly to subvert the free and
open Internet and its multistakeholder institutions. PRISM instead relies on the open
character of the Internet to function, gobbling up the metadata57 of communications on
the Internet. The more that people communicate openly on the Internet, the more
information PRISM is able to collect.
The subtle surveillance from PRISM, ECHELON, and other NSA/UKUSA
surveillance programs represents a different but no less subversive assault on the
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Metadata is not the actual contents of communications on the Internet, but rather the
routing information. While this data may not give actual content, it does allow the NSA
to create information about communication networks, i.e. who is talking to whom. From
this metadata, a large deal of information can be collected, and more targeted
surveillance can be made possible.
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norms and institutions of the Internet. Whereas China and Iran boldly censor and
monitor their citizens’ activities on the Internet, UKUSA attempts to use the open
character of communications on the Internet to build models of communication networks
to further target subsequent surveillance efforts. More than simple metadata collection,
however, programs such as MUSCULAR and STORMBREW collected actual message
content from service providers (ISPs) and tapped into the private clouds of Google and
Yahoo to obtain data (S. Gallagher, 2013, Bamford, 2013). The interplay between
government agencies and the primary providers of Internet services for the collection of
data extends far beyond the monitoring efforts of more directly subversive nations like
China and Iran.
These programs subvert the multistakeholder institutional model of Internet
governance not by creating a balkanized portion of the Internet, but instead by utilizing
the control over the Root network held by the US, as well as the relationship between
Internet service companies primarily based in the United States, to intercept the
informational flows on the Internet. While FISA and the Protect America Act require the
use of warrants for domestic surveillance activities, due to the global nature of the
Internet and the ability to penetrate the network from outside the United States (with the
help of other UKUSA signatories), these laws become easily subverted. China and Iran
may justify their own surveillance programs and censorship with the principle of
protecting both their populations and their regimes, but the United States and UKUSA
justify their programs with the banner of national security and anti-terrorism efforts. The
end results, however, remains the same: the collection of information about citizens’
activities on the Internet. But in the case of UKUSA, the subversion of Internet
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institutions and norms has the effect of possibly facilitating the fracturing of the Internet
creating national networks to withdraw from UKUSA surveillance activities as potentially
observed with the laying of the BRICS cable. While the surveillance law in the United
States regarding is currently under review, the potential outcomes and consequences of
a shift in surveillance law vis-a-vis the Internet remain to be seen. The only sure
outcome is that UKUSA will have much work to do to repair its relationships to the other
stakeholder in the Internet.
Net Neutrality in the United States One of the foundational norms of the
Internet is that all data should be treated equally. As data reduces down to a series of
1s and 0s, the machinery does not differentiate between the delivery of a webpage
about peregrine falcons, a video documentary about the horrors of living in North Korea,
and a song praising the glorious existence of Vladimir Putin. The only care exhibited by
the machines and the network is the amount of bandwidth and data that is to be
transferred, and from which server to which client. The original File Transfer Protocol
nature of the Internet is essentially agnostic to what data goes where, relying on inputs
from users and operators to deal with the order and priority of data routing. For the first
several decades of its existence, the Internet has treated all data equally, allowing for
direct competition between established providers and disruptive start-ups. This
characteristic of the Internet has been greatly lauded, but now that the Internet has
become crucial for daily commerce, many established players believe that the neutral
characteristic of the Internet can or should be changed. Other stakeholders believe that
the neutral nature of the networks should be maintained. This conflict has lead to the
push in the United States for net neutrality legislation, which both supports the norms of
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the Internet, but subverts the multistakeholder institutional model of Internet
governance.
The early days of the Internet saw thinkers and stakeholders become concerned
with open competition and the freedom to access content on the Internet, leading to
Timothy Wu coining the term “Net Neutrality” in 2003 (Wu, 2003). From this point until
early 2015, lobbying battles within the United States both for and against Net Neutrality
played out. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ultimately rendered a new
ruling in April 2015 reclassifying broadband Internet services as common carriers similar
to telephone and telegraphs. Common carrier classification strictly governs the way that
data should flow on the Internet, restricting ISPs from blocking lawful content, slowing
down services, and accepting fees for favored treatment (Reisinger, 2015, FCC, 2015).
This shift in treatment forces all data to be treated the same, securing a fairly strict
definition of net neutrality for the United States. Of course, this ruling spurred many
lawsuits about the overreach of the FCC, and has drawn some criticism from sitting
FCC board members 58 that the nearly century-old rules now governing the Internet are
inappropriate and will have unintended consequences for the functioning of the Internet
(Gillespie, 2015, Reisinger, 2015).
While this work will remain agnostic with respect to the outcome of the policy shift
around Net Neutrality and Common Carrier status, the subversion of the
multistakeholder model of Internet governance represented by the actions of the FCC
are highly important for the overall subversion attempts on the ODiis. While ultimate
authority for the Internet rests with the US Department of Commerce, the majority of
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decisions have been made through the multistakeholder model, allowing other actors
involved with Internet to have a say in Internet policies. On the issue of net neutrality
however, the FCC had claimed jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the multistakeholder
model. While this issue of net neutrality is one of commercial policy, perhaps lending
itself to regulation by a United State agency, the authority and ownership exercised by
the Commerce Department would seem the natural fit for this type of regulation outside
of the multistakeholder model. Yet the FCC has given itself the authority to render
decisions about net neutrality in the United States, having far reaching consequences
for network access across the world. With the outcome of reclassification of Internet
services as a common carrier, the FCC has given to itself a great policymaking authority
in relation to the Internet, authority far beyond the Department of Commerce for the
regulation of Internet service and content. It is quite possible that this new authority
could have far reaching effects on the overall network.
The decision-making process by the FCC is itself rather secretive and is
considered by some to be lacking in transparency (Suderman, 2015). Public comment
on policy proposals is allowed and encouraged, but the ramifications of these comments
remains suspect. According to norms for an Open Internet, themselves created by the
FCC in the early 2000s, one of the major norms for operation and governance of the
Internet is transparency (FCC, 2010). Yet the process employed by the FCC in crafting
Internet regulations in relation to net neutrality appears to lack that transparency
characteristic of the Internet. A series of several meetings between the head of the
FCC, Tom Wheeler, and members of the Obama administration occurred in the run up
to the release of new Internet regulations in early 2015 (Suderman, 2015.2). As a result
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of these meetings the eventual outcome of FCC policy, one that supported the creation
of so-called fast lanes for the Internet, appears to have changed from previous rulings,
(Gillespie, 2015).
Regardless of the eventual outcomes from this policy shift, transparency in policy
creation has clearly been undermined by the FCC in the rulings to reclassify the Internet
as a common carrier. The norms of transparency in policymaking, along with the
multistakeholder model of decision-making about the Internet, have been undermined
by the actions of the FCC. The ODiis themselves have also been subverted, inasmuch
as they were not the primary decision-making bodies for this important policy issue.
While these changes only impact the laws and functioning on the Internet in the United
States, the location of Internet service companies operating in the US as well as the rest
of the world could potentially impact their corporate policies and subsequently cause a
shift in the overall character of the Internet, an institutional arrangement that has to this
point functioned quite well. The decision to push for net neutrality rules, while generally
well accepted by members of the Internet community, still resulted in a subversion of
the norms and institutions of the Internet. The process undertaken, driven by the FCC,
functioned contrary to the well-established methods of Internet policymaking, both
nationally and internationally.
Conclusions
The Organically Developed Internet Institutions, along with the multistakeholder
model of Internet governance, find themselves under attack in a multitude of ways, from
a multitude of sources for a multitude of reasons. The majority of these attempts at
subversion stem from national entities attempting to assert their dominance over the
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Internet policymaking system, seeking to play the dominant role in policymaking that
traditional treaty organization have given to states. The Internet, however, is governed
under the multistakeholder model where states must participate in policymaking in
conjunction with other Internet users such as Internet corporations and individuals. Even
the United States, ostensibly the only nation-state with a direct claim for authority over
the Internet through the Department of Commerce’s ownership of the Root DNS
system, has sought to undermine the institutions as they exist through the push by the
FCC for net neutrality. As a result of national subversions, several “walled garden”
Internets (e.g., in China and Iran) have been created to filter out unwanted content,
typically in the name of protecting citizens or regimes as seen in China and Iran. These
national intranets, nascent as they may be, also allow the states to monitor the Internet
activities of their citizens. As revealed by Edward Snowden, even the developed world
has attempted to monitor the activities of their citizens.
At a higher level, direct attacks on the ODiis have occurred at the international
level. The United Nations and the ITU have each attempted to wrest ultimate authority
for the Root DNS from its current location. Yet this perhaps is a good thing, as the US
Department of Commerce has attempted to spin off its authority for Root DNS onto a
new organization. This attempt at subversion may be resolved within the
multistakeholder model, noting that not all subversions are necessarily a bad thing,
merely representing institutional change. On the other hand, the BRICS nations, in the
laying of their BRICS cable, have begun the process of potentially creating a separate
Internet, apart from the Internet governed by the ODiis through the multistakeholder
model. This new system can also be viewed as a reaction to the subversions put forth
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by the UKUSA surveillance system by the developing economies. What is clear, apart
from these attempts at subversion, is that the multistakeholder model of ODiis
represents a distinct change in the norms of international institution creation. The
previous system of nation-state centric organizations is under assault and, accordingly,
states and treaty-based international organizations will attempt to exert their authority in
this new system in any way possible. Yet the possibility remains that the
multistakeholder model will not only survive the attempts at subversion, but also may
actually continue and expand as distributed technologies like the Internet become more
important for daily life in a global context.
The next chapter will attempt to examine the various institutional types that have
come to govern technology: nation-state centric treaty-based organizations and
organically developed multistakeholder organizations. Similarities from both institutional
types will be explored to find common ground for all international institutions governing
technology. The difference in these institutional types will also be highlighted, in an
attempt to find best fits for institutional governance of future technology. It should be
clear at this point that the institutions for governing technology are diverse, but seem to
be driven not by the needs of the technology itself, but by the dominant norms of the
international system where the institutions are created. The technologies and
institutions begin to mature, attempts at outside subversion of the institutions can have
a great deal of impact on institutional change. It remains clear, however, that attempts
to subvert and change institutions will always occur, as long as the international system
remains in flux.
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CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS- INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS,
LESSONS LEARNED, AND POLICY PERSCRIPTIONS
“It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant factor in society
today. No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not
only the world as it is, but the world as it will be.” Isaac Asimov
The two case studies of institutional technological governance examined in the
work, that of space exploration technologies and the Internet, provide an interesting
contrast for the varying approaches utilized for the governance of technology at an
international level. While the institutions themselves have many fundamental
differences, when considering the larger technological and historical contexts for the
institutions, many interesting intersections occur. Up to this point, the comparison of
these institutions has been strictly implicit, if following a parallel structure. This final
chapter seeks to deal directly with the comparison of these systems of governance,
looking for some particular divergences in institutional structures that could possibly
explain the different levels of success for the technologies being governed. While much
work in comparative politics has been previously focused on the governance of people
and places, with the increasing role of technology in human society it will become
important to develop a new set of institutional best practices for the governance of
technology. This chapter will seek to draw some lessons from the comparison of the two
case studies to begin to gather the information necessary to create these new best
practices. Some preliminary policy prescriptions can also be derived from these lessons
learned.
This chapter will be structured as follows: first, the institutional structures from the
case studies will be compared. Distinct differences in regime structure and their
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consequences for policy and physical outcomes will be examined. The interesting
intersections between the two technology governance structures will also be discussed.
An examination of overall trends in institutional formation and change will also be held.
Secondly, the various lessons learned from these two case studies, focused on practical
outcomes for technological governance will be teased out for further exploration.
Interesting dynamics of institutional protection and attempts at subversion will be
explored, along with questions of institutional inertia. Distinct conclusions about effective
governance structures will be drawn from the two case studies. Finally, this chapter will
conclude with some policy prescriptions for future attempts at crafting governance
structures for nascent technologies of global importance. While international norms of
institutional creation may be constantly in flux, as illustrated by the case studies, some
practices and structures as well as general approaches to institutional engineering
seem to bear out as superior to others. Hopefully, these prescriptions can assist in the
successful crafting of governance structures for future technologies moving forward, as
it appears that these issues of technology will only continue to gain importance in the
next several decades.
Analysis of Governance Structures for Technologies
The two case studies covered in this work, the international governance
structures for space exploration and the Internet, provide an interesting contrast for the
study of technological governance institutions. On the one hand, with space exploration
exists a set of institutions that to the trained political science eye would seem highly
familiar. On the other hand, the governance structures for the Internet seem almost
anarchic, relying heavily on business and information technology-based institutional
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structures. Yet in their divergences from each other, as well as the intriguing
intersection of institutional structure, many interesting observations about both the
creation and change of international institutions, as well as attempts to govern
technology can be made. The following section will address a series of these
fundamental divergences as well as a series of intersections derived from the two case
studies at hand.
Divergence
The two case studies have revealed distinctly different institutional approaches
for the governance of technology. Examining where these institutional structures have
diverged can reveal important principles for the governance of technology. By
understanding how these governance structures approach their technologies in different
way, examples and lessons for good governance of technology can be derived. The
following areas of divergence can give us important information for crafting best
practices of institutional creation, expanding beyond the realm of the governance of
technology.
Foundational Principles
Space exploration and the Internet have many distinct points of divergence that
have a great deal of importance on how their particular governance institutions are
structured. Perhaps the most fundamental of these points of divergence stems from the
very foundational principle from which the institutional structures are derived. For space
exploration, the institutions set out from the point of the scientific commons. No
individual, corporation, or state can make a claim of ownership of any celestial body, as
outer space and the celestial bodies are, according to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
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to be held “in common” for all mankind. While this is a truly noble and high-minded
ideal, in practice many difficulties emerge, leading to legal and institutional struggles
that have hampered the ability for mankind to explore further reached of outer space.
The idea that space exploration should be limited and state-centric appears to be the
actual intent of using the commons approach (Oganbanwo, 1975). The Internet’s
governing institutions are not predicated on notions of scientific commons, instead
relying on principles of private property and ownership to guide the creation of
institutions, rules and norms (Kahin and Keller, 1997). While there are clear differences
in the technical requirements for the proliferation of these two vastly different
technologies, the ownership model perhaps creates incentive structures beneficial for
expansion of the Internet, leading to the rapid expansion of networked computing in
both society and commerce (Mueller, 2012, Murmann, 2003). This divergence in
foundational principles, while derived from the logic of proliferation, owes a great deal to
the historical background for the development of each technology.
Historical Background
The historical period during which both these technologies were developed, and,
accordingly, the period under which the institutions were created play a important role in
the eventual type of institution created. The fundamental technologies for space
exploration were created and refined during World War II under the Nazi regime. While
the Nazis were ultimately defeated, the scientists and engineers responsible for these
technologies were split between the powers that would eventually become the major
players in the Cold War. Against the backdrop of nuclear conflict and mutually assured
destruction, the creation of rockets capable of placing a man into outer space would run
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in parallel to the creation of missiles capable of delivering large nuclear payloads to
targets on the other side of the Earth. This context of the Cold War and possible global
annihilation would make states wary of new technologies capable of aiding such largescale destruction, and would have a large impact on the types of institutions crafted
during this era. Along with the consequences of the Cold War, this era was also one of
decolonization. Western states were loathe politically and economically to hold onto
distant colonies after several protracted struggles (e.g, France in Algeria and Vietnam),
instead valuing national self-determination. This context too would have important
impacts on institutional creation norms.
On the other hand, the Internet, while developed during the waning days of the
Cold War, is predominantly a product of the 1990s, a period of relative peace and
optimism. Economic activity and capitalism were the order of the day, and this period
has been interpreted by some as “the End of History” (Fukuyama, 1992). The great
ideological conflicts appeared to be over, and an era of collective security seemed to
reign in international politics. States had begun to take the back seat to corporations,
and individuals were beginning to become major players in the world system
independent of political bodies. This historical context would lead to vastly different
international norms for creating institutions than the context of the height of the Cold
War.
Institutional Norms and Primary Actors
The historical context for each of the case study technologies leads to a certain
understanding of the international norms for institution building during each period.
During the early phases of the Cold War, the era under which institutions governing
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space exploration were created, the dominant norms of institution creating could be best
categorized as the early Cold War. The norms of modernity lead to a state-centric view
of institutions, as states were the primary actors in the global system. The initial instinct
for any new international institution at this time would be to create a series of treaties
building on the work of the United Nations General Assembly. These international
institutions would seek to limit any unforeseen consequences by calling for consensusbuilding discussions between states party to the treaty. The background of
decolonization would also see states act more reluctantly in the extension of colonial
claims. This reluctance is perhaps responsible for the proliferation of the notion of
commons based institutions during this era, as observed in the creation of UNESCO,
and the Antarctic treaty (Christol, 1982). All of these norms taken together lead to the
early Cold War style of institution: international, treaty-based, UN organized, commons
oriented, and predicated on a state-centric single stakeholder model.
Alternatively, the institutional norms surrounding the creation of Internet
institutions are derived from a much more focused ideology of institutions,
“neoliberalism”. Under neoliberalism, states and politics take a much more diminished
role in institutions. Instead market mechanisms are allowed to play out, leading to much
more organically derived institutions. While neoliberalism is often associated large
corporations and globalization, individuals are also capable of playing an increased role
in both institutions and the international society (Steger, 2007). All of these come
together to shift the primary actor in the governance structure away from the single
stakeholder model as observed during the early Cold War towards a much more
inclusive multistakeholder model of governance. While neoliberalism often has negative
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connotation, in the realm of norms for institutional creation neoliberalism leads to
organically created of institutions inclusive of a wider variety of voices and participants
in decision-making.
Institutional Type and Authority Center
The results of the norms surrounding the institution creation process varying
widely are vastly different institutional structures. Space exploration’s governing
institutions take the form of a United Nations-supported treaty organization. Building on
a UN mandate, a series of treaties were created to establish norms for behavior in outer
space. While at the time of institutional creation only two states were capable of actually
operating in outer space, the vast majority of states chose to sign on to the treaties. By
the end of the 1970s, with the final treaty governing outer space, most of the states in
the world signed, except those actually capable of operating in outer space
(Ogunbanwo, 1976). Ultimately, the institutions for governing outer space rely on the
status of their treaties to grant authority for action against those who violate the treaties.
In principle, the United Nations theoretically acts as the arbiter and administrator of the
institutions, though in practice those capable of reaching space must coordinate their
actions independent of the UN.
For the Internet, and its organically developed institutions, the primary institutions
that were created took the form of private not-for-profit corporations. ICANN and ISOC
allow a wide variety of actors to participate in decision making, through the
mulitstakeholder model. Unlike space exploration, no treaty has ever been drafted,
much less ratified, to govern the institutions of the Internet. Corporate governance
documents have been drafted, but states themselves are not the parties to any treaty.
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Yet the results of the ODiis are essentially treaty organizations without treaties (Mueller,
2002). And while the multistakeholder model allows for a wider degree of participation,
the ultimate authority for Internet governance, at least for the time being, rests with the
United States Department of Commerce. While there is currently a push to make Root
DNS, the lynchpin system of the entire Internet, an entirely privately held authority,
current Internet governance institutions rely on the US Department of Commerce to
continue operation. Internet governance institutions appear and operate as an open and
relatively inclusive system but rely on one national organization to function, a situation
that has lead to tension with other participants in the system.
Institutional Change
One thing that should remain clear to all students of institutions is that despite
attempts to remain the same, institutions inevitably undergo some change. The
governance institutions of space exploration have been forced to change in interesting
ways over the course of the last few decades. While subject to subversions, as will be
discussed in the following section, several important concessions to institutional change
have been necessary. Primarily, a new openness to non-state actors has occurred. With
the processes of privatization and subversion, new actors in space exploration have
emerged and the role of the state has accordingly been revised. States remain the
primary actors, yet their relationship to those capable of accessing outer space has
shifted. While the legal documents creating the foundations for space institutions have
remained unchanged, this represents a potential for myriad legal problems in the future.
The institutions of the Internet have also undergone some small changes. While the
legal structure of Internet governance remains relatively un-codified, this has left room
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for national actors to attempt to balkanize the Internet through the creation of national
intranets. The lack of national and international-level treaties dictating national
behaviors on the Internet has also left the door open for massive surveillance programs,
perhaps precipitating the creation of said national intranets. While both the institutional
structures for space exploration and the Internet have undergone drastically different
types of change, the intersection between the two cases will show in a later section the
similar role played by institutional momentum in each case.
Intersections + Divergences= Convergences
Two particular realms of activity have seen the institutions of space exploration
and the Internet simultaneously have a convergence of issues, while at the same time
experiencing them in vastly different way. This section will address these areas of
convergence, examining how similar processes can differ so greatly in outcome across
the two case studies. These areas of convergence should provide great insight into the
particular problems faced in attempting to govern technologies, an entirely different
endeavor than attempting to govern a population.
Subversion- Who and How
Both case studies have revealed attempts to subvert the technology governance
institutions of both space exploration and in the Internet. Yet the manner and source of
subversion diverge widely due to the nature of the initial institutions. Borrowing and
adapting the Stolper-Samuelson Theory concerning factor distribution and favor for
trade, when dealing with institutional subversion, those actors who seek to subvert
institutions are the actors who lose out from current institutional structures (Stolper and
Samuelson, 1941). For institutions, these factors fall into the categories of public sector
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and private sector. For the public sector, these actors are nation-states and international
organizations. For the private sector, these actors are individuals, corporations, and
non-governmental organizations.
In the case of the institutions governing space exploration the institutional
structure benefits the public sector, leaving the private sector in a non-dominant
position. Under the initial distribution of capabilities for space exploration, this
institutional structure was very appropriate, as the very notion of a private corporation or
individual being capable of space exploration in the 1960s rested squarely in the realm
of science fiction. As time progressed, however, technology advanced and individuals
and private corporations began to gain influence and increased capabilities for
accessing outer space. By the 1980s and 1990s, major attempts at subversion had
begun, falling into the two categories of privatization and commercialization, as
discussed in chapter 6. The non-dominant factor, the private sector, upon gaining
capability began attempts at subversion that continue to this day, resulting in an
institutional overhaul affecting not just the institutions of space exploration governance,
but the overall legal structure for mankind’s activities in outer space.
The case of subversion for the Internet is much less straightforward, as
discussed in chapter 8. For Internet governance institutions, the dominant factor is
essentially the private sector. While the public sector does exert influence through the
US Department of Commerce’s authority over the Root DNS and IANA, the ODiis are
given an extremely free hand to set policy on their own. Moreover, attempts are
underway by the Department of Commerce to relinquish this authority in the near future.
While that particular subversion would serve to strengthen the position held by the
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private sector over the Internet, it is not overly illustrative of the general attempts at
subversion underway on Internet governance institutions. The non-dominant factor, the
public sector, attempts to subvert Internet institutions in several important ways.
International Organizations attempt to wrest IANA and Root DNS authority from ICANN.
States use their relationship to Internet institutions to put into place massive surveillance
and censorship programs. And perhaps most importantly, states and groups of states
attempt to balkanize the Internet by breaking away from the technical and governance
institutions of the Internet, sometimes in response to the surveillance activities as they
occur in the West.
Subversion attempts are important factors in both solidifying and causing change
for technology governance institutions. These attempts typically originate from the nondominant factor, as they have the most to win by changing the system. And these
attempts at subversion change as the norms of international institutional creation
change, as witnessed by the shift towards the private sector in space exploration upon
the shift to the neoliberal world. It is possible that a new era of institutional norms is in
the offing, as witnessed by national and international attacks on the institutions of the
Internet.
Adoption of Technology- Institutional Impacts and Success?
Many authors such as Murmann (2003), Ruttan (1974), and Ruttan et al. (2002)
have noted the relationship between institutional structures around a technology and the
eventual success or failure in adoption of the technology by a wide audience. While the
Internet and space exploration have a wide gulf between their mutual ready utilization
by the public and are not directly comparable technologies, there is still an interesting
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interaction between the types of institutions created for each technology and their
adoption by society up to this point. For space exploration, the institutions are created,
at least implicitly, to limit the ability of new actors to join into the system. The reward
structures for new applications for space exploration and possible exploitation are
limited. The ability for profit in space exploitation is limited to essentially nothing based
on the space treaties as they currently exist. While there is some room for possible
exploitation of celestial bodies, the institutions to fairly distribute any profits do not exist.
To this point, regardless of actual technical capability, exploitation of outer space has
been limited to data collection and transmission (telecommunication) activities within the
bounds of primarily private satellites launched on public launch vehicles. This appears
to fit the design and original intent of the space treaties (Oganbanwo, 1976).
The Internet provides a marked contrast for the effects of institutional design on
adoption of a technology by society. Whereas the space treaties attempt to lock out as
best they can any new actors in the field of space exploration, the Internet has evolved
very open institutions meant to ease the entry of new actors. Property rights exist on the
Internet, and barring some distinct limits on behavior, allow users to attempt new and
interesting things upon joining the Internet. From the early commercial open period of
the Internet, it has rapidly spread not only taking on new users to foster wider
communication networks, but it has also expanded into new commercial frontiers.
Massive amounts of trade and commerce have been made possible by new entrants
into the Internet Communication Technologies field (Denardis, 2007). By allowing actors
to collect financial rewards for creating novel uses for the Internet, over the course of
the last two decades it has grown from a small network of academics and hobbyists to

232

one of the major driving forces of the global economy. It would be fair to say that the
institutions of the Internet have allowed for a great deal of success in adoption by
society.
Intersections
These two case studies have a surprising amount of intersection in relation to the
institutions that have been created for such vastly differing technologies during vastly
different eras of modern history with vastly different norms for creating institutions.
These intersections could lead to some interesting insights about the creation of
institutions for the governance of technology. Perhaps these similarities can lead to
some best practices for future institutional creation, or can illustrate some of pitfalls that
have been experienced in the creation of technology governance institutions thus far.
Taken together with the divergences and the convergences we can begin to draw some
interesting lessons learned from these cases about the institutional governance of
technology.
Auxiliary Institutions
While both technologies that served as case studies develop their own distinct
institutional and governance structures, these institutions do not exist on their own. Both
technologies have a group of auxiliary institutions that aid in the governance of the
technologies. Space exploration, with it reliance on treaties, requires several other
institutions to ensure the laws and treaties are appropriately enforced. The Internet
relies on the various auxiliary institutions to participate in the multistakeholder model of
governance. While in both cases these institutions vary widely, of particular interest is
the fact that both technologies rely heavily on the International Telecommunications
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Union for effective governance. Originally tasked with coordinating international
telegrams, the ITU has since grown to coordinate and govern a wide variety of
international telecommunication technologies. The ITU has an important role to play in
the governance of the Internet, assisting in the coordination of international Internet
standards. And in a strange series of events detailed in chapter 4, the ITU has grown to
be the largest and most important player in the practical governance of space
exploration, coordinating the allocation of orbits and communications frequencies for
manmade satellites. Aside from the role played by the ITU, intriguing as it may be, it is
important to realize that the primary governance institutions examined in these case
studies rely on other auxiliary institutions to effectively govern the technologies.
Institutional Norm Guidance (Contextuality)
As noted in previous sections, the context of history and international norms
heavily influences the types of institutions that are created. This influence, while
different for each technology examined, still greatly affects the resultant institutional
arrangement. Space exploration may rely heavily on the norms of modernity and the
context of the Cold War, and the Internet may rely heavily on the norms of neoliberalism
and the context of the “end of history,” but both are still products of their own context.
Without paying attention to the historical context of institutions and attempting to
understand the norms of institutional creation within the international system during the
era of creation, a more complete picture of institutional functions will remain out of
reach.
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Institutional Inertia
Both sets of technology governance institutions examined in the case studies
underwent or are currently undergoing attempts at institutional subversion. But both
institutions have maintained a large degree of their institutional autonomy. This
continuity is most likely the result of significant institutional inertia (Bentham, 1880).
Once institutions are created and are adopted by their communities, these institutions
will gain momentum and continue to function in their current configurations. This inertia
is the result of institutional norms of operation, with those who participate in the
institutions becoming accustomed and acculturated to behaving in certain prescribed
manners (Valderrama-Ferrando, 2006, Bentham, 1880, etc.). It becomes more difficult
to overcome the risks for change than simply to keep functioning within the system as it
exists. The institutions governing space exploration and the Internet at this point both
have a large degree of institutional inertia, allowing the institutions to overcome
attempts at subversion.
Possibilities for Change
On the other hand, the institutions governing space exploration and the Internet,
while experiencing a large degree of institutional inertia, also have potential to undergo
changes in the future. The institutions governing space exploration are based on the
treaty model, which while exerting a large degree of institutional inertia is also open to a
great deal of change and modification. More importantly, as space exploration is
becoming more democratized from a technical standpoint and states’ roles in space
exploration becomes less relevant, the possibility of exit from the space treaties
becomes viable in order to create a new institutional arrangement.
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The institutions governing the Internet are even more susceptible to the
possibility of change. The Internet is not currently beholden to treaties, or any truly
codified laws for that matter. The institutions have been organically derived from the
actual community of Internet users within the bonds of the multistakeholder model, as
noted in chapter 6, and due to this organic nature could be changed to fit the needs of
the community. There also exists the possibility of the creation of actual Internet treaties
to govern states and international organizations roles vis-a-vis the Internet, should a
consensus for state level behavior in relation to the Internet ever be solidified. Even
ultimate authority over the Internet is up for possible change that is already in the
exploratory stages.
Clearly, potential for institutional change exists for the cases that have been
studied in this work, and with institutional change comes a different set of outcomes for
the technologies. Shifts in the governance structure for space exploration could allow
greater rewards for activities in space, leading to increased levels of commercial activity
in space, possibly changing the relationship of humanity to outer space. Similar
potential for change and shifts in human society could result from changes in the
governance of the Internet, although potential for further growth in an already free and
open Internet is possibly limited, resulting in change leading to negative outcomes for
society’s relationship to the Internet.
Cultural Impact
One final intersection between the two cases studies is less an observation about
the institutions of governance and more an observation on the overall cultural impact
these two technologies have had in the last century. Of all the various achievements
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that mankind can hold up during this time period, these two technologies stand out as
two of the most impactful and greatest achievements. Tremendous amounts of
information about our universe have been gained from space exploration, as well as the
social impact of actual human activities in space over the last 60 years. And with recent
developments in the private space sector, it has become apparent that barring
catastrophe of a massive scale humanity will continue in the coming decades to reach
out towards.
The Internet has allowed for globalization to come to true fruition, permitting
peoples separated by continents to form new communities. Information has become
greatly democratized and new spaces for expression have been created due to the
expansion of the Internet. The role of a networked society has increased human
productivity, massive economic growth, and possibly assisted in the removal from
poverty of a billion people (Economist, 2013). The Internet has held a massive place in
human life for the last two decades, and this role appears to be increasing as attempts
by the Internet’s governing institutions to decrease the digital divide begin to mature.
Both of these technologies loom large in humanity’s collective consciousness and have
exerted a powerful influence on the shape society has take in the last 60 years, and
appear to have a major role to play in dealing with the challenges humanity will face in
the decades to come.
Lessons Learned
Examining the divergences, intersections, and convergences of these two case
studies some important lessons can be derived about technology, governance
institutions, and the potential future of institutions. This section will examine several of

237

these trends and lessons, with the ultimate goal of crafting some discrete policy
prescriptions for those who would create new institutions to govern the technologies that
will emerge as important to humanity in the coming years. Some observations for further
research will also be highlighted, as this work has uncovered some large holes in the
literature that need to be addressed, as well as avenues that have not be examined to
date.
Technology Does Not Exist In A Vacuum
While this lesson may seem obvious to anyone in the social sciences, those of a
more technical nature and background can become very enmeshed in capabilities to the
exclusion of a wider context. To quote Dr. Ian Malcolm, “You spent so much time
thinking about what you can do, that you forgot to think about if you should do it.” Taken
further, technology is embedded within society and culture. Institutional and social
structures will influence the impact of a technology, from development to adoption. The
rules and reward structures crafted around a technology have a large and discernable
impact on the course a technology takes within a society (Murmann, 2003). This is by
no means a new observation, especially among the business and economics
communities, but the two case studies examined in this work clearly bear out that
technologies exist within a contextual social and political economic environment, and
that political elements play an important role in influencing this environment.
Institutions Matter
Another lesson born out from these case studies is also no new observation in
the world of political science, and more specifically political economics. The role of
institutions in outcomes is highly important, as seen previously in various political
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economic works such as Mahoney (2010, and Chibber (2003) . Yet these previous
works have focused on political, economic and social outcomes. The two case studies
show that a similar process of institutional influence is born out for technologies.
Technology, typically viewed as a social or economic process, has yet to become fully
disembedded from the rest of human society, if it even may ever do so. The institutions
of politics exert influence on the path of technology, sometimes deciding winners and
losers from the beginning, other times allowing the market to play its role. We have
seen the institutions of space exploration limit rather successfully new entrants into that
realm of activity for fifty years due in part to limiting the rewards for attempting
commercial activity in outer space. On the other hand, the Internet has been fostered
and grown in an open and competitive fashion, with a much larger group of participants
capable of directing policy. Institutions are highly important for technologies because
they create the context in which technologies operate, essentially filling the vacuum
around technologies.
Subversions Occur
Institutional rules create winners and losers. Once institutions are established,
there will be beneficiaries from the system and those who are negatively impacted by
the institutional arrangement. This observation is not without previous exploration, and
is responsible for a Nobel Prize in economics (Stolper and Samuelson). Yet the primary
factors for this observation have traditionally been capital and labor. At a national and
international level, capital and labor have warred with each other over the types of
institutions that affect trade. But for the institutions that affect the use of technology,
which admittedly is a subset of economic and social activity itself, the primary factors
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appear to be the public sector and the private sector (states/international institutions
and corporations/individuals, respectively).
Once an institution governing a technology is created, dominant and nondominant factors will emerge. As in most areas of human activity, the factor that is nondominant will attempt to subvert the existing institutions hoping to create a more
beneficial distribution of outcomes and power. This situation remains the case for the
two case studies at hand, revealing a further lesson about institutional creation for
technological governance and institutional creation more broadly. It appears to be a part
of human nature that institutions will suffer subversion attempts, as any institutional
arrangement will benefit some actors, but not others. \
Institutions are Contextual
Much like technology, institutions themselves are not developed in a vacuum.
Institutional creation occurs within a social, political, and economic context. This context
could result in a series of global norms about institutional creation. The two case studies
have identified two particular sets of norms for institutional creation, identified as
modernity and neoliberalism. More work should be conducted in the future to both
further flesh out the norms of modernity and neoliberalism as well as attempting to
identify other sets of institutional creation norms. It is entirely possible that due to recent
levels of global interconnection that these two sets of norms might be the only sets of
norms in human history, but smaller international institutions throughout history should
reveal norms for institution creation.
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States are not the Only Game in Town Anymore
The final two lessons derived from the two case studies reveals a rather
frightening outcome for students of political science, but one that allows for a large
degree of future study. States are no longer the exclusive primary force in international
society. While liberal theories have allowed for individuals and organizations to play a
role in international society for many decades, there has always remained a rather
strong focus on the activities of states. Primarily as a result of the expansion of the
Internet, individuals and corporations have gained a massive amount of wealth,
enabling them to utilize this wealth in ways previously held in the exclusive hands of
state, (for example creating a private space program or funding massive research in
genetics or artificial intelligence). Alongside these economic changes that push in the
distribution of power downward, the Internet has also expanded the ability of individuals
to be heard by a larger part of the human diaspora. This expansion of the agency has
precipitated a need for further evaluation of the role of the individual in the international
political system. It is unclear what effects this shift in technology will continue to have on
the global political system, but the time has come for the academic community to
reevaluate the relationship of individual and states, as well as the prominence of states
in the international system.
The Multistakeholder Model is Interesting, but Needs Further Study
The final lesson taken from these two case studies involves the novel
governance structure observed for the Internet: the multistakeholder model. The
multistakeholder model of governance provides some interesting implications for the
future of governance and the structure of institutions. Emerging from the information
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technology field, the Internet and its multistakeholder model present a possibly viable
alternative for governance in the near future. While traditionally governance structures
have required individuals to participate through their state of citizenship, with the growth
of communication technology precipitated by the Internet individuals can now directly
participate in the decision-making processes as they so choose. The multistakeholder
model of governance may not be directly applicable in all spheres of human action, but
it does provide an interesting alternative to traditional state-centric treaty based
institutions. As such, further research on the multistakeholder model should be
conducted from a political science perspective. If this field is truly the study of
governance, then the multistakeholder model presents a new and interesting field for
future research and possibly policy making.
Policy Prescriptions
From these two cases studies and the lessons that have been extracted from
them, a series of discrete policy prescriptions can be derived. Some of these policy
prescriptions reflect wider knowledge that has been gathered from other sources and
cases, but most emerge strictly from the examples at hand. It is the hope of the author
that at least some of these policy prescriptions be investigated by a larger audience,
hopefully causing a shift in policy and leading to more effective governance of
technology and better outcomes for humanity.
1) Generally speaking, Institutions should be contextual, not one-size-fits-all
The most general and widely accepted of these policy prescriptions is very
simple and has been reflected by much of the work in political science and economics.
Institutions, as seen in the previous section about lessons learned, are contextual,
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relying on the social, economic, and historical circumstances of the day when they are
being created. This situation is admirable, but there is also a tendency in policymaking
to create universal solutions and institutions, as has been observed in much of the
literature about the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2002). Following the advice of
Johann Peter Murmann (2003), institutions should fit the situation observed on the
ground. As opposed to universalist policy, institutions governing technologies should be
contextual, relying on the actual needs of the community of technology users to dictate
the shape of the institutions. Space exploration provides a good example for this, as the
users (states) created an institution that fit their needs, as well as the overall context of
the time. The story remains true for the Internet as well, but with a focus on individual
users. This situation is, generally speaking, a good thing, and should continue in the
future. Policymakers should reject attempts to create a universal institutional type to
govern technology, focusing instead on the particular needs and demands of the
technology and its community of users.
2) The Multistakeholder Model has a future, deserves more examination
Building on the first policy prescription as well as some of the lessons learned
from these case studies, the mulitstakeholder model of governance appears to have an
important role to play in the future of institutional creation and governance. That is not to
say that the multistakeholder model is a panacea and universal model for governance in
direct contradiction of the previous policy prescription. But in allowing the community to
have a stake in policymaking, the multistakeholder model allows various levels of the
international system, from individuals to states and international organizations, to play
an important role in policymaking. The multistakeholder model can allow for a more
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organic institutional process to emerge, crafting the institutions as needed and allowing
for a much larger freedom of change if desired.
Policymakers should keep the multistakeholder model in mind as they continue
to craft institutions to govern technology, as generally speaking policymakers are not
experts on the particular needs of the technology. Academics and political scientists
more specifically should give further examination to the viability of the multistakeholder
model, both for the governance of technology and governance as a whole. The
multistakeholder model is a rather novel innovation in governance structures and
accordingly deserves further study and consideration for wider applications.
3) OST 1967 and the other Space Treaties need a revision
More specifically as a policy prescription, it should be clear given real world
changes that have occurred in relation to both space exploration technologies and the
potential commercial activities that could occur in outer space that the treaties
governing space exploration are fundamentally flawed. Several particular elements
need to be addressed with either a revised treaty or a new set of institutions altogether.
First, international norms have shifted, as states are no longer necessarily the primary
actor. The technology of spaceflight has proliferated, not only to new national actors but
also to private corporations. While ad hoc solutions to deal with this trend have been
developed, as discussed in chapters 3 through 5, more permanent solutions are
necessary to deal with the real world allocation of capabilities.
Secondly, the question of resource allocation and compensation in outer space
need to be addressed and clarified. The notion of mining and industry in outer space
was purely in the realm of fiction at the time of institutional creation, and even the most
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recent space treaty, the Moon Treaty, states that technical capabilities for the
exploitation of space are not present, so institutions are not required yet. However, the
Moon Treaty, a failed treaty itself, is over 30 years old. In the intervening decades the
capabilities for private actors to exploit outer space have begun to come online. With the
start of a new age of private spaceflight, it is now time to rethink how resources will be
allocated when extracted from outer space.
Third, it must be acknowledged that in relation to space exploration, the idea of a
scientific commons is still an important one. There is still much to be learned about the
universe and how to live in it that requires the freedom to conduct scientific activities.
Holding the precious resources of the universe in common for all mankind is still a noble
idea, but it is much easier to hold to those principles when there are no resources
present and accessible. Science has now shown that there is much to be gained by
exploiting outer space, and commercial activities will increasingly matter in decisions
about outer space. The institutions that currently exist do not adequately reflect this
reality, leaving the potential for massive disruption and unrest in the future. Now is the
time to address these concerns and rethink mankind’s approach to governing activities
in outer space.
Accordingly, the author suggests that the multistakeholder model of governance
be explored for governing space exploration and future exploitations. While states are
still and probably should remain primary actors in space policymaking, new participants
such as private space corporations should have a voice as well. Perhaps a model with
states protecting scientific matters and private corporations lobbying for and deciding
technical and commercial matters, with both sets of actors consulting on either set of
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issues would be beneficial. While it is clear that the current institutional structure is not
sustainable in the coming years, a better structure is not currently apparent. The
multistakeholder model could perhaps be a guide, but more study and careful
consideration is necessary.
Finally, it is the belief and suggestion of this author that the role of the UN Office
of Outer Space Affairs should be increased and the organization strengthened to
prepare it for a role as a global coordinator for diverse space activities. UNOOSA was
initially created to deal with international outer space issues, but has evolved into a role
of fostering space activities to aid developing nations in their growth. While this is a fine
role, with a potential boom in space activities, some institution is required to coordinate
and arbitrate these activities. The best-fit institution is UNOOSA, which represents not
only the states of the UN, but also non-state actors who have an interest in outer space
(UNOOSA, 2015). UNOOSA could serve as the coordinating body for a
multistakeholder model of governance for outer space activities in the future. But the
office would require a much-expanded capacity in order to fill this role. UNOOSA could
also serve as the coordinating body for any effort to revise the current institutions
governing outer space.
The institutions governing space exploration have served mankind well to this
point, but have severely limited outer space activities by limiting rewards attainable from
spaceflight. With the birth of a new space race driven by private actors, who while
desiring greater rewards from space activities, have neither the same oversight
structures as states and the ability to fund space activities on their own, a revision of the
current institutions governing space exploration is past due. The future of mankind lies
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at least in part in outer space, and as such new rules and institutions will be required to
make this future as smooth as possible.
4) ICANN Works, but needs Better Supervision
ICANN, the primary governing body for the Internet, has overseen in the last
several decades a massive transformation in the way the world communicates. For the
most part, ICANN and the other institutions governing the Internet, have been
successful in their roles, yet this has been predicated on the mostly reasonable actions
of participants in the multistakeholder model. Once the United States Department of
Commerce relinquishes its overall Root authority, the Internet and its governing
institutions will be essentially self-regulating. History has already borne out the notion
that self-regulation does not always result in beneficial outcomes. 59 The author
recommends that ultimate authority and the oversight that comes with that authority
should perhaps not be vested in ICANN, but in another organization.
To this point, the Internet has relied on its organically derived institutions to
successfully govern, leading to unwritten norms dictating how users and actors interact
with the technology. As the Internet and its communication technologies begin to
mature, it would be best to codify these norms into rules and perhaps create a treaty to
govern behavior patterns on the Internet. While this might have been seen as an assault
on freedom, free societies generally require the rule of law. This treaty could also dictate
the behaviors of states, limiting their invasions of privacy, an outcome desired by the
other participants in the multistakeholder model. A treaty emanating from the
multistakeholder model of governance would be novel in global society, perhaps putting
59

This has been the case particularly with the banking and automotive industry over the
last several decades.
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individuals and states in a directly accountable relationship in ways that have not been
previously seen.
Finally, as previously mentioned, Root DNS authority should not be given to
ICANN, even if split off into a separate, but wholly owned, entity. Instead, this author
recommends that Root DNS and IANA authority be given to an international
organization that has a strong track record of coordinating telecommunication issues.
The ITU would be a natural home for IANA and Root DNS authority, so long as the
actual administration remains with ICANN. A similar contract of service as the one with
the US Department of Commerce should serve as the basis of the relationship between
ICANN and a IANA holding ITU.
5) Better Attempts to Prevent Network Balkanization Are Necessary
The final policy prescription is that the global Internet community should take
better actions to prevent network balkanization. National intranets should be
discouraged. The balkanization that has been seen in recent years is bad for both the
network as a whole and society, reversing the gains in communication and expression
that have been made since the proliferation of the Internet in the 1990s. It must be
acknowledged that behaviors by the West, such as the UKUSA surveillance programs,
might have a role to play in the balkanization process. In order to achieve this goal, the
multistakeholder process must be strengthened, giving voice in policymaking to those
states and actors who have felt under-represented in Internet policy. This change could
perhaps discourage further network balkanization. While the author does not
recommend full Internet democracy, as its policy is still of a technical nature beyond the
understanding of the average user, a larger role for the Government Advisory
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Committee of ICANN would be a step in the proper direction, as long as it does not
come at the expense of the pluralistic nature of the multistakeholder model.
Avenues for Future Research
Several interesting questions have arisen that will deserve further exploration for
the future. The multistakeholder model deserves study from an institutional perspective.
While this work has gone down the road of examining the multistakeholder model in the
context of the Internet, further work should seek to look at the model in other contexts.
Perhaps a comparison of outcomes from the multistakeholder model could be
compared to more traditional governance models. This might require comparison
between governmental institutions and business institutions.
Further research should be continued on institutional creation and evolution. A
renewed focus on the study of international institutions as entities unto themselves
should be part of this continued study. A more empirical approach to the study of
international institutions should be conducted, especially focusing on how the
international system affects institutional types. More research into the context of the
international system, with a focus on how power and history interact to create
international norms of rulemaking (constitutional creation), is also called for.
On the side of the study of technology and governance, additional technology
governance scenarios should be searched for and case studies conducted. While past
technologies seem the obvious first step in this research area, more contemporary
cases could also be illuminating. Exploring national-level governance of technologies,
especially in the biological, nanotechnological, and robotics areas should bear fruit.
These national level regimes could be compared to each other, looking for both best
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practices and best outcomes. The future of the governance of technology will rely on the
study of institutions today, and more research into this question is required. Hopefully as
technology progresses, more attention will be paid both the benefits and drawbacks of
certain governance structures, and the impact on the technologies themselves can be
better understood.
Conclusions and Final Thoughts
The two case studies undertaken in this work provide interesting and diverse
examples of institutional creation. While most institutional approaches focus on the
governance of people, or in the most abstract cases, businesses, by focusing on the
governance of technology we have learned new things about how to govern. Reliance
on laws and structures is not the only focus of institutions as the dynamics of organically
developed institutions may now play a role. Also, barring a massive shift in the global
system or some catastrophe, technology appears on the verge of becoming a major
political issue for the next century. Technology presents at the same time a more
abstract and more concrete case for studying the governance of things60. With the
possibility that states are losing at least some of their importance in the world system, it
will be necessary to think of new ways of governing and creating order in the system.
And as technology continues to proliferate and become more advanced, creating new
and more powerful things that change society in unexpected ways, structures to
mitigate the possible negative outcomes of new technology will be necessary. By
looking at how two of the more disruptive and influential technologies of the last
hundred years have been governed, it is the hope of this author that we can learn the
Insofar as things can be governed. The main thing being governed is people’s
interactions with things.
60
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lessons necessary to adjust our governance structures and institutions as this century
progresses.
These different institutional structures for the governance of technology have
presented many important lessons that can be learned. From these lessons, the policy
prescriptions for technological governance generally, and the governance of space
exploration and the Internet specifically present some interesting directions for the
future. These lessons should be well learned by policymakers and academics, and that
the potential policy prescriptions be explored. Technology has played an important role
in the creation and development of civilization, and it appears that this role will only
increase in the future. It is the role of institutions to harness these changes and allow
society to continue to develop. To borrow from Elon Musk institutions “… could either
watch it happen or be a part of it” (Musk, 2010). Hopefully, we as a society will choose
to participate as a whole, rather than watching it happen for a select.
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